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Adult Mental Health Essay
Both behaviour therapists and cognitive therapists may use 
behavioural techniques in the treatment of anxiety disorders and 
depression. However, the underlying theoretical rationales of these 
techniques differs. Critically evaluate these different theoretical 
rationales by drawing on the literature from anxiety and depression.
Introduction
There are three key criteria for critically evaluating the theoretical rationales behind cognitive 
and behavioural therapy. The first is clinical effectiveness: is the treatment based on the 
rationales clinically effective? If it is not, then there is a strong case for arguing that the 
underlying rationale for treatment was either wrong or, at least, incomplete. Additionally, if 
one finds evidence of effectiveness, it is then necessary to show that the improvements can be 
traced back to the theories underlying treatment conceptualisations. Secondly, do the 
theoretical rationales have an evidence base in experimental psychology? Finally, the 
theories need to account for the clinical presentations of people with anxiety disorders and 
depression. In this essay I will describe common techniques and their differing rationales. 
Next, I will take a shared technique to illustrate how it is differentially used by therapists 
with different orientations. As there is an extensive literature on the anxiety disorders and 
depression, for the purposes of this essay I will concentrate on the literature relating to panic 
disorder and agoraphobia (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) among the anxiety disorders and Major 
Depressive Disorder (DSM-IV) for the depressive disorders. I will then critically evaluate the 
differing approaches against the key criteria. As Wells (1997) indicates there is more than 
one cognitive theory for the treatment of anxiety disorders and depression. Here, therefore, I 
shall largely look at the theories generated by Aaron Beck’s work on the emotional disorders 
because his writings have produced a generic model, which has been refined by others to 
develop models for specific disorders. For the behaviour therapies , I shall evaluate a number 
of models, which have their empirical roots in classical and operant conditioning.
Behavioural techniques and the rationales underlying them
In depression, behavioural techniques in common include activity monitoring and scheduling 
and graded task assignment. In anxiety disorders, shared techniques include graded 
exposure, relaxation, assertion training and social skills training. While it is difficult to 
generalise, broadly speaking the cognitive rationale for the use of behavioural techniques in
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treatment of the emotional disorders is this: the client is maintained in the disorder primarily 
by the way he thinks about himself and the environment (Beck, A. 1976). In therapy, the 
client becomes a scientist collaborating with the therapist to test the hypotheses of cause and 
effect reflected by his thinking. Behavioural techniques, then, are behavioural experiments, in 
which what the patient thinks, becomes the subject of an investigation. The results of these 
'experiments’ are then used to identify, reality-test and challenge the client’s existing 
thoughts and beliefs. Behaviourists, on the other hand, largely draw on the paradigms of 
classical and operant conditioning to justify the use of behavioural techniques. Put simply, in 
depression, for example, therapists use behavioural techniques to increase positive 
reinforcement and decrease negative reinforcing environmental events in the lives of their 
patients. In anxiety disorders, therapists are generally aiming for clients to unlearn 
maladaptive conditioned stimulus- conditioned response (CS-CR) events and habituate to 
aversive stimuli.
How the rationales are used in practice is best illustrated by examining their use in specific 
treatment regimes. In vivo and interoceptive exposure is used by both cognitive and 
behavioural therapists in the treatment of panic disorder. A widely used cognitive model of 
panic disorder was proposed by Clark (1986). He states that “individuals experience panic 
attacks because they have a relatively enduring tendency to interpret a range of bodily 
sensations in a catastrophic fashion.” Clark includes thoughts and images as internal stimuli 
that can trigger this catastrophic misinterpretation. The cognitive therapist, therefore invites 
his patient to expose himself to either interoceptive cues or real-world feared stimuli in an 
attempt to provide evidence to the client that his hypothesis -  that exposure will lead to 
personal catastrophe -  is not proven. The “experiment” is then used as one strand of evidence 
to challenge the patient’s “incorrect” catastrophic assumptions. Behaviourists also use 
exposure techniques to treat panic disorder. For example, Goldstein and Chambless (1978) 
put forward a learning theory model for interoceptive conditioning in panic disorder. They 
argued that in the first stage, through temporal contiguity a neutral stimulus -  a normal 
bodily sensation - is associated with an unconditioned stimulus that innately elicits fear in the 
patient. The neutral stimulus now acquires aversive properties and becomes a conditioned 
stimulus (CS), which elicits fear and anxiety. After a number of attacks, patients become 
hyperalert to bodily sensations and appraise them as signals of oncoming panic. As patients 
cany the CS with them, the fear becomes generalised so external situations also produce 
panic. Interoceptive and in vivo exposure is therefore used to extinguish the maladaptive
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learning through the process of habituation. The client’s interpretation of events is not 
important; new learning through the rearrangement of environment conditions is.
Critical evaluation — clinical effectiveness
One way to critically evaluate the theoretical rationales is to examine outcome studies. If the 
outcomes are poor, then it is difficult to have confidence that the rationales are correctly or 
completely premised (whilst acknowledging that success in treatment does not always signal 
an understanding of the cause of a disorder). As cognitive theories are premised on the basis 
that cognitive change is a necessary and sufficient condition for therapeutic change, then 
cognitive treatments which do not include behavioural elements should be sufficient to bring 
about change. As cognitive change is also necessary for relapse prevention, cognitive 
theorists predict that long-term recoveiy in the emotional disorders is more assured where 
there is specific cognitive change than through behavioural change alone. The client is 
equipped with new ways of thinking and problem-solving which act as a protection against 
future problems. Outcome studies which report follow-up measures must be considered, 
therefore, to test the hypothesis that cognitive therapy is superior to behaviour therapy in 
preventing relapse.
A number of outcome studies in panic disorder (Amtz and van de Hout, 1996) and 
agoraphobia (Williams & Falbo, 1996) indicate that cognitive therapy alone is effective. It is 
difficult to explain these results from a learning theory perspective. Marks, Basoglu and 
Noshirvani (1994) argue that treatment studies up to that time were not sufficiently robust to 
say whether cognitive therapy (and exposure techniques used by behaviourists) worked 
because clients changed their misinterpretations of bodily sensations. They argued that 
successful cognitive treatment could possibly be explained through patients learning general 
problem-solving techniques such as problem definition and goal-setting or by fostering a 
sense of control. But this argument is weak. Nearly all studies on treatment effectiveness 
contain a control group, which controls for therapist factors such as attention. Most studies, 
as cited in Clark (1999), find significant group differences between CT and exposure 
treatments and a range of control treatments. It is, therefore, difficult to explain symptom 
change without exposure to the feared situation or interoceptive cues -  except by accepting 
the central role of cognitive processes in panic disorder and agoraphobia. It can be seen, then, 
that cognitive therapy alone is sufficient for the treatment of panic and agoraphobia and that 
this finding cannot be explained either in behavioural terms or by generic therapeutic factors,
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such as therapist attention. The behavioural rationale is, then, weakened by the finding that 
CT alone is sufficient for improvements in these conditions.
However, treatment studies do indicate that CT is not a necessary condition for effective 
treatment in these particular anxiety disorders. A number of studies cited by Rachman
(1997) (e.g. Margraf and Schneider, 1991) have shown that exposure-only therapies are 
effective in the treatment of panic disorder. So, cognitive therapy alone is not necessary for 
clinical effectiveness. However, it has been argued that exposure therapies in panic work by 
producing change in key cognitions regarding threat appraisal and catastrophic interpretation 
of discriminative stimuli. A number of studies (e.g. Burke et al., 1997) have found cognitive 
change following exposure-only procedures. It could be, then, that cognitive therapy and 
exposure techniques work through a common mechanism -  cognitive change. This does 
throw into question the theoretical rationale of behavioural techniques with these disorders, 
which at its most fundamentalist has no place for the role of cognitive events.
But outcome studies do still leave questions marks over the cognitive, as well as the 
behavioural rationale. Some studies (e.g. Williams and Falbo, 1996) have found that 
exposure only therapy for agoraphobia and panic bring about significantly more cognitive- 
restructuring in key panic and phobia-related cognitions than a cognitive approach. This does 
not sit easily with a rigid cognitive rationale, which justifies the therapeutic task of 
challenging client beliefs on the grounds that without such challenge the necessary cognitive 
shift will not happen. Additionally, as argued above, CT by targeting key cognitions, should 
produce better long-term outcomes. There is mixed support for this prediction. Clark et al. 
(1994) found that patients who continued to misinterpret bodily sensations at the end of 
treatment did show worse outcome at follow-up than those that did not. However, some 
studies (Burke et al., 1997; Ost et al., 1995) do not support the prediction that cognitive- 
behavioural therapy (CBT) will be significantly superior to other treatment methods in 
reducing relapse rates.
Outcome studies for panic disorder and agoraphobia do, then, provide stronger evidence for 
the robustness of the cognitive rationale than the behavioural. At best, it appears both 
cognitive and behavioural approaches are sufficient to produce improvement in patients. 
However, there is evidence that the common mechanism of improvement is through cognitive 
change -  holding out the possibility that cognitive change alone is sufficient for therapeutic 
change. But proponents of CT lack strong evidence from long-term follow-up studies
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confirming the prediction that CT and CBT will have lower relapse rates than behavioural 
treatments.
Effectiveness -  clinical implications
The results of the outcome studies do have clinical implications for the management and 
rehabilitation of people with emotional disorders. Durham and Turvey (1987), in a study of 
generalised anxiety disorder, found that at six-month follow-up participants who received CT 
largely maintained improvements while behaviour therapy (BT) recipients deteriorated. But 
they also found that on follow-up, of those who received CT “virtually no patients were 
symptom-free” and that one third were not significantly improved from their pre-treatment 
levels. As the authors point out, the results indicate that clinicians need to consider 
appropriate forms of continuing “management and rehabilitation once the limitations of 
active treatment have become apparent.” Clinicians will also have to be careful not to apply 
portmanteau treatments for idiosyncratic presentations of apparently similar problems. For 
example, Williams and Falbo (1996) warned that their study revealed that agoraphobics were 
not a homogeneous group and both CT and BT were less effective at reducing panic attacks 
with subjects high in agoraphobia, than those low on agoraphobic measures. Roth (1997) 
makes the same call for psychological assessments tailored to the individual in treating 
depression, as studies indicate treatment approaches vary in effectiveness according to 
clinical presentation.
Critical evaluation -  the empirical status
The second critical criteria for the theories is their empirical base. The extent to which a 
theory both generates hypotheses and is supported by the experimental evidence is a critical 
measure of the robustness of therapies derived from the theory. For the purposes of this 
essay, Beck’s (1987) theory of depression (cited in Haaga et al. 1991) and Seligman’s (1975) 
original learned helplessness theory will be taken as an example of the cognitive and 
behavioural models respectively.
Beck’s model of depression places cognitive disturbance at its heart. Beck does not ascribe 
causal status to cognitive disturbance, but says that “deviant cognitive processes” are 
“intrinsic” to the depressive disorder. Beck speculated that the early experience of a person 
who develops depression is characterised by loss, which leads to the formation of 
dysfunctional schemas. These schema -  relatively stable cognitive structures which guide the 
appraisal and interpretation of events -  lie dormant until activated by another loss event.
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Beck introduced personality modes of sociotropy and autonomy as an additional vulnerability 
factor for depression. Loss events will only trigger depression if they are congruent with the 
personality mode. Once reactivated the dysfunctional schemas -  containing unconditional 
negative beliefs about the self (e.g. “ I am worthless”) and maladaptive rules (e.g. “ I must be 
perfect, or I will be rejected”) -  are the cognitive set by which all situations are appraised and 
interpreted. Beck postulates that the thoughts of depressed people are characterised by a 
negative triad about the self, current events and the future and by cognitive biases -  such as 
attending only to negative aspects of a situation -  which maintain the depressive disorder.
One other feature of the disorder is that these depressed cognitions are automatic; that is 
repetitive and not readily controllable.
A number of testable hypotheses have been derived from this theory. The model predicts that 
dysfunctional beliefs will be stable before, during and after a depressive episode. It is also 
hypothesised that the personality modes of patients will need to be congruent with loss events 
, for the latter to act as a trigger to depression. It is predicted there will be information- 
processing biases, that depressed people will display the cognitive triad and that people with 
depression will display thinking that is more loss-oriented than people with anxiety. In an 
extensive review, Haaga and his colleagues (1991) analyse a number of studies supporting 
the predictions. Depressed patients do have more negative attitudes than non-depressives or 
themselves in remission (Eaves and Rush, 1984, cited in Haaga et al. 1991). There is also 
evidence that the negative cognitive triad of thinking is present in, and specific to depression. 
Relative to non-depressed controls, depressed patients are more self-critical (Blatt et al.,
1982, cited in Haaga et al., 1991) and are more hopeless about the future (Abramson et al., 
1978, cited in Haaga et al., 1991). Overall, Haaga and his colleagues (1991) found support 
for cognitions of increased negativity, increased hopelessness, specificity of themes of loss 
and mood-congruent encoding of memories. They also found weak evidence for the 
prediction that depressed subjects had exclusively negative cognitions compared with 
patients with other psychological disorders. The hypothesised cognitive distortion in 
appraising situations, seems rather to reflect a bias; Krantz and Gallagher-Thompson (1990), 
found that in hypothetical scenarios, depressed patients do tend to draw more negative 
conclusions than controls about negative scenes, but not with neutral or positive scenarios 
(cited in Haaga et al., 1991).
There are also a number of weaknesses with Beck’s theory as a diathesis-stress model of 
depression. For example, there is little evidence to suggest that dysfunctional core beliefs are
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stable aspects of personality. In a study of depressed subjects in remission from their 
symptoms, Blackburn et al. (1990) found that dysfunctional beliefs were at a normal level. 
Additionally, in a prospective study of students, Lewinsohn and his colleagues (1981) found 
that dysfunctional beliefs about the self, reduced expectation of future positive outcomes, 
higher expectations of negative events, and measures of helplessness, did not predict which 
students went on to develop depression.
It can be seen, then, that a major cognitive model for depression is not fully supported by 
experimental evidence. The descriptive aspect of Beck’s theory of depression is largely, but 
not completely supported. As a diathesis-stress model, there are significant weaknesses. 
What, then, of a behavioural model of depression.
Seligman (1974) (cited in Davison and Neale, 1994) drew on experimental studies in animal 
learning to propose the “learned helplessness” theory of depression. With its empirical base 
in learning theory, in its original form it is one of the behavioural theories of depression. 
Seligman found that dogs in a Skinner box who received inescapable shocks, at first 
attempted to avoid the shocks but then became passive. When the same dogs were exposed to 
shock they could escape, it was found that they did not acquire the avoidance response as 
efficiently as control dogs. In other words, the animals showed helplessness in the face of 
aversive stimuli they were unable to control and an inability to learn new behaviours when 
the contingency conditions changed. Experiments with humans have yielded supporting 
evidence (e.g. Klein and Seligman, 1975; cited in Davison and Neale, 1994). Seligman 
proposed that depressed people displayed this characteristic passivity and lack of problem­
solving in the face of environmental events.
A number of studies have failed to confirm the hypothesis that people who feel helpless do 
not engage in problem-solving behaviour. Davison and Neale (1994) cite a study by 
Wortman and Brehm (1975) which indicates that subjects induced to feel helplessness 
become more skilled at certain performance tasks. Another key anomaly came from the 
clinical observation of depressed subjects. In particular, clinicians noted themes of 
responsibility and guilt for their actions. These feelings indicate that the client could have 
avoided a negative event, which, in turn implies controllability. The model predicts people 
will report a lack of control. Significantly, Seligman himself had to turn to attribution theory 
to explain what was actually seen in depression -  in other words, he had to add the crucial 
element of how subjects interpreted the meaning to themselves of aversive events. In short,
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he added cognitive elements to the learning elements, exposing a significant weakness in 
behavioural theories.
Rachman (1997) makes a cogent argument for saying that one of the weaknesses of cognitive 
therapy, compared with behaviour therapy, is that the former is not grounded in cognitive 
science but is developed entirely from clinical observation. Behaviourism, on the other hand, 
was about lawfulness in behaviour - built on the laws of learning derived from empirical 
studies. Rachman cites Teasdale’s criticism that, for example, for cognitive therapists even 
key terminology such as “cognitive processing” diverged from the understanding of the term 
in cognitive psychology. In particular, until recently there had been little attempt to link 
cognitive therapy with the underlying neuroscience. Brewin (1989) has usefully tried to link 
the two and answer a critical question for both cognitive and behavioural approaches: how is 
therapeutic change mapped on the brain? Neither tradition has tried to answer what 
neurology underlies an S-R connection or a dysfunctional schema. Brewin (1989) suggests 
that behavioural techniques such as in vivo exposure create new situationally available 
knowledge, in the form of new memories which share enough of the contextual features of 
the old maladaptive memory to be preferentially accessed in future. Such work has 
strengthened links between cognitive therapy and cognitive science. Eysenck, M. (1997) 
cites studies by Williams et al. (1988) and Eysenck, M. (1982) which have established that 
attentional biases do occur during emotional experience and that memories, involving recall, 
often are mood-related. Wells (1997) draws on information-processing tasks for evidence of 
the robustness of Clark’s model of panic disorder. Rachman predicts that attempts to link 
cognitive therapy with neuroscience and cognitive science will continue.
The integrity of cognitive and behavioural theories for depression, then, are undermined by 
the evidence from laboratory studies and clinical observation. Judged on this criteria, both 
theories are incomplete, although there is stronger empirical support for Beck’s cognitive 
theory of depression than Seligman’s behavioural theory. It was just such evidence that 
prompted behaviourists, such as Seligman, to include a client’s meaning of an event in their 
models of psychopathology, thus weakening the behavioural rationale underlying the use of 
behavioural treatment techniques.
The centrality of the meanings subjects ascribe to situations has been demonstrated in a 
number of areas of psychopathology. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) provides a good 
example of where learning theories cannot adequately account for the empirical data. Foa,
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Sketkee and Rothbaum (1989) cite a number of studies (e.g. Sales, Baum & Shore, 1984), 
which found that perceived threat was a better predictor of the onset and maintenance of the 
disorder than actual threat.
Such studies severely weaken the behavioural paradigm and provide support for the theories 
underlying the cognitive rationale for anxiety disorders and depression. For the clinical 
psychologist this finding has significant implications for practice. It suggests that some 
behavioural techniques may inadvertantly become a factor in maintaining a condition, if the 
behavioural procedures reinforce the “meanings” which are preventing the client from 
recovering.
Empirical status — clinical implications
Safety behaviours are behaviours patients engage in to prevent a feared event from 
happening. From the cognitive perspective, they prevent the patient coming into contact with 
information and experiences which are incongruent with their negative beliefs. Safety 
behaviours thus prevent disconfirmatory evidence of threat and loss appraisals from being 
processed by the client. A behavioural explanation proposes that safety behaviours such as 
escape and avoidance prevents full or incomplete exposure to the feared stimulus thus 
preventing extinction of the conditioned response. Wolpe (1958) (cited in Davison and 
Neale, 1994) drew on learning paradigms to develop systematic desensatization for the 
treatment of phobias in humans. It had been shown that emotional states such as anxiety 
could be inhibited if a person were in a state of relaxation (reciprocal inhibition). This has 
lead to the widespread use of the behavioural technique of teaching relaxation to clients with 
anxiety disorders, including panic disorder. However, cognitive therapists have argued that 
without cognitive change, the teaching of relaxation in feared situations could be construed 
as teaching a new safety behaviour, which does not eliminate the central maintaining factor; 
namely, that the client believes certain bodily sensations or mental events signal imminent 
personal catastrophe. Patients will continue to hold such beliefs -  and the belief that it is 
only the use of relaxation techniques that prevent the feared catastrophe occurring — if 
negative cognitions are not challenged. Clark (1999) cites a study by Salkovskis, Clark, 
Hackman, Wells and Gelder (in press) to determine whether safety behaviours actually 
prevent disconfirmation of panic patients’ negative beliefs about bodily sensations: “As 
predicted, the dropping of safety behaviours condition led to a significantly larger decrease in 
negative beliefs and produced a significantly greater improvement in anxiety in a subsequent 
behaviour test.” Effective practice is both an ethical and organisational imperative for
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clinical psychologists. If techniques such as applied relaxation undermine effectiveness by 
leaving clients vulnerable to relapse through continued incomplete exposure to the feared 
stimuli, then therapists must take note of the importance of considering the theoretical 
rationales by which they practice.
Critical evaluation -  the match between models and clinical presentations
There are also problems for both theories on the third criteria -  their ability to account for the 
clinical presentation of anxiety disorders and depression. Both behavioural and cognitive 
theories underlying the use of behavioural techniques are open to the criticism that they are 
unitary theories. Biological and social factors in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders and depression are marginalised. According to the behavioural paradigm, patients 
are passive recipients of environmental events and histories of learning. Elaborate attempts 
are made to eliminate intrapsychic factors from the explanation of abnormal behaviour, but 
the examples given above (e.g. around “meanings”) indicate the weakness of this approach. 
On the other hand, the cognitive paradigm appears to place too great an emphasis on 
intrapsychic factors. Yet, the observed course of, say, depression would appear to contradict 
a purely intrapsychic approach. Major depressive disorder is time-limited and spontaneously 
remits in six months (Keller and Shapiro, 1992; cited in Roth and Fonagy, 1997). It is 
difficult to explain spontaneous remission using Beck’s model. The model states that a 
vicious circle is established which is driven by dysfunctional negative schema about the self, 
the world and the future. Any new information about the self, world or future is organised 
within this negative cognitive framework. The theory predicts that without cognitive 
restructuring recovery will not take place. The theory also limits the possibility of 
spontaneous cognitive restructuring: “positive” information, incongruent with negative 
beliefs, will be ignored or negatively reframed. Spontaneous remission in depression, 
therefore, cannot be easily explained by cognitive theory. It can be seen from this example, 
then, that cognitive theory is inadequate to explain the complexity of the clinical presentation 
of depression.
Unitary models also have difficulty accounting for comorbidity. Thirty-nine percent of 
agoraphobics, 35 per cent of people with panic disorder and 17 percent of people with 
generalised anxiety disorder also have depression (Davison and Neale, 1994). Wells (1997) 
has argued that the strength of cognitive theories is their specificity. Specific cognitive 
models for the anxiety disorders have emerged from generic models (such as Beck’s), which 
have proved invaluable to clinicians. But Clark’s model of panic (1986), which can underpin
12
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treatment for panic disorder, provides little guidance for clinicians’ faced with a client with 
both panic and depression. Does the client hold a separate cognitive set for the depressive 
features -  as outlined by Beck -  and thus holds two discrete cognitive sets? If so, do they 
interact in some way? If not, does the client presenting with comorbidity hold a specific 
cognitive set integrating threat and loss appraisals? If so, what does this look like? Alloy and 
colleagues (1990) (cited in Davison and Neale, 1994) proposed that the learned helplessness 
model of depression explained the comorbidity of anxiety with depression. They suggest that 
when a client expects he will be unable to influence the environmental contingencies of a 
situation, he will appraise the situation as dangerous and therefore be anxious. When the 
prediction of helplessness is fulfilled, negative views of the self and the future develop and 
depression sets in. Such models are rare in the field. Integrative models drawing on the 
strength of the specificity of cognitive models need to be developed.
Integrative models
A wider picture of the emotional disorders would be helpful. As indicated above, both 
cognitive and behavioural techniques are effective in panic disorder without agoraphobia. 
Other studies indicate the same pattern of effectiveness in other anxiety disorders. For 
example, in a randomised control trial, Marks, Lovell, Noshirvani, Livanou and Thrasher
(1998) found that both prolonged exposure and cognitive restructuring were therapeutic alone 
and were each superior to relaxation in the treatment of PTSD. Medication has also been 
shown to be effective in a range of anxiety disorders and depression. Such diversity of 
findings confound the main-effects model, upon which both cognitive and behavioural 
therapy rest. Marks and his colleagues (1998) suggest that diverse findings on effectiveness 
can be integrated by viewing emotions “as response syndromes, loosely linked reactions of 
many physiological, behavioural and cognitive kinds.” Different therapeutic approaches may 
act on one strand or factor of the syndrome more than another. Some treatments may act on 
several strands simultaneously. Marks and his colleagues, referring to the effectiveness of 
both CT and behavioural approaches in PTSD, argue: “Exposure gradually alters behaviour, 
physiology and cognitions by habituation...Cognitive restructuring might distance sufferers 
from strident feelings and facilitate dealing with them by changing perspectives; it may 
include habituation via behavioural experiments including exposure, but this is not essential. 
Relaxation might be a way to reduce arousal and then other problems.. .Each treatment might 
act on particular emotional strands, which in turn help unravel other aspects of the disease.” 
A dose-responsiveness approach is required.
13
Adult Mental Health Essay
Such an approach implies that unitary models will be most useful when they map the 
symptom presentations of the disorders precisely and comprehensively. Brewin (1989) 
argues that panic disorder, for example, is a circumscribed disorder, which can be traced to a 
specific faulty belief and cognitive process; in this case, interpretative bias. Phobic disorders, 
for example, can be conceptualised as a faulty behavioural response; making it amenable to 
behavioural techniques. The cognitive and behavioural strands of the skein are painted in 
bright colours and can be easily and usefully unravelled. But depression and generalised 
anxiety disorders (as Brewin, 1989 suggests) are not circumscribed. The strands are 
complexly interwoven. In therapy, depressed clients report emotions or physiological arousal 
or actions as triggers of negative thoughts that, in turn, maintain the other three strands. As 
Williams (1997)suggests, access to autobiographical memory is also distinctive in 
depressives. Depression is more complex than just expressing interpretative bias to specific 
stimuli and requires more complex modeling.
Brewin (1989) has examined some of the commonalities behind the actual clinical practice, 
to try to develop a model that integrates behavioural and cognitive models with cognitive 
science. He argues that cognitive therapists use behavioural methods because they “create 
new situationally accessible memories that will be preferentially accessed in the future.” In 
addition, he argues that, in depression, for example, by verbally isolating, identifying and 
challenging negative automatic thoughts, the therapist seeks to alter verbally accessible 
knowledge to counter inappropriate stimulus classification and to avoid the accessing of 
nonconscious situational memories. New semantic categories and classification rules are 
generated. It would appear that because clients, in being taught to act differently in phobic or 
distressing situations, will always think about the situation -  that is produce new categories 
of threat or loss appraisal or self-efficacy and control -  cognitive change will go hand-in- 
hand with behavioural change. Brewin (1989) usefully suggests a conceptual framework 
based on cognitive science which seeks to explain how cognitive and behavioural 
approaches, in most cases, complement each other.
Conclusion
It has been shown, then, that cognitive and behavioural therapies do have different rationales 
for shared techniques. Judged against three critical criteria -  effectiveness, empirical basis 
and as explanations for actual clinical presentations -  the theories underlying the rationales
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have been shown to be incomplete. The evidence indicates that in panic disorder, there is 
great cohesiveness between theory and practice in cognitive therapy. With depression, 
cognitive theory and therapy has less cohesiveness. Learning theory is particularly weak at 
explaining much of the empirical evidence. This can have serious clinical implications, as 
shown with safety behaviours. It has been suggested that the common weakness of both 
approaches is that they are unitary models of disorder. Outcome studies showing significant 
cognitions shifting together with behavioural and physiological changes indicate the need for 
a multi-factor or syndrome model of anxiety disorders and depression. Wells (1997) suggests 
that cognitive models will become more closely wedded to information-processing paradigms 
in psychology, rooting cognitive approaches more firmly in a research base. Brewin’s (1989) 
conceptualisation that cognitive approaches seek to enrich verbally accessible knowledge, 
while behavioural approaches elaborate situationally accessible knowledge provides a 
conceptual framework for thinking how therapeutic change can be linked to cognitive science 
and information-processing models. Such moves will bring more sophisticated models of the 
emotional disorders.
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Introduction
Some kind of deficit in communicative ability is implicit in the label “learning disabled”. 
As Leuder (1989) suggests, any difficulty in articulation results in an increased, 
frequency of the “normal” communicative partner clarifying or rephrasing unprompted 
what the other person has said (Sabsay and Keman, 1983). The result of such 
conversational “repairs” are paradoxical; instead of being cooperative as intended, they 
'reproduce the existence of mental handicap by displaying the participating individuals’ 
different levels of competence and consequently the incompetence of the handicapped 
person.’ (Leudar, 1989). What is also implicit in the label “learning disabled” is that the 
labelled person has both a need and a potential to communicate, whether fulfilled or not. 
It is the contention here that the communicative potential of people with learning 
disabilities (PLD) is often unfulfilled. Historically, researchers have concentrated on the 
communication skills deficits of PLD (e.g. Rondal, & Edwards, 1997) as an explanation 
of the communication problems they face. By drawing on literature which indicates that 
communication is a transactional social process, it will be suggested that it is the 
unrealistic expectations that others hold of their communicative abilities, which stifle 
PLD’s communicative potential. At its extreme, it will be argued, the impact is immense: 
it can increase the likelihood of challenging behaviour. Theory needs to be presented that 
explains why others might have inaccurate expectations of the communicative abilities of 
PLD, with empirical evidence to support the observation. It will, then, be necessary to 
show that it is the expectations of others, as well as real 'deficits’ in communication 
abilities in some PLD, that have both an immediate and a long-term impact on the daily 
lives o f PLD. It will be assumed for the purposes of drawing general conclusions from 
this essay that PLD are a homogeneous group with a homogeneous range of 
communicative abilities. Their communication partners and the quality of those 
exchanges will also be assumed to be uniform. These assumptions are clearly unfounded,
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however. The implications o f such assumptions, which underlie many of the theories 
behind the research, will be examined and challenged when considering what a 
psychologist can do when working clinically with these issues.
Communication as a social, transactional process
Van der Gaag and Dormandy (1993) define communication as follows: 'communication 
is conveying some message a communicator has in mind and its interpretation by an 
addressee.’ Thus communication may take the form o f a behaviour as well as a language 
or a sign. A raised eyebrow can be a greeting, a warning, surprise. It might, however, not 
be a communication because it either lacks intent on the part of the communicator to 
convey a meaning or because an addressee is unable to interpret the intent. For a speaker 
to be successful in communicating, that is convey to another person (a listener) what he 
has in mind, two factors are involved. As Van der Gaag and Dormandy point out, the 
speaker needs to know enough about the listener in order to choose the right topic and 
speech style. Second, the listener needs to know enough about the speaker 'in  order to 
make inferences as to the purpose of the communication and to interpret the message that 
was meant to be conveyed.’ Perkins (1995), cited in Bartlett and Bunning (1997), 
stresses that successful communicative interaction is not just the sum of two halves, i.e. 
the communication partners, but rather the co-construction o f discourse to which both 
people contribute. Studies of language development in children (e.g. Dunham &
Dunham, 1992) also indicate communicative exchanges are transactional. Carers respond 
to infants early vocalisations as if they had communicative significance and in return 
infants have been shown to be equal and influential partners in carer-infant exchanges. 
From a radical behavioural perspective, language development and communication in 
adulthood requires responses to be contingent on both sides. Where there are difficulties 
in this contingency schedule, communication breakdowns on both sides can emerge. 
Communication, then, is a transactional and social process. The implications for a person 
with LD (learning disabilities) with any physiological, cognitive or psychological 
constraints on communicative ability are likely to be profound, affecting the quantity and
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possibly the quality o f his/her transactions.. If one communicates in an exceptional 
manner one 'establishes and indeed reproduces a non-standard communicative world.’ 
(Leudar,1989). Prevalence rates of communication problems in the learning disability 
population indicate that a considerable number are at risk of establishing this non­
standard world.
Prevalence rates of communication problems in PLD and their environments
Remington (1998) cites a study by Garcia and Dehaven (1974) indicating that 80 per cent 
of people with severe/profound learning disabilities had communication problems, while 
McLean, Brady and McLean (1996) found that caregivers reported that 59 per cent of 
PLD showed limited symbolic communication, 19 per cent showed limited non-symbolic 
communicative intent and 21 per cent showed no evidence of any intentional 
communication. A survey o f clients in day centres and longstay hospitals completed by 
Blackwell, Hulbert, Bell, Elston, Morgan, Robertshaw and Thomas (1989) and cited by 
Bartlett and Bunning (1997) concluded a total of 62 per cent of the population had 
identifiable communication problems.
The nature of the communication problems
A participant observation study (Kernan & Sabsay, 1989) of a mixed gender group of 
people with a mild learning disability living in the community in the US indicated the 
kinds of communication problems faced by this population. Within a heterogeneous 
range of communicative styles, the authors found consistent 'deficits’ in the person with 
LD. PLD in social exchanges variously provided piecemeal information, omitted 
necessary and included unnecessary information, perseverated and ran unconnected 
thoughts together in the same sentence. The consequence was that a listener had to attend 
more carefully and be more patient. Often the result was an end to the transactional 
process and a disregarding of the wishes of the person with PLD. Referring to the 
“deficient” communicative style of PLD in the study, the authors said: 'Parents impatient 
with their rambling, confusing or incomplete explanations or stories often step in and 
speak for them. Doctors and social workers frequently turn to whatever non-retarded
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persons has accompanied their clients for explanations of the purpose of a visit or the 
presenting problem and sometimes treat their clients as non-persons altogether...’ The 
study found problems not only in how some of the subjects spoke but also in what they 
spoke about even when they spoke coherently. The authors ascribe this to subjects having 
a history o f institutionalisation, and limited educational and employment opportunities as 
well as cognitive and, sometimes, sensory impairments. Kernan and Sabsay found a third 
communicative problem located in their subjects. They found evidence that their subjects, 
made aware of their difficulties in communication, often wove a “cloak o f competence” 
(Edgerton, 1993) in which they tried to display greater skills than they possessed. The 
authors concluded that listeners’ reactions varied but often they were drawn into a 
'benign conspiracy’ in which 'they attempt to protect such individuals’ fragile self­
esteem, either by not revealing they are aware of their incompetence or by helping to 
cover up failings.’ In other words, there is no attempt to clarify the subjects intended 
meaning or to explore ways to enhance the client’s communicative abilities.
Kernan and Sab say’s study showed how communicative deficits located in PLD 
generated impoverished communicative interchanges which became established as 
chronically impoverished communicative environments, with PLD not expected to 
contribute to exchanges in a valued or respected way -  they became “non-persons”. 
Beveridge and Hurell (1980) found that more than 50 per cent of communicative 
initiations by PLD were ignored by staff in residential units. Coupled with the finding 
that PLD are less likely to ask for help to solve a problem than a non-disabled population 
(Beveridge, 1989), and it is clear to see that communicative environments are 
impoverished and are likely to become increasingly so in a spiral o f decreasing initiations 
and responses. Learning theory indicates that communication might extinguish in such a 
non-contingent communicative environment.
There is evidence, then of communication 'deficits’ in PLD and contingent impoverished 
communicative environments, which in a transactional model (Sameroff & Chandler, 
1970) impact on each other. But is there evidence to suggest that non-disabled partners
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have expectations o f the communicative process that has an impact on the person with 
LD?
Evidence for under-estimations
Leudar (1989) investigated whether the communications of PLD and “average” - 
populations were judged against the same conversational conventions. In other words, 
he used linguistic pragmatics to investigate whether carers had differing expectations of 
PLD than “average” people. Leudar drew on the work of Grice (1975) and others, who 
have identified a number of maxims which partners expect to operate in conversation. 
Carers, who had known a person with a learning disability for at least three months, were 
asked to rate whether their client affirmed or violated the maxims. Questionnaires were 
completed on 157 PLD with an average age of 29 (range 16-45) and an estimated IQ 
range o f25-70. The PLD lived in a variety of hospital and community settings. They 
were compared with ratings by non-carers of their friends’ conversational 
conventionality.
Using factor analysis, Leudar found that the same conversational maxims appeared to 
apply to a person with LD as to the average person, as predicted, with one significant 
exception. Carers did not assume that PLD were a competent source of evidence for the 
truth of what they said. Carers also perceived them to be less sincere about what they 
communicated. Leudar also found that carers perceived that PLD produced significantly 
more communications which violated the maxims. Leudar was able to illustrate how 
people questioned the validity of the communications of PLD with some qualitative 
examples (Instructors are non-learning disabled; trainee is learning disabled):
Instructor 1: (to another instructor) Where is John?
Trainee: Gone shopping
Instructor 1: (addressing the other instructor) Is John gone shopping with P.?
Instructor 2: Yeah
24
People with Learning Disabilities Essay
Studies cited by Leudar (e.g. Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975) have shown that this type of 
dialogue - where the evidence presented by one party is called into question - is typical of 
teacher-child interactions. ‘Such [pragmatic] structures are typical when participants in 
dialogues are asymmetrically empowered,’ concluded Leudar.
Evidence for over-estimations
By contrast, there are indications that significant others sometimes have unrealistically 
high expectations of the communicative ability o f PLD. It is unclear why this happens 
but two factors are likely to contribute. Carers are unlikely to be trained in language 
development and processes (see the UK Social Services Inspectorate Report (1989), cited 
by Bartlett and Bunning (1997). However, this is only likely to result in overestimations 
if PLD themselves appear to show expressive or receptive language skills beyond then- 
actual abilities. Kernan and Sabsay’s participant observation study (1989) cited above 
appears to confirm the existence of such a “cloak of competence”. Whatever the full 
reason for over-estimation, there is evidence o f its existence.
Purcell, Morris and McConkey (1999) studied the staff perceptions of the communicative 
competence of PLD. Twenty-four staff working in residential services and day services 
reported on the communicative ability of 28 clients who were described as being ‘a 
representative sample of adults in one (NHS) administrative area.’ Staff rated clients for 
hearing, receptive and expressive language and general use of communication. Staff also 
rated non-verbal signs and communication functions before and after interacting with 
clients in a 15-minute session. Clients were also assessed by speech and language 
therapists (S&LTs) both directly and in videotaped interactions with staff. Staff rated 
clients’ verbal comprehension very highly; 37 per cent were judged to understand 
language some o f the time; 59 per cent most of the time and four per cent all the time. 
S&LTs gave clients significantly lower ratings for verbal comprehension. Staff had 
difficulty in identifying clients’ non-verbal signals. Overestimation was also found by 
Bartlett and Bunning (1997) in a study of six people (age range 26-48) with a learning 
disability who had some verbal means of communicating from single words to simple
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phrases. Their keyworkers were recorded interacting with the clients in a free 
conversation condition and while looking together at selected pictures. Staff consistently 
over-estimated the comprehension level of clients. Significantly, the greater 
overestimations were evident in the “free conversation” condition. The small sample size, 
and the study’s concentration on purely verbal measures, limits its conclusions. However, 
it does indicate over-estimation might occur and that it is more pronounced in non-task 
oriented settings.
A model for over-estimations
Bartlett and Bunning (1997) propose a model for the vicious circle of overestimation. 
They argue that staff, imbued with the philosophy of'normalisation’ (Wolfensberger, 
1983), encounter PLD with real communicative limitations but hold high expectations 
because of the philosophy of an 'ordinary life’. Unrealistic opportunities are presented to 
use the communicative skills which the client fails, thus establishing negative or 
diminished experiences which, in turn, will lead to more restricted communication skills 
use. They continue: ‘The overall effect of this pattern of devaluation is likely to be poor 
self-esteem and isolation of adults with learning disabilities and their exclusion from 
communicative partnerships.’ The fault in this model is that it posits circularity of effect 
but the circular logic leads one back to the premise that staff maintain high expectations 
of clients. Yet the authors themselves describe how breakdowns in communications 
would lead staff to lower their expectations of individual clients.
The impact
It has been shown, then, that other people do overestimate or underestimate their 
partner’s communicative ability. But what exactly is the impact? Taking O’Brien’s 
1981 model (cited in Bartlett & Bunning, 1997) of the 'deviancy career’ of a person with 
a learning disability, one would expect that on an individual level it would lead to a lack 
of opportunities to communicate and a deterioration in communicative performance. 
Additionally, based on the principles of operant conditioning, one would expect to find 
that where the client’s communications were not contingently reinforced, they would
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extinguish. As biological survival dictates that a person -  especially one with a disability 
who might rely on others -  cannot stop expressing needs, it seems extinction of 
communicative intent is impossible. Learning theory would indicate that other behaviours 
which are contingently rewarded by the meeting of a person’s needs would be reinforced. 
In other words, where there is a historic and continued breakdown in communication 
problems, that, at the extreme, challenging behaviours might emerge.
Challenging behaviours
Emerson (1995) defines challenging behaviour as 'culturally abnormal behaviour of such 
intensity, frequency or duration that the physical safety of the person or others is likely to 
be placed in serious jeopardy, or behaviour which is likely to seriously limit use of, or 
result in the person being denied access to ordinary community facilities.” It would be 
wrong to suggest that challenging behaviour is caused by a chronic and complete 
breakdown in communication between PLD and their communicative partners. For 
example there is evidence that neurobiological processes may be involved in the 
maintenance (and possibly the aetiology) of the challenging behaviours of at least some 
people (Carr & Smith, 1995). However, two
strands of evidence indicate that challenging behaviour sometimes serves a 
communicative function. First, prevalence rates of challenging behaviours (Emerson, 
Alborz, Reeves, Mason, Swarbrick, Kiernan and Mason, 1997, cited in Emerson, 
1998)amongst a cohort of 393 people varied according to a number o f'risk ’ factors. One 
of these was that challenging behaviour was correlated with people with additional 
sensory impairments, reduced mobility or specific impairment of communication. (The 
fact that other risk factors included gender and age warns us to exercise caution about a 
one-factor explanation for the complexity of challenging behaviours). People with 
specific syndromes, including autism, are also more 'at risk’. Studies of autism indicate 
that there is an interaction between communication difficulties and specific syndromes. 
There is evidence that early communicative functioning in autism correlates with later 
social development (Bailey, Philips and Rutter, 1996). There are specific language 
problems associated with autism. There is general language delay. There are pragmatic
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deficits, pronominal reversal, delayed echolalia, neologisms and idiosyncratic usage of 
language. There are difficulties in building conversational interchanges and a lack o f 
prosody to communicate social and affective information. Clements (1998) argues that 
work on social and cognitive development illustrates that particular types of language 
interaction have an impact on the development of social understanding and internal 
controls. He argues: ‘Explanations about feelings, reasons and mental states may be 
particularly influential in promoting in the [developing] child an understanding of others 
and internalising controls.’ While a number of other factors, such as limited social 
cognition, are undoubtedly a factor in behavioural problems in autism, Bailey et al.
(1996) conclude that ‘language delay is a good predictor of social and educational 
outcomes and is strongly associated with severity of behavioural symptoms, social and 
cognitive performance and familial loading.’ What emerges from the example o f autism 
then, is that communication problems interact in a specific way with cognitive and 
biological constraints in the development of impoverished communicative environments 
and , in extreme cases, behavioural challenges.
The second strand of evidence for the link between impoverished communicative 
environments and challenging behaviours comes from intervention studies, in which 
challenging behaviour is treated as chiefly serving a communicative function. Emerson 
(1998) cites two studies in which facilitating the communication of clients with 
challenging behaviours produced reductions in the behaviours. Steege et al. (1990) taught 
two children with severe multiple disabilities to press a micro-switch which activated a 
tape-recording requesting a break from self-care activities. There was a significant 
reduction in the escape-motivated self-injury which the children had previously 
exhibited. Bird et al. (1989) taught two men to either exchange a token or to use a 
manual sign for 'break’. This intervention, which focussed on improving communication,
led to a number of changes. There was a rapid reduction in the challenging behaviours;__
there was an increase in spontaneous communication; and both men spent more time on- 
task and requesting to work. As Emerson suggests Bird et al’s findings indicate that
28
People with Learning Disabilities Essay
facilitating appropriate communication may act to moderate stress through increasing a 
client’s perceived control over an aversive event.
One must caution against suggesting that just because something reduces challenging 
behaviour, that it explains its aetiology. However, the weight of the evidence presented 
above suggests that the expectations of others around communication have a serious 
impact on PLD.
Social learning theory: a model for understandine the impact?
Bandura’s social learning theory (1971) provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding how misconceptions in the transactional process of communication can 
lead to the disadvantaged party, the person with a learning disability, experiencing a 
cycle of failure and perceived powerlessness. To communicate effectively, both the PLD 
and his communication partner have to believe that they are capable of engaging in the 
appropriate behaviours and that these behaviours will attain the communicative goal. For 
the person with a learning disability, who is expected by his partner to have little 
communicative ability, outcome expectations may be lowered because even when s/he 
has reached the required communicative standard his/her communications are ignored. 
Beveridge and Hurell’s (1990) finding that staff react to only 50 per cent of PLD 
communicative initiations, indicates that this might be the case. Further research is 
needed to establish whether this is the process by which outcome expectations are 
lowered. In addition, where efficacy expectations are unrealistic (see the evidence cited 
above) then both partners will be likely to perform poorly. Situations are perceived from 
both sides as uncontrollable and effort is reduced. This model could provide an 
explanation for the low rates of PLD initiations and staff response to the communication 
initiatives of PLD (Beveridge and Hurell, 1980), leading to a lack of communicative 
opportunities for the PLD, a failure to meet his/her needs and, in some extreme cases, 
challenging behaviour. Staff beliefs about PLD’s ability to learn is likely to act as a 
mediating factor in this process.
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What clinicians can do
It is vitally important, therefore, that psychologists have strategies to enhance the 
effectiveness of their communicative exchanges with PLD. Psychologists can take action 
both on the individual and systems level. One of the key implications of the studies 
suggesting others both under- and over-estimate abilities, is that it is necessary to liaise 
with other staff, especially speech and language therapists, to establish the 
communicative competence of the client before interviewing him or her. In discussing 
interviewing PLD in legal settings, Bull (1995) indicates a number of pitfalls to avoid. 
These include avoiding:
• Leading questions that suggest the answer being sought (including being sensitive to 
non-verbal communication as a form of leading question).
• Pressuring clients into saying more than they wish, which can lead to confabulation.
• Repeating questions on the same point, which can cause people to deviate from the 
original response presuming it was wrong.
• Using complex grammatical structures
Bull cites a study by Sigelman et al. (1981) which indicates that 'mentally retarded 
people may be especially likely to give biased answers that are influenced by question 
structure and wording.’ The most common response bias found in the study was a bias 
towards acquiescence in response to yes-no questions. Sigelman et al. found evidence for 
the usefulness of using pictures rather than verbal communication. They found that more 
interviewees answered either-or questions in pictorial form than in verbal form, and that 
such answers were more consistent with each other than those to verbal questions, and 
they were free from the acquiescence response bias. A psychologist needs to make use of 
such research knowledge and bear in mind Bull’s instructions when interviewing people 
with learning disabilities.
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Other approaches also suggest themselves from the empirical work into the 
communicative environments PLD often face and generate. Most importantly, a 
psychologist should always value the communicative potential o f the speaker. Kernan 
and Sabsay (1989) found that listeners, faced with a speaker speaking unclearly, 
attempted to understand the communication according to two criteria: an awareness of the 
discomfort of the interlocutor in trying to put across his message; and the perceived 
importance of what is being said. In other words some communication attempts were 
considered too trivial to try to understand correctly. It is clearly important that 
psychologists must not devalue their communicative partners by ignoring or pretending 
to understand the communication when it is not understood. The other important message 
is always to check that you have understood. As it is impossible to measure success in 
communication, because one can never be sure what another person has in mind, it is 
imperative to reflect back to the PLD what your understanding is of what they have 
communicated (Van der Gaag and Dormandy, 1993). Acquiescence bias means it is 
likely that sometimes your reflection will be approved when it is wide of the mark, but 
the practice lessens the possibility of misunderstandings.
When dealing with challenging behaviour, which may have a communicative function, it 
is important to consider a constructional approach and investigate whether it is better to 
improve the client’s functional communication than to extinguish the behaviour. As 
Emerson (1998) notes the keys to success in this approach are two-fold:
• The replacement response must be truly equivalent to the challenging behaviour
• It must be a more 'efficient’ response than the person’s challenging behaviour
Emerson defines more 'efficient’ to mean 'that the new replacement response should 
require less effort than the person’s challenging behaviour and should lead to more 
frequent, rapid and higher quality reinforcement.’ This second criteria suggests that for a
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psychologist to help a PLD fulfil his/her communicative potential the former must not 
only work with the individual in the way indicated but also with carers.
In any behavioural intervention success must be measured not only by a reduction in the 
unwanted behaviour (and, in constructional approaches, an increase in an alternative 
appropriate behaviour) but also in the maintenance of improvements and whether they 
generalise to other settings, particularly the daily living conditions of the client. 
Interventions aimed at improving communication must be measured on the same criteria. 
Working with carers is essential to achieve success on these criteria. To achieve 
maintenance, regular reviews of the use of the “new” functional communication needs to 
take place for, as Emerson points out, challenging behaviours often emerge in the first 
place because staff are responding preferentially (over more appropriate 
communications) to the challenging behaviours. Therefore without reviews there is a risk 
that 'the response efficiency of the alternative behaviour will reduce ( e.g. care staff not 
attending to socially appropriate requests for breaks or attention) and challenging 
behaviour will re-emerge.’
If language and communication is viewed from a developmental perspective, partners in 
communication can also be viewed as teachers, helping not only to maintain 
communication but also to foster on-going improvements. As Butterfield and Arthur 
(1995) indicate ‘positive experiences in being able to successfully communicate 
intentions act as a powerful reinforcer in the process of learning how to effectively 
communicate with others.’ Receptive communicative partners can foster communication 
development in all areas of communication -  “how” we communicate; “what” we 
communicate; and “why” we communicate. Receptive partners can: a) create 
opportunities for quality interactions [the “what” of communication] (b) attend to client 
initiated behaviours and be responsive in predictable and consistent ways [the “why” ] 
and (c) provide “scaffolding for the next level of development [the “how” ]. Working 
with the others, then, a psychologist needs to ensure they recognise the existing level o f a 
client’s communication abilities and accept development can take place; educate and
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,perhaps, train others in the above skills and knowledge of communication development 
stages (e.g. from pre-intentional to intentional communication); and ensure there is an 
ever-increasing social interactive focus in carer-client interchanges ( adapted from 
Butterfield and Arthur, 1995). Liaison with speech and language therapists and even 
service-provider managers would be necessary to achieve this wider objective. ..... 
Psychologists need to draw on research findings to argue for structures that allow clients 
greater integration into mainstream society (e.g. Cole & Meyer, 1991, who found in a 
longitudinal study that children with a severe learning disability segregated from their 
normal peers regressed in social competence).
The transactional model of communication proposed above indicates that in some 
instances, psychologists are also likely to have to challenge the beliefs and attitudes of 
the client him/herself (speech and language therapists may be better equipped to tackle 
skills deficits). Cognitive-behavioural work for clients at a symbolic level of 
communication may address low self-esteem. In social learning terms, the psychologist 
here is intervening at the level of efficacy-expectations. Assertiveness training might be 
indicated where the client was displaying signs of weaving “a cloak of competence”. In 
social learning terms, such training would be seeking to change outcome-expectancies.
A psychologist, then, can use his/her knowledge to be a responsive partner. S/he can 
liaise with other professionals to educate, train and support carers. S/he can use research 
skills to agitate for improvements in service delivery; and s/he can work on psychological 
barriers faced by clients to fulfilling their own potential. Optimally, because of the 
transactional nature of communication, a psycholgist needs to work with client and carer 
in action together.
The danger of generalising: lessons from developmental literature
It is important before.drawing a conclusion to review the literature on the language 
development of children with disabilities to sound a note of warning against making 
overgeneralised statements. Conti-Ramsden (1989) argues that many studies of the
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development of language in children with learning disabilities have produced often 
inconclusive and contradictory results ( for example, on the question of the role of the 
parents’ interactional style on language development). Price (1989) reports a range of 
methodological difficulties with studies on this question. She challenges how readily the 
results from one study can be compared with other studies, given the heterogeneity of the 
samples, and possible variations in age, stage of language development, setting and data 
collection and analysis. Large numbers of studies have used unrepresentative samples -  
either very small numbers or a narrow white middle-class socio-economic band or 
children with Down’s Syndrome, who are easy to identify but represent only 10 per cent 
of the learning disabled population. Measurement problems include the difficulty that 
mean length of utterance ( a favoured measure) is a crude measure of pragmatic skills and 
receptive and expressive language. These concerns also apply to studies o f adults and 
their communication difficulties.
Conti-Ramsden’s conclusion is pertinent to the adult population: “Child language 
research with non-handicapped children has revealed the individuality of children, the 
different interacting styles parents and children manage to mesh together as well as the 
enormous range of variables that impinge on the interaction.” Studies (e.g. Wootton,
1989) have shown a fluid not static mother-child communication dyad which varies 
across situations. Interventions, then, need to be individually tailored because 
idiosyncratic communication patterns are determined by both partners and by 
environmental and biological constraints. In dealing with user-carer dyads, Conti- 
Ramsden recommends psychologists consider characteristics of both parties. For the user, 
issues to consider are aetiology of the disability, institutionalisation, severity of the 
disorder, language learning style, temperament and motivation. For the carer, issues are 
attitudes to handicap, believed severity of the disability, believed user’s communicative 
ability, personality, motivation and degree of organisational support.
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Conclusion
It has been shown that PLD often have their communicative potential stifled by others. 
Learning theory provides one model for considering how to change the pattern when 
working individually with PLD. However, because communication is a social process the 
importance of working with others and with PLD and others in interaction is paramount. 
To begin to make satisfactoiy interventions, individually tailored programmes are 
indicated taking into account not only the communicative constraints dealt with in this 
essay, but also recognising the complex interplay of biological, cognitive, behavioural 
and social factors (see the evidence cited above on autism). In addition, clinicians might 
have to adopt a “political” role, either by role-modelling respect for the communicative 
abilities of their clients or by challenging wider societal obstacles to greater community 
integration. Further research is indicated, particularly to ascertain under what conditions 
expectations vary and change. Work in the field of self-fulfilling prophecies (Jussim, 
1986) might inform this activity.
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Psychiatric classification is irrelevant to the understanding and 
treatment of mental health problems in childhood and adolescence. 
Discuss.
Introduction
Psychiatric classification lies at the heart of much treatment and research into child and 
adolescent problems (Sonuga-Barke, 1998) and the organisation of mental health services and 
resources for this client group. In this essay, the history and current organisation of present-day 
psychiatric taxonomies will be examined to understand their role and aims. The strengths and 
weaknesses of psychiatric classification systems will be examined and the implicit assumptions 
behind the system (Sonuga-Barke, 1998) challenged. Pilgrim (2000) argues that the alternative to 
psychiatric classification is psychological formulation. This alternative view will be examined 
with particular reference to interactional psychological models.
History of child classification:
Classifications are intended to help us deal with complex phenomena by abstracting certain 
attributes as a basis for grouping individuals or disorders. Each category of a taxonomy represents 
a hypothetical construct defined by attributes that are singled out from all other attributes that 
characterise individuals (Achenbach, 1985). The first modem system of classification for mental 
health problems was published by Emil Kraepelin in 1883. Kraepelin regarded each mental 
health problem as discrete from others, having its own genesis, symptoms, course and outcome. 
As in medical science, it was presumed different “diseases” required different treatments, 
requiring a system to allow professionals to identify different “diseases”. The current major 
categorical classification systems -  the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), and the International Classification of Diseases 10 
(ICD-10) (World Health Organisation, 1992) - were developed in response to the need to 
standardise a multitude of classification systems which it was considered were preventing 
professionals from identifying “disorders” and communicating with each other accurately about 
cases (Kendell, 1975). These systems, however, focussed mainly on adult disorders and it became 
apparent that a classification system for child and adolescent mental health problems was 
required (Rutter, 1965).
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The early child and adolescent classification systems were heavily influenced by psychoanalytic 
thinking, which lead to confusion as psychoanalytic terms were disputed and there was little 
empirical justification for the categorisations (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). It was felt that systems 
based on symptomoiogy and systematic reviews of empirical data would lead to greater 
consistency among clinicians and therefore have greater clinical utility (Cantwell & Rutter,
1994).
Current Systems of Psychiatric Categorical Classification for childhood and adolescent 
disorders:
Both ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994) classify childhood disorders, while 
disorders presenting in adolescence are classified partly in these childhood schemes and partly 
within adult categories (Gelder, Gath & Mayou, 1991). The categories are based on symptom- 
pattems, which are described by a single diagnostic term. Each category includes statements 
drawn from research literature about age of onset, course, degree of impairment and 
complications, predisposing factors, prevalence and sex ratio. The explicitness of the diagnostic 
criteria was designed to reduce diagnostic unreliability caused by descriptive inadequacies in 
previous systems (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). A multiaxial system was introduced to force 
clinicians to consider a wide range of information (Davison & Neale, 1994), including 
information not only on abnormal behaviour but also on general medical conditions, psychosocial 
and environmental problems and current adaptive functioning. The system allows a range of 
information on mental health problems and wider contextual issues to be coded simply, without 
losing information lost to a single-axis classification system (Carr, 1999). Achenbach (1985) 
notes that the two major versions of the Kraepelinian taxonomy -  DSM and ICD -  defined 
disorders via debate and negotiation between practicing psychiatrists, as much as on the basis of 
empirical data. He notes that there is an especially weak empirical basis for the childhood 
disorders, because few had been properly researched when they were first devised and there were 
no research diagnostic criteria to improve the reliability and validity of the clinical concepts (i.e. 
hypothetical constructs) on which these were based.
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Strengths of psychiatric classification:
Communication between professionals:
Psychiatric classifications typically include a clinical description of a problem and the 
identification of factors associated with etiology, maintenance, course and possible management 
of the problem and thus forms the basis of sound clinical practice (Carr, 1999). The systems lay 
claim to a number of practical and empirical merits. First, psychiatric classification acts as an aid 
to communication between professionals (Klein and Riso, in press, cited in Cantwell & Rutter, 
1994). A single diagnostic term provides an efficient, simple summary of a large quantity of 
information. For example, if a clinical psychologist is referred a child with autistic disorder, s/he 
would expect to find in the child’s presentation a triad of deficits in social development, language 
and behaviour (Wing, 1981).
Research facilitation:
Psychiatric classification also has heuristic value. It can help the development of a body of 
knowledge about conditions. Only after a diagnostic category has been formed can people who fit 
its description be studied systematically and factors, such as aetiological factors, and maintaining 
factors be uncovered and treatments developed. As Mendels (1970, cited in Davison and Neale, 
1994) notes it was first necessary to recognise a subtype of learning disability, phenylketonuria, 
before developing dietary treatments. Without the classification of the subtype, dietary treatments 
on a random group of people with a learning disability would have shown an insignificant 
response and the treatment would have been discarded.
Clinical utility
Psychiatric classifications are also diagnoses (Achenbach, 1985). A formal diagnosis abstracts 
attributes that link an individual to similar individuals presumed to have the same disorder. 
Diagnosis, in itself, can have benefits. Kanner first described autism in the 1940s. In the last 
decade alone, since pervasive developmental disorders were classified in DSMIV and ICD 10,
there has been a seven-fold increase in the number of children diagnosed with an autistic 
spectrum disorder (ASD). Since it is unlikely that there has been a rise in the overall prevalence 
of ASD, it can be assumed that before classification many children with ASD went untreated and 
their families unsupported. Now, with a diagnosis, families can be given information on
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prognosis and strategies for management and the child can access educational support and a range 
of training, including communication-skills training (Carr, 1999). Additionally, as ASD can have 
genetic aetiologies, diagnosis paves the way for some parents to have genetic testing and genetic 
counselling (J. Turk, personal communication). On the other hand, if a child has autistic features 
but fails to meet the strict criteria for autistic disorder, the failure to fit a formal classification can 
result in health and education authorities withholding special clinical and educational support.
Passport to resources:
To be classified with a psychiatric classification involves being labeled in a particular way. 
Clausen and Yarrow (1955, cited in Cantwell & Rutter, 1994) indicate that to lay people it means 
that “abnormal” behaviour is perceived as an illness process, out of the control of the “diseased” 
person. Although, there are a number of concerns that labeling in this way brings negative 
consequences, there are a number of studies (e.g. Gove and Fain, 1973, cited in Davison & Neale, 
1994) which suggest that labeling may not have harmful consequences. Like extemalisation 
(White & Epston, 1990), it can encourage families to view behaviour which is unpleasant as 
understandable and not malicious (it should be noted that extemalisations and behavioural 
formulations can also have this effect, without pathologising the child). It can serve to prevent 
children and families being isolated. Psychiatric classifications serve as the basis for delineating 
and developing self-help support groups, in which parents can share experience and knowledge of 
a problem. As parental isolation is often a predisposing factor in childhood problems and parental 
adjustment and social support networks are protective factors (Carr, 1999), the role of 
classification here should not be under-estimated.
Criticisms of psychiatric classification with childhood and adolescent problems:
Reliability:
The extent to which a classification system produces the same observation each time it is applied 
is the measure of its reliability (Werry, 1992). Considerable effort has been put into improving 
inter-rater reliability of both the DSM and ICD systems, which were bedevilled by low inter-rater 
reliability. The major mechanism for doing this has been to largely excise theoretical diagnostic 
terms and replace them with diagnostic criteria based on atheroretical and observable signs and 
“symptoms”. Reliability has improved from previous systems, but for both DSM-IV and ICD-10 
“the demonstration of satisfactory reliability remains a central problem (Carr, 1999).” In a review
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of seven clinic-based studies involving structured interviews with 750 children by Hodges et al., 
(1989, cited by Carr, 1999) interrater reliability for conduct disorder, attention deficit disorder, 
depression and anxiety disorders fell below the threshold for “satisfactory” reliability. The 
problem, however, does seem to be one of training, on the one hand, and the clinical context, on 
the other. Sonuga-Barke, 1998, notes that reviews indicate that where clinicians are given special 
training or use a standardised diagnostic interview (e.g. the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for 
Children; Costello et al., 1984) reliability is acceptably high. With training, then, reliability can 
be raised to acceptable levels but there remains a practical clinical difficulty. The problem for 
practising clinical psychologists is that in the clinical context they are drawing on a number of 
different sources of information not just a diagnostic interview schedule (with children it can 
include the child, his family, schoolteachers, and other health professionals) all of which are open 
to various biases (Achenbach, 1985) and his/her own experience (also open to biases, 
Achenbach,1985) in order to make “diagnoses”.
Co-morbiditv:
Epidemiological data shows that the co-existence of two or more supposedly separate child 
psychiatric conditions far exceeds that expected by chance (Caron & Rutter, 1991). A study by 
McConaughy and Achenbach (1994) using parental and child self-report on dimensional 
behaviour scales found 40 per cent of children with aggressive behaviour also reported attention 
problems and 43 per cent of children classified as “anxious-depressed” cases also reached 
caseness criteria for attention problems. DSM IV and ICD-10 treat co-morbidity differently and 
thus produce different rates of co-morbidity (Rutter,1988). In ICD-10 the clinician is expected to 
choose the diagnosis which most closely matches the symptom pattern, reflecting the assumption 
based on a physical medical paradigm, that a mixed clinical picture represents a slightly atypical 
manifestation of one disorder, rather than the co-occurrence of two separate conditions 
(Rutter, 1988, cited in Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). Clinicians following DSM IV are encouraged to 
diagnose a separation condition for each condition where diagnostic criteria are met and to make 
multiple diagnoses. But each approach has problems. Let us take the ICD-10 system as an 
example. The ICD-10 system is based on a medical model of conditions being discrete disease­
like entities. In the realm of childhood and adolescent disorders, with the exception of a limited 
number of conditions, for example, the pervasive development disorders, this model does not fit 
with psychological models of dysfunction. Dysfunction in psychological models is 
conceptualised in bio-psycho-social terms and abnormal behaviour is often seen as different in
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severity not kind to “normal” behaviour. Second, as there is a lack of empirical evidence on how 
mixed clinical pictures should be diagnosed (Cantwell and Rutter, 1994), there is a danger of the 
wrong hierarchical rules being followed in ICD-10. This has considerable implications for the 
claim that ICD-10 classifications aid understanding and treatment with child and adolescent 
mental health problems. Without clarity in hierarchical rules of classification, clinicians and 
clients are left to decide on treatment approaches without a clear evidence-based rationale for the 
chosen approach. Additionally, there is the possibility that the comorbid combination represents a 
distinctive syndrome in its own right. Clinicians following the ICD-10 and DSM-IV approaches 
are then faced with the possibility of treating the client inappropriately. The high levels of co­
morbidity in the child field also undermine the clinical utility of the existing psychiatric systems. 
It suggests that pure, unmixed cases are no more prototypical of clients with a “disorder”, than 
mixed cases (Clark et al., 1995), leaving the clinician with little understanding or guidance in 
treatment for many of his clients. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that people with diagnostic 
co-morbidity have worse prognoses (Keller et al., 1992, cited in Clark et al., 1995), meaning 
clinicians following existing psychiatric classifications have less ability to help their most needy 
clients.
Validity
The validity of diagnostic categories involves demonstrating that cases share common critical 
criteria, from having common predisposing factors to sharing commonality of course and 
response to specific treatment. As there is no single measure of validity, external validating 
criteria for psychiatric classifications include statistical groupings of data, epidemiological data, 
course of the “disorder”, genetic data, psychosocial risk factors, neuropsychological patterns and 
responses to treatment.
In a major review of psychiatric classifications for childhood and adolescent mental health 
problems, Cantwell and Rutter (1994), who support the use of psychiatric classifications, report 
that “in no case is their validity fully established and in some instances there are very few, if any, 
validating data. For most the evidence provides partial support, albeit sometimes strong, but 
uncertainty remains on key details.” These authors, however, err on the side of optimism. They 
suggest that differentiation of a number of conditions has major clinical meaning; that is, that 
clients so classified share characteristics relating to aetiology, phenomenology, prognosis and 
response to treatment. They argue there is sufficient evidence to suggest discrete clinically
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meaningful entities for depressive disorders, schizophrenia, hyperkinetic disorders, conduct 
disorders, autism, Rett’s syndrome, severe mental retardation, mild mental retardation, specific 
developmental disorders of language, Tourette’s syndrome, obsessional disorders and anorexia 
nervosa.
Autism provides a good example of a disorder, in which evidence from a range of validating 
criteria converges to differentiate a child diagnosed with autism from a child diagnosed with 
another mental health problem. Epidemiological data provided support for the separation of 
autism from schizophrenia, which were originally linked (Rutter,1972, cited in Cantwell & 
Rutter, 1994). Autism, hyperkinetic disorders and speech and language disorders, have an early 
onset, marking them off as possibly different clinical entities than, say, schizophrenia or major 
depression, which have a marked rise in incidence in adolescence.
The longterm course of autism provides supporting evidence for its differentiation from specific 
developmental language disorders (SDLDs). Rutter et al. (1992, cited in Cantwell & Rutter,
1994) have found children with autism have poor social outcomes, in terms of employment and 
independent living, compared with those diagnosed with an SDLD, and have persistent 
stereotyped behaviour and other language abnormalities. These findings complement twin and 
family studies, which indicate that autism is strongly genetic (Rutter, 1991, cited in Cantwell & 
Rutter, 1994). Again genetic data indicates the discreteness of autism from schizophrenia, which 
shows no increase in familial loading. Neuropsychological data also converges to indicate autism 
is distinct from other forms of learning disability and from SDLDs. Deficits in mentalising 
capacity (Frith, 1991) and particular linguistic features appear distinctive to autism, although it 
would be wrong to suggest that there is a specific pattern of cognitive deficits which is diagnostic 
on its own (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993).
However, even with the ICD-10 classification of pervasive developmental disorders, of which 
childhood autism is a subcategory, there is a debate over the validity of the current classification. 
Some authors argue whether 'childhood autism’ (ICD-10) is distinct from Asperger syndrome 
(Frith, 1991) or whether they are meaningfully bound together under the grouping, autistic 
spectrum disorder.
Although Cantwell & Rutter (1994) say there is strong validating data for hyperkinetic disorders,
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The claim needs examination and illuminates the validity problems of ICD-10. Validating support 
for the distinct hyperkinetic disorders category comes from epidemiological evidence, long-term 
course, neuropsychological patterns and its response to drug treatment. However, the evidence in 
a number of these areas is questionable. The adult outcome for conduct disorders in childhood is 
particularly poor when the disorder is of early onset, when it is associated with 
hyperactivity/inattention and when it arises in the context of family discord. This has prompted 
some to question whether hyperkinetic disorders constitute a distinctive syndrome or rather are a 
variety of conduct disorder with hyperactivity as a risk factor (Taylor, 1994). There is also 
research data (Jones, 2000) which questions whether hyperkinetic disorders can be distinguished 
from learning disability on the basis of a distinctive pattern of cognitive deficits, as proposed by 
Kaufman (1994, cited in Jones, 2000). Finally, the finding that children with hyperkinetic 
disorders respond to stimulant drugs is again suggestive but not conclusive of a discrete 
“disorder”, as children not diagnosed as having ADHD respond to these powerful drugs.
Interventions:
The test of clinical utility for practising clinicians is how a taxonomy helps in guiding the 
treatment of a condition. Using psychological models a classification has to inform thinking about 
the aetiology, maintaining factors and prognosis of a specific presentation (Carr, 1999), as these 
things form the basis of formulation which guides treatment. There is not scope in this essay to 
consider each aspect in turn, but an analysis of aetiology and prognosis will indicate the current 
systems’ limitations in these areas.
Prognosis:
Psychiatric classification in isolation gives little clue as to prognosis, which is based on a number 
of factors including age of onset, severity of symptomology, knowledge of the “disorder” process 
and strengths and weaknesses of the individual and the system s/he inhabits. The major 
exceptions to this are in the cases of pervasive developmental disorders and learning disability. 
Autism, particularly when it co-occurs with a learning disability, has a poor prognosis (Gillberg,
1990). This can be identified within current multiaxial systems. Similarly, there is some evidence 
that children diagnosed with moderate or mild learning disability show degrees of social 
impairment into adulthood (Richardson and Roller, 1992, cited in Cantwell and Rutter, 1994)
This is also identifiable in psychiatric classification systems. However, significant personal and
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contextual protective factors, which can be used forjudging the prognosis of a referred child with 
a range of problems, are not identified within psychiatric classification systems. For example, 
Rolf et al. (1990) found that a child’s temperament, a high IQ and high self-esteem were 
associated with positive adjustment. On a contextual level, Carr (1995), has found that children 
are more likely to benefit from treatment where there is good co-ordination within 
multidisciplinary teams or in interagency work. There is evidence that family, parental, social 
network and quality of schooling (Carr, 1999) act as protective factors improving prognosis 
across a range of presenting problems.
Aetiology:
Since the early versions of DSM there has been a deliberate move away from a theoretical model, 
where etiological mechanisms could be inferred, to a descriptive taxonomy (Achenbach, 1985). 
However, because of this move, psychiatric classification of child and adolescent disorders in 
DSM IV and ICD-10 is significantly lacking in clarity or transparency about both risk factors and 
aetiological mechanisms. With risk factors the problem is that a single important risk factor may 
lead to a range of quite different disorders through diverse mechanisms. Being the child of a 
parent with a depressive disorder increases the risk for a wide range of disorders (Rutter, 1990; 
cited in Cantwell and Rutter, 1994). Major depressive disorders in children may be genetically 
mediated in part (Harrington et al., 1993). But depression can also interfere with parenting and act 
as a vulnerability for attachment disorders (Carr, 1999). Or it can generate family discord, which 
is likely to create an increased risk for conduct disorders (Rutter & Quinton, 1984, cited in 
Cantwell and Rutter, 1994). Psychiatric classification does not illuminate which factors mediate 
these risk pathways. Cantwell and Rutter (1994) admit: “if aetiological considerations are to play 
any role in classification it will be crucial to proceed from the identification of broad risk factors 
to the delineation of specific risk mechanisms.” The current psychiatric systems, they admit, have 
yet to undertake that development.
Additionally, in psychiatry there are many multifactorial disorders where there is no single 
specific or necessary or main cause and hence no basis for organising the classification system. 
With Conduct Disorder, for example, there is a plethora of hypothesised aetiological mechanisms 
-  for example, the arousal theory supported by evidence by Raine (1988, cited in Carr, 1999) that 
children with conduct disorders have lower arousal levels than “normal” children and thus are 
less responsive to rewards and punishments. This theory competes with other biological theories,
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cognitive theories, psychodynamic theories, social learning theories and systems theories, all of 
which have an evidence-base in research. The psychiatric classification Conduct Disorder, then, 
does not delineate for the clinician which aetiological mechanism is at work. This is a serious 
weakness of the system in terms of understanding and treatment. Kendell (1989) argues that an 
understanding of aetiological mechanisms constitutes the single best means of developing 
effective prevention and treatment strategies.
Ethical considerations:
Labelling:
The proposition that to give a person a psychiatric classification places them in danger of being 
stigmatised (Szasz, 1974), is worth consideration by praticitioners with every client group, but 
especially those dealing with children and adolescents. In many cases, the latter have not chosen 
to see a clinical psychologist and they can be treated without their consent (Division of Clinical 
Psychology of The British Psychological Society Professional Practice Guidelines, 1995), as long 
as consent is gained from a recognised parental authority. As noted above, there are some 
advantages to labelling, but this potential disadvantage has to be considered. Diagnosis carries an 
explicit and pejorative message about the way a child will behave. There is some evidence this 
can have a negative effect on the parent/child and child/professional dynamic (Johnson, Rasbury 
& Siegel, 1986), although it is difficult to be sure about the direction of the effect - whether the 
stigma of diagnosis or the behaviour disrupts the relationship. The other concern is that the child 
sees him/herself as defective -  diagnoses highlight problem behaviours not strengths -  and this 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (Carr, 1999).
It can be seen, then, that, in general, psychiatric classification is often irrelevant in the 
understanding of childhood mental health problems. Problems of validity, for example, limit the 
degree to which existing psychiatric taxonomies help us develop process models (particularly, of 
maintenance) and contribute to diagnosis being a limited tool for communicating clinically 
important information between professionals (and children and their carers).
Psychological formulation as alternative to psychiatric classification
Sonuga-Barke (1998) challenges the claim that prevalent diagnostic categories are essentially 
atheoretical. He argues that the DSM and ICD classification systems reflect a medical “disease-
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process” model in which disorders are seen as the characteristic of the individual (endogeny) 
rather than the result of an interaction between the individual and the environment. Such an 
approach does not fit easily with psychological approaches. Psychology is obviously a broad 
church, but at its most fundamental it conceptualises the development and maintenance of 
psychological problems in terms of risk factors, precipitating factors, maintaining factors and 
protective factors which exist either in personal or contextual domains and are embedded in the 
interactions between the two (Carr, 1999). The assumption of dysfunction centred in the 
individual ignores the possibility that problems are manifestations of complex interactions 
between children and members of their social and community networks. For example, with 
Conduct Disorder, problems which contribute to its development and maintenance include family 
systems factors, parental factors and social network factors (Carr, 1999). Patterson’s coercive 
family process theory of conduct disorder (1982) provides one example of an interactional model, 
rather than endogenous psychiatric model. The theory is based on operant conditioning principles 
and involves a number of interactional processes, including a hierarchy of negative reinforcement 
between parent and child. Partial support for the validity of such a non-endogenous 
conceptualisation comes from studies which indicate that it is effective to provide parent 
management training for conduct disorders in which the therapist works on altering the parent’s 
reinforcement contingency without working with the referred child (Kazdin, 1997). It can be 
seen, then, that there is evidence to challenge the implicit assumption that a child with Conduct 
Disorder has some kind of categorical condition confined to his own behaviour.
Psychological formulation versus psychiatric classification - idiographic .v. nomothetic 
approaches:
To compare psychiatric classification with psychological formulation is to compare nomothetic 
and idiographic approaches to classification (Achenbach, 1985). The nomothetic psychiatric 
approach suggests that all children diagnosed with a particular disorder share common attributes. 
The danger of this for the practising clinician is that it may not allow the clinician to move from 
the general presentation to the specific client manifestation in a way that will guide treatment. A 
case study illustrates this problem. Simon (not his real name) was referred as a 15-year-old 
following concerns that his schoolwork had deteriorated after he had been involved in a fatal 
coach crash. A boy he had befriended on the coach trip was one of ten killed in the accident. 
Clinical interview revealed that Simon was having intrusive thoughts about the incident but was
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using thought avoidance to rid them from his mind. The DSM-IV classification of PostTraumatic 
Stress Disorder fitted the presentation well. However, although it would have guided the clinician 
to look for intrusive thoughts about the accident it would have been silent on the relevance of the 
phenomenon, except as an indicator of dysfunction. An idiographic psychological approach (e.g. 
Ehlers and Steil, 1995) would indicate the need to specify the content of the intrusive thoughts 
and the meaning ascribed to them by this particular client. In this case, such an inquiry revealed 
that Simon repeatedly remembered getting off the coach and not helping his friend. This had a 
strong personal meaning to Simon associated with shame. Such specification of the symptom 
helped guide the selection of treatment (cognitive-behavioural therapy) and the implementation of 
treatment (CBT to challenge specific beliefs about shame).
Psychological formulation as an alternative to psychiatric classification is not without its 
problems, however. It is an idiographic approach, in that it refers to the detailed portrayal of the 
individual as a unique entity. The focus in psychological formulation is 'on a network of inferred 
constructs that define the individual’s personality and explain his or her behaviour (Achenbach, 
1985)’. But idiographic portrayals of individuals are difficult to compare. It is, therefore, difficult 
to identify similarities among cases and consequently it is difficult to develop a body of 
knowledge in a domain required to develop specific treatments and models.
In addition, an idiographic approach may well face greater problems of reliability than the current 
approach. Psychological formulations are complex, requiring information on predisposing, 
precipitating, maintaining and protective factors. Additionally, in particular in the field of child 
and adolescence, formulations are based on a number of different sources, which introduces 
increased scope for unreliability. In many cases, particularly the more complex ones that are 
found in clinical samples, it would be difficult to find two psychologists who would agree on a 
formulation.
Alternative Classification systems:
Dimensional Approaches:
Achenbach (1991) used multivariate statistical techniques to analyse data from over 2000 
children, parents and children which indicated that many of the behvioural difficulties of referred 
clients reflect scores on two major behavioural dimensions. The posited dimensions are
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internalizing behaviour problems, such as crying, worrying and withdrawal and externalising 
problems such as fighting and disobedience. In dimensional systems, symptoms are assessed on a 
continuum of graded severity. The severity of a condition is often the best indicators of prognosis 
(Keller et al., 1992; cited in Clark et al, 1998). Clark et al., 1998, have argued that assessing the 
severity of a dysfunction may be more helpful than specifying the precise nature of a disorder, 
particularly where there are high levels of co-morbidity (as in childhood psychiatry) which make 
it difficult to specify the precise nature of the disorder. Dimensional conceptualisations offer 
other benefits to the clinical psychologist. Carr (1999) indicates that reliable and valid behaviour 
checklists and ability tests can be easily incorporated into clinical assessments. Improvement or 
deterioration can be assessed along dimensions and procedures can be manualised.
There are problems, however. The multivariate methods on which dimensions are constructed are 
poor at identifying rare syndromes or those that contain a single symptom, such as encopresis 
(Cantwell and Rutter, 1994). Dimensional systems are also not well developed, currently, and 
development will involve complex decisions, similar to those faced by the current categorical 
taxonomies. Clark et al., 1998, say the major problem will be deciding which types of dimensions 
are required and which specific dimensions are most valid for classification purposes in mental 
health. Werry (1992) puts the case for a combination of current nosologies and dimensional 
approaches in the childhood field. The dimensional approaches, he argues, would be most 
suitable for assessing personality features, which figure highly in childhood psychiatry in 
presentations of externalising behaviours, such as conduct disorder.
Conclusion
A phenomenological system that is categorical is not in itself undesirable. The clinical context, 
where resources are limited, is one in which categorical decisions about who has treatment and 
who does not have to be made daily. Additionally, child mental health problems cover a broad 
span and as the above review indicates in some areas -  especially where disorders have a strong 
genetic base (e.g. autism) or have single symptoms (e.g. encopresis) -  psychiatric classifications 
aid understanding and treatment. However, psychological formulations and dimensional 
approaches exist which can complement psychiatric classifications. It is not necessarily a 
question of competition between the two (Werry, 1992). However, it must be remembered that 
“diagnoses apply to disorders, and not to people. “ (Cantwell & Rutter, 1994). As has been noted 
above diagnosis does not tell us everything which is clinically useful about a client. Used in a
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holistic, complementary way, a psychiatric classification can be helpful. In ADHD, for example, 
the classification which highlights the presence of a triad of behavioural “symptoms”, alongside 
psychological formulations focussed on how the child’s behaviour may be a factor in 
maintenance -  contributing to coercive interactional processes between parent and child 
(Patterson et al., 1982), academic attainment difficulties and peer-relation problems - and on 
protective factors, such as appropriate strategies for maximising academic attainment at school, 
will inform a multisystemic treatment package.
Target and Fonagy (1996) point the way forward in the short-term if our understanding of 
childhood problems -  and our treatments -  is to improve. They argue what is needed is the 
development of standardised measures of childhood functioning covering symptomology AND 
developmental achievements and processes which must be integrated into thinking about a 
child’s difficulties (Target & Fonagy, 1996).
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Can Breakwell’s integrated process theory of identity (1986) 
contribute to the understanding of theory and practice in Narrative 
Therapy?
Introduction
“Constructivist therapy is not so much a technique as a philosophical context within which 
therapy is done, and more the product of the Zeitgeist than the brainchild of any single 
theorist...” (Anderson, 1990, cited inNeimeyer, R., 1993).
Anderson’s observation can be applied to narrative therapy, a constructivist approach to 
clinical psychology developed in the 1980s, at first in parallel, and then, in collaboration by 
Michael White and David Epston. As the quotation suggests, the theoretical foundations of 
narrative therapy reside not in psychology -  either social, cognitive, developmental or clinical 
-  but in philosophy and literary criticism. White and Epston (1990) write that the 
understandings of philosopher Foucault and literary critic and philosopher, Derrida, underlie 
the attitudes and practices of narrative therapy. The Zeitgeist is that of postmodernism, with its 
commitment to the idea that' the belief systems and apparent “realities” one indwells [sic] are 
socially constituted rather than “given”, and hence can be constituted veiy differently in 
various cultures (or subcultures), times, and circumstances, although they might appear to 
carry the force of necessity to those that inhabit them’ (Neimeyer, R. A., 1993). 
Postmodernism is evident in the language of narrative therapy, which echoes the language of 
postmodernist literary criticism ( e.g. “stories”, “narratives”, “deconstruction”, and 
“discourses”). Narrative theory does not mention vocabulary such as “cognition”, “schema”, 
“assimilation” and “learning”, or the discourses connected with other clinical psychology 
traditions, especially cognitive approaches to clinical psychology. There appears to be no 
bridge between the language of elements of modernist psychology and that of narrative 
therapy. In this essay, it shall be argued that this present day lack of communication between 
the two traditions creates difficulties for clinical psychologists wishing to practice narrative 
therapy in the NHS and for both clinical psychology and narrative therapy themselves. It will 
be suggested that links can be established by viewing narrative therapy through the lens of a 
constructivist theory of identity devised in the field of social psychology. The implications for 
the development of narrative therapy theory and practice will be considered. As with all well- 
embedded “re-authored” stories, I will start by suggesting that links between social 
psychology and narrative therapy have continuity with events in the past.
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The evolution of narrative therapy:
The link between narrative therapy and other psychological traditions contains a number of 
stories. Some have been authored. For example, Zimmerman and Dickerson (1994) show 
how narrative therapy has continuity with second-order cybernetic thinking in family systems 
therapy. But other strands in this story are less well elaborated into narrative therapy’s 
identity. Kelley (1998) notes how narrative therapy, based on the work of White and Epston 
(1990) developed in relation to postmodernist influence and in relation to constructivist and 
constructionist therapy approaches developing in North America and Europe. White and 
Epston (1990), perhaps because of the Antipodean cultural context in which they practised, 
where indigenous peoples were being marginalised, drew on the works of French philosopher 
Michael Foucault. It appears that Foucault was of particular interest to White and Epston 
because of his thinking around how social power forges the knowledge people use to interpret 
their own lives. However, White and Epston also drew on constructivist ideas, particularly 
those of Bruner and Bateson. As Kelley (1998) indicates, however, constructivist ideas 
themselves have their roots in Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955). Kelly’s 
theory was to profoundly affect social psychological research into identity and spawned a 
large body of research. There is then a historic link between a theory of identity construction 
espoused by social psychologists and present day narrative therapy. However, this “territory” 
remains largely unstoried in the narrative sense.
Is the lack of a “thickened” (White, 1992) alternative story linking narrative therapy with 
social psychology a cause for concern, however? It might not be if narrative therapists worked 
in isolation, but as social constructionists they know the importance of political, cultural and 
social context in generating problems and solutions. In the context of clinical psychology 
practice in 2001 in the NHS, the weakness of links with other psychological traditions is 
problematic.
Problems associated with the isolation of narrative therapy from its psychology roots.
The most significant problem is that there is almost no experimental research into the 
effectiveness of narrative therapy. A trawl through Psyclnfo databases under the keyword 
“narrative therapy” reveals 165 entries. However, not one of these articles is an account of 
even a control-group design, let alone a randomised controlled trial into the effectiveness of 
narrative therapy for adults with mental health problems. There are a number of case studies, 
however, these are not experimental in design, but are descriptive, anecdotal accounts used to
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illustrate the theory and practice of narrative therapy. Reviewing the family therapy literature 
in 2000, Etchison and Kleist found just four experimental studies into narrative therapy.
A number of reasons have been advanced for the scarcity of research. R. Neimeyer (1993) has 
stated that research into constructivist methods is limited because of the therapy’s recent 
emergence. This is a weak argument. Eye-movement desensitisation reprocessing (EMDR) for 
trauma is of more recent origin and has generated dozens of experimental studies. Gale (1993) 
suggested that the epistemological and methodological differences between constructivist and 
positivist paradigms have played a part. Outcome and effectiveness research traditionally 
adopts the positivist approach. As Etchison and Kleist point out, constructivist researchers are 
more at home with qualitative methodology where the subjectivity of the researcher is 
acknowledged and valued and where emphasis is laid on the meaning research participants 
attach to their experience (Smith, 1996). Researchers’ historical lack of training in qualitative 
methodology and a historical bias to quantitative approaches in psychology journals also 
undoubtedly contribute to the lack of outcome and effectiveness research into narrative 
therapy. It is also possible, however, that the epistemological and philosophical gap between 
narrative therapy and mainstream clinical psychology “realist” discourse is promoting 
hesitancy in researchers who favour a narrative approach to therapy. The language of text 
discourse on which narrative therapy is based emphasises deconstruction as the prime research 
endeavour, not hypothesis-testing, theoiy-generation or effectiveness measurement.
Whatever the reasons, the scarcity of research into narrative therapy creates professional and 
ethical problems for clinical psychologists working in the current NHS. There is both a 
managerial, professional and ethical imperative to apply evidence-based practice wherever an 
evidence-base exists. There are no research studies into the effectiveness of narrative therapy 
which meet the strictest established research criteria used by the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence or the Cochrane Collaboration. In practice, a clinician who wants to advance the 
cause of narrative therapy is faced with not being able to practice his /her preferred approach, 
especially where the evidence-base points to substantial improvements using other approaches 
(such as using cognitive-behavioural therapy for panic disorder). Ethical practice requires that 
at least clients be informed of alternatives to the narrative approach and their chances of 
success. Clinical governance requires clinicians to prove -  in terms of outcome and efficiency 
-  that they were justified in not using the “standard” approach. The continued development of 
clinical psychology itself -  as well as narrative therapy - is jeopardised because research into 
innovative practice is constrained in this way.
Specialist Essay
It would be significant and helpful to both the modernist and postmodernist traditions, then, if 
a bridge could be reconstructed between the two in the field of clinical psychology. The 
obvious place to look for such a bridge is in the field of social psychology. You would look 
here because as suggested before a link already exists in Kelley’s construct theory (which 
heavily influenced both social psychology and narrative therapy) and because the view of 
identity in narrative therapy and in current social psychology are influenced by social 
constructionist ideas. It will be suggested that Breakwell’s integrated process model of 
identity (1986) from the social psychology domain might help reconstruct the bridge.
The theory underlying narrative therapy
To search for common ground, one first needs to describe the territory called “narrative 
therapy.” One of the difficulties of narrative therapy is that it is a broad church that has taken 
on a number of different forms (Neimeyer R., 1993). In this essay I shall concentrate on 
narrative therapy as defined by Michael White and David Epston (1990). The key to 
understanding narrative therapy lies in the text analogy. White contrasted the study of human 
behaviour using the analogy of text against the analogies drawn from the positivist physical 
sciences. Under the text analogy, social organisation is constructed as behavioural texts, 
problems constructed as the performance of oppressive, dominant stories, and solutions 
comprise of opening a space for the authoring of alternative stories. The use of the text 
analogy 'enabled the interaction of persons to be considered as the interaction of readers 
around particular texts... (and) to conceive of the evolution of lives and relationships in terms 
of the reading and writing of texts, in so far as every new reading of a text is a new 
interpretation of it, and thus a different writing of it.’ (White and Epston, 1990). Moving from 
the interpersonal level to the intra-psychic level, White and Epston argued that people engage 
in meaning-making to order to make sense of their lives and this can be best understood in 
terms of stories or self-narratives. 'The success of this storying of experience provides persons 
with a sense of continuity and meaning in their lives, and this is relied upon for the ordering of 
daily lives and for the interpretation of further experiences.’ (White and Epston, 1990). As 
Carr(1998) indicates this means narrative is identity: "the narrative approach rests on the 
assumption that narratives are not representations of reflections of identities, lives, and 
problems. Rather narratives constitute identities, lives and problems.”
Crucially, a person’s dominant self-narrative also establishes the criteria for data/text selection 
into the ongoing texts resulting in people paying a price for stoiying their lived experience 
through dominant narratives. Lived experience is richer than discourse, so some parts of our 
experience (the possible alternative self-stories we have of ourselves and that others have
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about us) go unstoried and remain 'amorphous, without organisation and without shape.’ 
(White and Epston, 1990). Problems, then, occur either because a client is being situated in 
stories that others have about him/her and his/her relationships, and that these stories are so 
dominant that they allow insufficient space for the performance of the person’s preferred 
stories, or that the client is actively engaging in stories she finds unhelpful, unsatisfying or 
dead-ended, and which do not encapsulate the person’s lived experience or run counter to the 
lived experience (White and Epston, 1990). Such positioning occurs because dominant social 
and cultural discourses become reified into objective ‘‘truths” about life against which 
individuals make comparisons and evaluations of their own lives. For example, young women 
in Western society might internalise the dominant discourse that to be valuable and attractive 
they must be slim, subjugating other discourses around what is valuable and attractive in 
young women. In narrative terms the therapeutical process is concentrated on the process of 
re-authoring personal narratives, which "changes lives, problems and identities because 
personal narratives are constitutive of identity." (Carr, 1998).
From theory to therapy.
Therapy, then, in narrative terms, involves the client being invited to re-author their own 
narratives, deconstructing dominant narratives and re-visioning their stories (Davis-Berman & 
Berman, 1998). For clients to be coming to therapy, they or those in power around them must 
consider the client to live in a problem-story. This problem-saturated story is often 
internalised and experienced as the sum of the person. The client believes, say, “I am stupid 
and I have always been stupid” or “I am depressed” to the exclusion of alternative 
descriptions. One of the therapist’s and client’s tasks is to identify “unique outcomes”, which 
are moments in which the client resists the invitation of the problem to organise his life 
around ways that support the problem and cohere with the problem-story. White and Epston 
(1990) recommend that the identification of unique outcomes can be facilitated by the 
deconstruction of the problem-saturated story. Deconstruction involves exposing the 
underlying assumptions that background a problem-story, which often appear to the client as a 
fact or rule about the world. Deconstruction challenges the notion that beliefs are “facts” 
(based on the postmodernist challenge to objective reality). Externalising the problem- 
saturated story is a favoured technique of deconstruction in narrative therapy. Extemalisation 
promotes agency, so that clients 'experience a capacity to intervene in their own lives and 
relationships, and the identification of unique outcomes. Deconstruction allows clients, not 
necessarily to move out of problem stories but to stand in a different relationship to them’ 
(Epston, 1992). Clients are then required to ascribe meaning to the unique outcomes and to 
plot them into an alternative self-narrative or other-narrative. As alternative stories become 
available to be performed, clients are encouraged to identify expressions of lived experience
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which would otherwise have gone unstoried and to review the effect of these expressions in 
their lives and relationships (White, 1990). Alternative stories can be “thickened” (White, 
1995) by the client recruiting an audience to witness the performance of the new story (White 
and Epston, 1990).
The problems of narrative therapy and its construction of identity and identity change.
Narrative theory suggests that self-narratives, while capable of being changed and moulded 
are "stable structures of the mind that dictate what information will be processed in what 
way." (Strand, 1997). Unlike structural family therapists who argue that what needs to be 
restructured is interactions between individuals, narrative therapists believe that what needs to 
be restructured is the intraindividual constructions of problematic situations. Yet as Strand
(1997) points out the theoiy offers 'surprisingly little in terms of describing the mental 
structures in need of restructuring.’ It lacks explanatory power over the process of re­
authoring. For example, narrative theory does not explain why some stories are more 
amenable to be re-authored than others and it does not predict whether some individuals are 
more amenable to a narrative approach than others. It is in seeking to address these issues that 
a process model of identity should be considered.
Breakwell’s integrated process model of identity (1986)
Breakwell’s integrated process model of identity (1986) is one model from a social 
psychological tradition which appears useful as a link between the two traditions. The model 
of identity proposed by Breakwell is social constructionist in nature in that identity is not 
considered stable and unitary but as “a dynamic social product, residing in psychological 
processes, which cannot be understood except in relation to its social context and historical 
perspective.5 (Breakwell, 1986). The structure of identity as proposed by Breakwell is easily 
recognisable in the discourse of narrative therapy. Breakwell contends that identity structure 
consists of two planes: the content dimension and the value dimension.
The content dimension 'encompasses both those characteristics...considered the domain of 
social identity (such as group membership, roles etc.) and of personal identity (values, 
attitudes, cognitive style etc.)5 (Breakwell, 1986). The traditional view of social and personal 
identities being separate is abandoned because 'seen across the biography, social identity is 
seen to become personal identity.5 As Kitzinger (1998) has it, the two “interpenetrate each 
other55 in a dialectical relationship. The content dimension is organised in terms of degree of 
centrality, hierarchical arrangements of the elements and the relative salience of components. 
Content, however, is not static and is responsive to changes demanded by the social context.
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In narrative therapy terms characteristics considered the domain of social identity can be 
equated with subjectivities, while those of personal identity relate to subjectivities shaped by 
and shaping discourses.
Each element in the content dimension has a positive or negative value attached to it, which 
constitutes the value dimension. The value dimension is subject to revision as a consequence 
of changes in the social value systems and modifications in the individuaPs position in 
relation to social value systems (Breakwell, 1986).
There is, then, in this conception of personhood a strong overlap with narrative therapy. The 
idea of the individuated self is deconstructed and other models of personhood/identity are 
presented. The role of time as being biographical, rather than an objective reality also threads 
through both discourses. Both theories also rest on the implicit assumption that human 
systems are characterised by self-organising development, evolving in such a way as to 
protect their internal coherence and integrity (Matron & Valero, 1987, cited in R. Neimeyer, 
1993).
Crucially, however, Breakwell describes the processes and the principles by which an 
individuaPs sense of identity responds to changes (or “news of difference” as narrative 
therapists would have it) in the environment. The processes of identity are guided by 
principles which define desirable states for the structure of identity. In western culture the 
current prime principles are: continuity, distinctiveness and maintaining or increasing self­
esteem (defined as a feeling of personal worth or social value). These three principles will 
vary in their relative salience over time, across situations and on a developmental dimension. 
These principles guide the processes maintaining identity structure: assimilation and 
accommodation (which are components of the same process) and evaluation.* The two 
processes constantly interact. This process-model generates a theory of what defines a threat 
to identity (or a problem for a client). A threat to identity occurs when these two processes are 
unable to comply with the principles of continuity, distinctiveness and self-esteem.** 
Breakwell makes a distinction between occupying a position in which identity is threatened 
and actually experiencing threat. She argues that if coping strategies are effective, occupancy 
of a threatening position may lose its power to threaten. Some interventions in narrative 
therapy can be conceptualised as effecting this shift. For example, if a client presents with a 
dominant story that he cannot control his anger. One narrative strategy would be to identify 
the alternative story embedded in unique outcomes when the client had controlled his anger 
and allow the client to enter into this stoiy. As life will always continue to evoke anger- 
inducing situations, it could be said that the strategy has been to help the client stay in a
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threatening position but not to experience threat. In identity terms the principle of self-esteem 
has become more central than continuity.
Breakwell (1986) theorises that threats to identity can produce coping responses on an intra­
psychic, interpersonal and group/intergroup level (See Appendix 1). She proposes that the 
choice of coping strategy is determined by an interaction between the type of threat involved 
and the salient parameters of the social context, the prior identity structure and the cognitive 
capacity of the individual. She further argues that suboptimal coping strategies will be 
maintained as long as the constellation of factors that produced the choice remains unchanged.
Conceptualising narrative therapy using Breakwell’s model:
An example from clinical practice will demonstrate how Breakwell’s theory can help 
conceptualise narrative therapy practice. Anne (name changed) is a single mother with two 
children, who is presenting with obsessional behaviour around throwing away food which is 
not entirely fresh, with cleanliness; with a fear of taking medication; with mood swings; and 
with almost daily panic attacks. She was raised in a family which reflected the dominant 
cultural discourse that “abnormal” behaviour was considered deficient and a sign of weakness. 
Since leaving home, Anne has maintained a peer group that has espoused such discourses.
The “weakness” belief also reflects the wider social/cultural discourse, which has real 
threatening effects in terms of “abnormal” people being isolated and marginalised. Anne 
herself reflects the dominant discourse in seeing the panic attacks as “a sign of weakness”.
She believes it is “girl-ly” to show vulnerability. If she has a panic attack she likes to hug her 
eldest daughter to make her feel “rational” again. Anne cannot always remember being 
particular with food. She says the problem started with the birth of her first child six years 
ago. She sometimes pretends with her friends that she has no problems (but is now “fed up 
with pretending all my life”) and sometimes she avoids going out altogether because she fears 
the disapproval of friends if she had a panic attack. Unlike a cognitive-behavioural approach,
*Assimilation refers to the absorption of new components into identity structure; accommodation refers 
to the adjustment which occurs in the existing structure to find a place for the new elements. The 
process of evaluation entails the allocation of meaning and value to identity contents (Breakwell, 1986).
** A threat to identity can originate externally (e.g. if a person is made redundant) or internally, if a 
person seeks to alter his position in the social matrix in accordance with one principle only.
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a narrative therapist would not concentrate on the “diagnosis”. A narrative therapist might 
externalise problem and map the effect of the problem on Anne and vice versa. S/he would 
search for the dominant story, particularly focussing on how the client identifies problems and 
then ascertaining how the client perceived the behaviours as a reflection on her preferred 
identity as a mother, friend, daughter etc. (White, 1995). BreakwelPs theory allows the 
narrative therapist to conceptualise why this particular behaviour would be considered a 
“threat” to this woman’s identity structure. As content and value dimensions of her identity 
contain a positive valence for normality and healthiness, to assimilate the new “abnormal” 
behaviours would not comply with the principle of self-esteem. The continuity principle is 
also contradicted by the emergence of the behaviours seven years ago. Assimilation- 
accommodation cannot take place, therefore Anne remains in a threatening position. 
Additionally, Breakwell’s model allows the therapist to conceptualise Anne’s current 
interpersonal coping strategies as wavering between isolation and passing. The alternative 
story, which will enable the identity processes to take place, will be found where Anne resists 
the invitations to adopt these sub-optimal strategies.
Breakwell’s model as an explanatory tool in narrative therapy
Breakwell’s model allows the clinician to hypothesise about what stories are unhelpful and 
why some stories are more amenable to being re-authored than others are. White and Epston 
(1990) offer some pointers to the clinical decision of what story to look out for, particularly 
when the clinical presentation is mixed. They suggest that the therapist looks out for 
discourses that are “oppressive”. Tomm (1987) suggests that the therapist listens out for 
negative external conversations which have become internalised by the client. For example, if 
family and peers and partners repeatedly tell a person they are useless, then the person’s 
identity structure interpenetrated by its social context will assimilate the information into its 
content and value dimensions. Chen, Noosbond and Bruce (1998) recommend listening for 
problem self-descriptors that are “totalising”( such as “I am an alcoholic”), which involve the 
client in the belief that s/he is defined entirely by his/her drinking. Breakwell’s model 
provides a more specific guide to considering how to define the problem stoiy. It is a story 
that violates one or more of the three principles. Most obviously, it will be a story that lowers 
self-esteem. Interestingly, Breakwell’s model suggests that to accommodate the story into 
identity structure the story over time will have to harmonise with at least one of the three 
principles. Most commonly, problem-stories appear to adhere to the principle of continuity. 
For example, a depressed person who feels he is incompetent, will story his life as one of 
continual and continuing incompetence.
Breakwell’s model also guides the clinician and client in choosing which alternative stories to 
co-construct and how to go about it. Again, the model indicates that the story must be
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consonant with one of the three principles. The continuity principle provides an example. 
Alternative stories cannot just be the opposite of the dominant oppressive story, unless the 
client indicates by their language that the opposite view of them has existed in their store of 
lived experience but in unstoried, disorganised form. Taking the example of Anne given 
above, it might be inappropriate to focus on a unique outcome in which she indicated that she 
was “strong” not “weak”. Further questioning would be required to explore whether this 
alternative self-view was one that had some continuity with Anne’s lived experience and that 
fitted with Anne’s vision of her personhood into the future. The therapist and Anne would 
then be engaged in embedding this re-authored story in Anne’s personal and interpersonal 
history and into her current context.
Process issues in narrative therapy
The key feature of Breakwell’s model is that in integrating a number of existing theories and 
evidence in social psychology on identity she added a model of the processes underlying 
identity structure and content. Again, the ideas on process may advance the practice of 
narrative therapy, or at least provide a conceptual framework for reflective practice. Breakwell 
refers to three major processes: assimilation and accommodation and evaluation. Narrative 
therapy is mainly concerned with accommodation and evaluation. Assimilation is not its 
primary concern, in as much that therapists are concerned with joining with clients to story 
existing areas of their lived existence not new material, “to notice and reconstitute their lives 
along lines they may prefer, and to develop more preferred versions of themselves.’ 
(Zimmerman and Dickerson, 1994). The process of assimilation in narrative therapy may 
occur after alternative stories have been co-constructed in the therapeutic conversation and the 
client recruits “witnesses” to enactments of the re-authored self. If a woman who is subject to 
domestic violence forms a self-help group, regaining a sense of efficacy and agency, then 
action in this domain may form new material regarding power and gender to be assimilated by 
the identity structure.
However, authoring alternative stories primarily involves accommodation of existing, but 
unstoried identity content, and changes in evaluation of existing content. In Breakwell’s 
model the two processes stand in a dialectical relationship; changes in the content of identity 
brought about by accommodation will effect changes in the evaluative process and value 
dimension which in turn will effect changes in the content dimension and so forth. Similarly, 
this dialectical relationship can be seen in narrative therapy. Taking Anne’s example, if 
unique outcomes can be identified that suggest an alternative story of personal strength, and 
even communal/gender strength and Anne notices this news of difference, then, in terms of 
Breakwell’s model, accommodation of unstoried identity structure is taking place. With such
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accommodation, concerns around eating and taking medicines would be expected to be re­
evaluated as Anne stands in a new relationship to her “problems”. This new stance in relation 
to eating and medicines would in turn engender fresh experiences in which lived experience 
expressing personal strength and power could be more readily assimilated as it is more readily 
attended to and positively valued.
Limits of narrative therapy?
One part of Breakwell’s model throws up an interesting question around the limits of narrative 
therapy. Breakwell argues that identity structures are the product of the interaction of the 
biological organism with its social context. Therefore, “the parameters of the biological 
organism.. .set the ultimate constraints upon the development of identity and provide the 
capacities necessary for the operation of identity processes.” (Breakwell, 1986). Breakwell 
(1986) does not argue that more differentiated identity structures are in any way more 
“mature” or “better” than less developed ones, but she does suggest that cognitive capacity 
will effect the processes. Strand (1997) argues that cognitive development does limit narrative 
therapy, even among adults without cognitive impairment. He says for deconstruction in 
narrative therapy to be successful the client must be able to see that his/her self-identity is 
socially constructed; that is the client must be able to take a meta-position on identity as a 
basis for reconstructing a new reality. Some clients, he argues, are not at that cognitive 
developmental stage and will therefore respond better to a solution-focussed approach, in 
which therapist and client remain closer to the client’s current construction of reality. Against 
this, Michael White’s use of narrative therapy with children provided some of the first 
anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of die narrative approach, and Silvester (1994) has 
developed the approach for group assertiveness work with people with a learning disability.
Research, narrative therapy and Breakwell’s identity model.
As noted earlier there is a big research gap around narrative therapy in the context of clinical 
governance in the NHS. As Kelley (1998) notes when writing about narrative approaches in 
the context of the managed care market in the US, there are a number of ways in which 
narrative therapists can present their work in a framework acceptable to a managerial and 
scientific community wedded to empirical research approaches. Case-studies (White and 
Epston, 1990) and clinical practice indicate that narrative therapy is briefer than insight- 
oriented approaches and is therefore an efficient use of resources. Narrative therapists do 
discuss and label problems and, if required, could apply DSM-IV labels while “still keeping 
the narrative language and thinking for working with clients” (Kelley, 1998). Narrative 
therapists help individuals and families stop, control and alleviate specific problems that are 
oppressing them and such goals are easily defined in outcome terms. For these reasons there is
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no pragmatic reason why narrative therapy could not be the subject of traditional empirical 
outcome research. However, as narrative therapists do not assume the linear relationships 
which underlie statistical procedures in positivist research methodology, they have been 
traditionally resistant to it. This essay suggests that other methodologies such as ethnographic 
approaches, stochastic modelling and transcript analysis could also be useful (Kelley, 1998). 
Additionally, as Kelley (1998) suggests repertory grids, devised to measure clinical changes 
using Kelley’s Personal Construct Theory, could also be used. Training in the use of repertory 
grids would be required. However, such methodology alongside other qualitative and 
quantitative techniques could help narrative therapists talk more easily with a wider 
psychological community. Breakwell (1986) herself also advocated a catholic approach to 
methodology in the task of understanding better the “individual and ideological system” in 
identity.
Conclusion
The story of narrative therapy can accommodate a link with the wider psychological, even 
modernist, community without threatening its distinct identity. The argument put forward here 
is that not only is this possible, by thinking of narrative therapy and practice in terms of an 
integrated model of identity favoured in social psychology, but that it is necessary. If one only 
takes the area of research, the importance of bridging the communication gap between 
narrative and other approaches is palpable and paramount. To bridge the gap and foster 
research would be of benefit to the development of narrative therapy theory and practice and 
to the practice of clinical psychology itself. For example, one possible way forward would be 
to draw on the identity work in social psychology of Berzonsky (199, cited in Neimeyer, G. 
and Metzler, A., 1994), which might help narrative therapists reflect on the styles of storying 
adopted by clients and how these styles effect the process and content of generating re­
authored alternative stories (see Appendix 2).
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Appendix 1:
Breakwell’s model for coping with threats to identity (1986):
Breakwell (1986) argues that intra-psychic coping strategies rely on the process of 
accommodation-assimilation to either deflect or accept the implications of the threat. 
Deflection tactics entail the refusal to modify the content or value dimensions of identity. 
Deflection tactics include denial, transient depersonalisation, belief in the unreality of the self, 
fantasy, and reconstrual and reattribution. Another strategy involves a the process of 
evaluation revising the value placed upon either the existing or prospective content of identity 
(See fig. 1 below):
Interpersonal coping strategies rely upon changing relationships with others in order to cope 
with the threat. These include isolationism, negativism, passing and compliance. Group 
strategies include engendering group support for a dilemma, and using a group as a context 
for consciousness-raising, Groups can bring about change in the social structure or in the 
ideological milieu (Breakwell, 1986).
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Appendix 2:
Berzonsky (199 , cited in G. Neimeyer and A. Metzler, 1994) proposes that individuals adopt
one of three styles in processing information which pertains to their identity structure and
content.
These are:
1. Information-oriented individuals, who are marked by active efforts to seek, process and 
utilise self-relevant information prior to developing firm personal beliefs or commitments.
2. Normative-oriented individuals, who are marked by a reliance on available prescriptions 
and standards of referent groups and who place special emphasis on conserving existing 
beliefs and cordoning off aspects of identity.
3. Diffuse-oriented individuals, who are marked by heightened attention to situational 
demands and whose behaviour and self-beliefs are strongly shaped by immediate 
contexts.
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Older Adults Essay
Critically discuss the argument that psvchodvnamic psychotherapy is 
inappropriate for older people compared with other approaches.
Introduction.
Freud famously wrote in his 1905 paper 'On Psychotherapy’ that clients near or above the age 
of 50 were contraindicated for psychoanalytic psychotherapy because 'near or above the age 
of 50 the elasticity of mental processes, on which treatment depends, is as a rule lacking -  old 
people are no longer educable... ’ He went on to say that psychoanalytic psychotherapy was 
also impractical with this group because 'the mass of material.. .would prolong the duration of 
the treatment indefinitely.’ Since he made his comments psychoanalytic therapy has been 
accepted enough for it to be enshrined in the National Service Framework for Older People 
(DoH, 2001) as a treatment option for older adults with depression. However, there is still 
resistance to the idea of using psychoanalytic psychotherapy for older adults among 
psychoanalysts themselves and among referring psychiatrists. Bateman and Holmes (1995), 
while taking issue with Freud, list “older patients” among “special groups” in their 
introduction to psychoanalysis. Turner (1992) cites a study by Ford and Sbordone (1980) 
which revealed that psychiatrists were less likely to refer older patients than younger ones for 
psychotherapy in general, including dynamic therapies, on the grounds that older clients had a 
poorer prognosis than their younger counterparts. In this essay, the evidence for the 
appropriateness of psychodynamic psychotherapies with older adults will be examined. The 
criteria forjudging “appropriateness” will be wide. It will include an examination of Freud’s 
criteria. The process of cognitive changes in normal development will be examined briefly to 
see if the psychotherapies are inappropriate on the basis of “mental inelasticity”. As Freud 
was basically arguing that for process reasons psychoanalytic therapy was inappropriate, 
theory and process issues will also be examined. The essay will also tackle time and cost 
effectiveness -  Freud’s second prohibition. However, the criteria of appropriateness will also 
be extended to include modem NHS concerns with clinical effectiveness.
In this essay, the term psychodynamic psychotherapy will be taken to include both 
psychodynamic and psychoanalytic approaches as much of the theoretical literature and case 
studies concentrates on psychoanalytic approaches and much of the research literature lumps 
both together as “insight-oriented” therapy. Psychodynamic psychotherapy will be compared 
with cognitive-behavioural therapy and pharmacotherapy, in the main, as these are the best 
researched and most prevalent alternative treatments in the NHS. Older adults will be taken to
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mean clients over 65, as this is the age-related criterion for service provision and the age often 
used to define older adults in research studies.
Clinical effectiveness:
It is widely accepted that older adults can have the same range and severity of psychological 
problems as younger adults, although with sometimes differing presentations. Anxiety 
disorders provide a good example. A community sample study in the US found combined 1- 
month prevalence of phobia, panic and obsessive compulsive disorders in older adults was 
5.5% (Flint, 1994; cited in Niederehe and Schneider, 1998). Additionally, evidence suggests 
that depression and anxiety disorders are more frequently chronic and recurring than with 
younger adults. Murphy (1994, cited in Niederehe and Schneider, 1998) found that 25-33% of 
older adults failed to make a complete recovery from depression.
A meta-analysis by Scogin and McElreath (1994) of 17 studies of psychosocial treatments 
including cognitive and psychodynamic therapies for depression revealed that all treatments 
were more effective than no-treatment conditions, with treatment effect sizes comparable to 
psychosocial treatments for younger adults. The analysis revealed no advantage for one 
treatment approach over another. However, analysis of a series of randomised-controlled trials 
by Gallagher, Thompson and their colleagues comparing various psychosocial interventions 
for depression with each other and a delayed-treatment control group reveals a more complex 
picture. Gallagher and Thompson (1982,1983) compared treatment outcomes for 30 adults 
with an age range of 59-90 on three treatment conditions -  behavioural, cognitive, and 
insight-oriented psychotherapy. Patients received 16 sessions over a 12-week period and were 
followed-up four times over a one-year period. Their findings paint a more complex picture of 
treatment efficacy. While each therapy gained an equal treatment response, improvement was 
maintained more effectively one-year post-treatment for clients treated with behavioural or 
cognitive therapy than with insight-oriented therapy. Additionally, the authors found that both 
cognitive and insight therapies were less effective depending on the severity and sub-type of 
depressive disorder. They also found that the insight-oriented psychodynamic psychotherapy 
achieved favourable outcomes compared with pharmacological treatments for younger adults 
with depression. The results of this study need to be treated with caution. Like most clinical 
effectiveness studies in older adults the sample size is small, indicating that replication is 
needed to be confident about generalising the results. The study also included an unspecified 
number of people under 65, with no indication whether there was a treatment-by-age effect. 
Additionally, since the study was completed in the early 1980s a new class of anti-depressant 
drugs has become available. The suggestion that insight-oriented psychotherapy is more 
effective than some drug therapies needs to be treated with caution, therefore. Another
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problem is that for this trial, as with many other controlled trials in this area, the type of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy offered had to be adapted to fit the limits of time and staff 
training, and may not be a reflection of the more traditional “real” psychodynamic approach.
The same research team (Thompson et al., 1987) replicated the study with a larger sample 
(n=91) in 1987 and published findings on follow-up data in 1990. Again, the authors found 
that each treatment approach was more effective than a delayed-treatment control. However, 
they found that contrary to their 1982 study improvements were maintained equally among 
the treatment conditions. Indeed, they found higher rates of remission in psychodynamic 
psychotherapies, although the difference compared with the cognitive approach was not 
statistically significant. Notably, they again found a significant group of clients -  30% spread 
equally among the three treatment conditions - did not respond to any treatment approach.
Case studies have been widely utilised to explore the effectiveness and discuss the processes 
of psychodynamic approaches with older adults. The use of case studies was widely used by 
Freud and has an important place in the development of psychodynamic theory and practice. 
However, caution must be exercised when using case studies to provide evidence for efficacy 
of a particular treatment approach. The obvious dangers are that the individuals involved may 
not be representative of the population at large and that it is difficult to disentangle cause and 
effect. Moreover, case studies are usually selected for publication on the basis that the 
therapist considers them a success. Bearing in mind this caveat, case studies indicate that 
psychodynamic psychotherapies can be effective with a range of presenting conditions. 
Sandler (1978), for example, reports on a successful 8-year analysis of a 58-year-old man with 
narcissistic concerns to please others and with fears about dying. Gorsuch (1998) used brief 
analytic methods to treat a 75-year-old woman whose asthma attacks were being exacerbated 
by stress. These studies are suggestive - although not conclusive - of the utility of both 
traditional long-term analysis and brief methods and complement some of the findings from 
controlled group studies. They pose a challenge to Freud's strictures on age - one of the 
subjects was 25 years older than his suggested limit - and on volume of material - Gorsuch 
(1998) effected changes in 14 sessions.
There have been few studies into the most effective treatment modality for psychosocial 
approaches to depression in older adults. Steuer et al. (1984) conducted one of the major 
studies comparing group CBT with group psychodynamic therapy. Subjects with chronic 
depression ranging in age from 55 to 78 received 48 sessions of treatment over nine months. 
The results were not unequivocally successful. Both groups showed statistically significant 
reductions in symptoms, which appeared not to be due to spontaneous remission as
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participants had on average suffered from depression for four years prior to therapy. However, 
three-quarters of the sample who completed therapy still had moderate to severe depression as 
rated on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961). Success rates were equivalent for 
both treatment conditions. There was a hard-to-treat group (15%) who did not benefit at all. 
Again, caution must be exercised in interpreting the results, and the study needs replication. 
However, the group results are rather worse than those achieved through individual treatment. 
Significantly, the authors did not find that group CBT was more effective than group 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, in contradiction to findings with younger adults. It may be 
then that psychodynamic group approaches are as effective as the CBT group approach.
Studies suggest that the use of pharmacotherapy for treatment of depression may be limited 
for some older adults because of reduced tolerance and severe side effects (Strauss and 
Solomon, 1983, cited in Thompson et al., 1987). In their review Niederehe and Schneider
(1998) conclude that the research base is suggestive not conclusive in indicating that 
psychosocial approaches are as effective as drug therapy. Studies directly comparing 
treatment approaches with drug therapy have concentrated on CBT and Interpersonal Therapy 
(IPT), not on psychodynamic approaches and on a limited number of anti-depressants. The 
research base, however, is sparse and more studies are needed. The picture that is emerging, 
however, is that CBT and drug therapy in combination can work more quickly and effectively 
than either treatment approach alone (Niederehe and Schneider, 1998).
Despite the prevalence of anxiety disorders in older adults (Roth and Fonagy, 1996), research 
in this area with an older population is both sparse and of limited quality by current standards 
(Niederehe and Schneider, 1998). Niederehe and Schneider (1998) report that there is only 
one randomised control study with clients with diagnosed generalised anxiety disorder.
Stanley and Beck, 1995 (cited in Niederehe and Schneider, 1998) found that both CBT and 
supportive psychotherapy was effective in treating clients with chronic comorbid anxiety and 
depression, with an advantage for CBT in dealing with some specific anxieties.
Summary of clinical effectiveness findings.
The research literature indicates that psychodynamic approaches are as effective in treating 
some clients for depression and anxiety as other treatment approaches. Individual treatment 
approaches seem more effective than a group approach in both CBT and psychodynamic 
therapy. Combined drug and CBT treatment appears to work quickly and effectively with 
quite severe depression. Additionally, there appears to be a sizeable hard-to-treat group 
(ranging from 15-30%) for whom psychosocial approaches are not helpful and there is another 
group for whom pharmacotherapy is either impractical or unacceptable. However, there are a
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number of gaps in the research. There is little research into the over 75s and into anxiety 
disorders. Questions need to be answered regarding the effectiveness of psychodynamic and 
CBT approaches for clients with severe Axis 1 disorders. More research is needed into the 
effectiveness of both approaches with older adults with Axis 2 disorders.
The appropriateness of psvchodvnamic psychotherapy - development considerations:
Since Freud (1905) indicated that there were process issues that impede successful 
psychodynamic approaches, there have been a number of theoretical developments on ageing 
which make it an obligation for psychotherapists of any persuasion to consider older adults for 
psychotherapy. Specifically, these theories suggest that older adults, as much as younger 
adults, are engaged in an ongoing developmental process with two possible results -  
psychological healthiness or psychological problems. Ethically, psychotherapists are obliged 
to consider offering treatment where psychological health is threatened. Two developments 
will be discussed here.
Erikson (1959):
Erikson (1959) adopted an epigenetic approach to psychological development. He formulated 
eight phases of life in which the growing individual is faced with new phase-specific tasks 
that require resolution to move to the next phase. The task for the older adult is to reconcile 
the mistakes and achievements of the past to achieve ego integrity. Success or failure in this 
task will result in either an old age faced with integrity or an old age faced with despair. A 
case example illustrates how this theory can shed light on the presentation of depressive 
symptoms in older adults. Peter (not real name) was a man in his 70s who had suffered a 
stroke and was currently on a specialist rehabilitation ward. Rehabilitation staff were 
concerned that he was depressed and might have dysexecutive function. Assessment indicated 
that Peter did not fit the DSM-IV criteria for depression. However, it revealed that he had 
strong emotions about past family losses and about his past achievements and failures.
Without direct prompting and with great emotion he recounted his proudest moment and his 
biggest regret of his life. He hated the idea of ageing, which he viewed as an inevitable, 
inexorable process of loss. He also spoke of his attempt to come to terms with his past life and 
its mistakes. This case can be formulated in terms of Peter’s current struggle to resolve the 
integrity, v. Despair dilemma. The appropriateness of using psychodynamic approaches to 
treat Peter will be discussed later, but the case indicates how Erikson’s theoretical framework 
-  developed since Freud -  allows therapists not only to consider using a psychosocial 
intervention but also a way of thinking to guide an intervention.
Scientific gerontology:
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Knight (1999) argues that perspectives from scientific gerontology indicate strongly that 
NORMAL ageing is not associated with psychological problems and therefore, where there 
are problems, there are strong imperatives to consider treatment. He cites research (Rybash, 
Hoyer and Roodin, 1986, cited in Knight, 1999) that suggests older adults can develop 
expertise founded on experience and a movement to post-formal reasoning based on an 
understanding of the dialectical nature of argument and social change. Knight (1999) also 
cites research (e.g. Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe & Bulka, 1989) which indicates older adults can 
be more emotionally mature than their younger counterparts.
Summary of developmental considerations:
The ongoing development of theories of ageing since Freud’s time, then, does indicate that 
psychotherapists -  including psychodynamic therapists -  should consider older adults for 
treatment on the basis of need and that therapists have a theoretical framework in which to 
formulate and make interventions effective.
Appropriateness- client-related factors:
Indeed, a number of authors argue that rather than older adults making less appropriate clients 
for psychodynamic psychotherapy, advancing years makes them clients who are more willing 
to face the challenge of insight-oriented therapy. Newton et al. (1986) suggest that ageing and 
experience prepare older adults for self-examination by reducing the defence of narcissism 
characteristic of younger adults. They also cite Weinberg’s 1970 suggestion that older adults 
may have an increased capacity to delay gratification and accept the pain necessary to achieve 
psychotherapeutic gains. King (1974) is one of many authors who has argued that the nearness 
of death may add impetus and focus to the therapeutic process. King (1974) also argues that as 
older people often suffer real losses as they age, the immediacy of the losses makes it more 
incumbent on the client to face underlying anxieties.
Appropriateness — normal ageing and cognitive factors
Current research indicates that Freud’s contention that people over 50 lack the mental 
elasticity of younger people, is at best, a huge oversimplification and at worst wrong. Freud 
does not define mental elasticity, but the context suggests he was talking about overall 
intellectual and problem solving ability. The research is too extensive and complex to go into 
here, but a summary will be provided. Research from cross-sectional data indicate that there is 
a general overall intellectual decline but it occurs from age 60-70, not earlier. Dividing 
intelligence into fluid and crystallised intellectual skills (Horn & Cattell, 1967, cited in Woods 
& Britton, 1985), research (cited in Woods & Britton, 1985) suggests that on many tests older 
people perform one or two standard deviations below their younger counterparts in tests of
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fluid skills, putting many into the category of people with a learning difficulty. This is clearly 
an artefact of the tests, as many older people function in daily life normally or at a high level. 
One possible explanation is that older people use their crystallised abilities to 
compensate for losses in fluid cognitive abilities. In a review of the literature on everyday 
problem-solving ability, Willis (1996) found that older people increasingly use prior 
experiential knowledge and “well-honed procedural strategies” to solve problems. In fact, he 
describes the process as more “efficient” (in terms of needing less information to act) than 
problem-solving in younger people. Indeed, Willis (1996) argues that research indicates older 
people make decisions about their own health more quickly than younger people do. The 
finding on fluid ability may just reflect a cohort effect. Labouvie-Vief et al. (1974) argue that 
apparent intellectual deficits in older adults reflect a lack of practice and familiarity with the 
tasks involved in an IQ test and nothing else. Older people, then, are efficient problem solvers, 
who make flexible use of crystallised cognitive abilities to compensate for losses in fluid 
cognitive skills.
Freud’s contention also assumes homogeneity in intellectual functioning which is not borne 
out by research. Summarising a 20-year longitudinal study, Siegler and Botwinick (1979, 
cited in Woods & Britton, 1985) found that “a sizeable proportion” of older adults declines 
intellectually “very little”. This finding of heterogeneity in intellectual decline suggests factors 
other than age-related ones are playing a part in “mental elasticity”. Among the many factors 
to be found to effect IQ are concurrent illness and closeness to death. Rabbitt et al. (1997) 
have found that physical problems interfere with intellectual functioning. Physical problems 
can occur at any age, although they increase in prevalence with age. The clinician needs to 
assess for physical problems, not assume intellectual rigidity on the basis of age. Additionally, 
as early as 1961, the phenomenon of pre-death intellectual decline was observed by Kleemeier 
(cited in Woods & Britton, 1985). Both fluid and crystallised abilities decline dramatically in 
the 18-months prior to death. But again, apart from the fact that in most cases clinicians 
cannot know when a person is due to die, this decline is not age-related (although it its is more 
likely to occur in older adults). Patients coming to therapy may be or may not be in this pre­
death group. The clinician cannot bar older people on the false assumption of homogeneity of 
older adults with regards to this phenomenon. It can be seen, then, that Freud’s assumption on 
mental inelasticity has been shown to be false. Older people are often good problem-solvers 
but they use different strategies than younger people. Intellectual decline is not universal by 
any means. Other non age-related factors (e.g. physical illness) are more important than age- 
related factors in determining intellectual functioning.
Appropriateness -  time (and cost) restraints:
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The above research also bears on Freud’s second argument, that the amount of material the 
older client will bring to therapy makes insight-oriented work impractical. A number of 
studies cited in the effectiveness research above (e.g. Gallagher & Thompson, 1982, and 
Gorsuch, 1998) indicate that brief analytical approaches produce symptom reduction in older 
adults with depression. In the NHS context, where efficiency of treatment forms such a key 
component of effectiveness, this indicates that psychodynamic psychotherapy cannot be 
deemed inappropriate on the basis of length of treatment (at least with depression). 
Additionally, the research on problem-solving cited above (Willis, 1996) gives a theoretical 
basis for indicating that older adults can utilise brief approaches: many older adults make 
health-related decisions more quickly and use efficient means of problem-solving.
Summary of ageing, cognitive and time factors:
There is, then, no theoretical -  in terms of psychological and intellectual development -  or 
practical reason -  in terms of time and resources -  why older adults should not be offered 
psychodynamic therapy as well as other therapies. In empirical terms, too, while more 
research is needed, the indications are that, especially for depression, psychodynamic 
psychotherapies are effective and may be as effective as other treatment approaches.
However, most writers on psychodynamic psychotherapy argue that therapists need to modify 
their practice with older adults. This begs three questions: is modification really needed? If it 
is, does psychodynamic psychotherapy require greater modification than other approaches? 
and how does it need to be modified?
Do psvchodvnamic and other approaches need to be modified to be appropriate?
To take the last question first, a range of authors have put forward age-related factors to argue 
the need for modification of psychodynamic therapy. Newton et al., 1986, put the arguments 
eloquently. They argue that with some older adults, especially those who are isolated through 
bereavement, the therapist should shed his/her traditionally neutral analytic stance. For 
example, they argue therapists might enter into “symbolic giving” by being empathic and 
reaffirming to provide gratification for the client’s psychological neediness and to contain 
his/her dependency needs. They also argue that to build the therapeutic alliance, which is the 
bedrock and template for change in the psychodynamic tradition, the therapist should be more 
active in helping clients address concrete concerns. Understanding transference in different 
ways than with younger clients is also invaluable, according to many authors, including King 
(1974). A client will have a wider network of significant attachments than simply the parental 
relationship, which dominates work with younger adults. King (1974) reports that therapists 
may, therefore, take on the role in the transference relationship of anything from 
grandson/daughter to a parent or teacher. Knight (1999) argues that countertransference issues
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can be different than with younger adults and are a notable obstacle to psychotherapists doing 
psychodynamic work with older adults. For example, ageism may block the work. Newton et 
al. (1986) give the example of a younger therapist feeling uncomfortable because of ageist 
taboos on older adult sexuality when the client develops sexual fantasies regarding the 
therapist in an eroticised transference. Additionally, King (1974) has argued that Freud and 
other psychotherapists’ traditional reluctance to treat older adults might be the result of their 
own fears about death and ageing, which by countertransference prevents therapy beginning 
in the first place. Knight (1999) argues that psychodynamic psychotherapists should not avoid 
therapy with this group, but should learn about the group from other disciplines -  notably 
scientific gerontology - and tackle the therapeutic issues through informed peer supervision.
It could be argued that the resources in terms of training and practice required to modify 
psychodynamic psychotherapy will, where resources are stretched, make it inappropriate for 
work with older adults, compared with other treatment approaches. However, there are 
indications that modifications are required to cognitive-behavioural therapy as well. Dick et 
al. (1999) argue cognitive therapists, like their psychodynamic counterparts, may have to 
adapt their own beliefs about older adults regarding mental elasticity and to gain supervision 
for countertransference issues (such as fear of getting old) to work effectively. Additionally, 
because of the complexity of many referred cases, treatment will often be multi-disciplinaiy 
and require the therapist to gain experience in consulting with other disciplines. Cognitive 
therapy may also need adaptation to deal with cohort-effects. For example, clients bom before 
the war may need more socialisation to the role of psychology in general and the model of 
CBT in particular as a collaborative venture, argue Dick and her colleagues (1999). Old age 
also poses some philosophical challenges to CBT, which in turn have implications for CBT 
practice. Niederehe and Schneider (1998) cite a number of studies ( e.g. Hassan and Pollard, 
1994) which indicate that anxiety and depression in older adults is linked to an increasing 
number of real-life stressors such as the death of family and friends. Yet Aaron Beck (1976), 
who developed CBT, places CBT in a strict positivist frame; therapists, for example, are 
expected to challenge clients’ cognitive ‘‘distortions” about the difficulties of their lives. 
Faced with many realistic concerns about the present and the future, older adults pose a 
challenge to this rationalist CBT approach.
The final question regarding modification of traditional approaches, concerns the question of 
whether modification is really required. As indicated above, there are instances where 
modification is necessary. However, there is a danger in assuming the homogeneity of older 
adults and, as Knight (1999) notes, in automatically equating ageing with some sort of loss. 
For example, Knight (1999) cites research evidence which undermines a number of Newton et
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al’s claims (1986)about adapting psychotherapy to meet the changed needs of older adults.
For example, Newton et al. (1986) argue that one of the key tasks of psychotherapy with older 
adults is to tackle regression caused by physical and social frailty. Knight (1999) argues that 
frailty is NOT the pre-requisite of the old and that there is evidence that regression in the face 
of frailty will take place whatever the age of the client.
It follows, then, that the decision as to whether psychodynamic therapy is more appropriate 
for a specific client with a specific problem should largely be based on the same criteria for 
such a decision with younger clients: on the duration and severity of the presenting problem, 
on the disposals available after assessment, on effectiveness criteria, on the wishes of the 
client, and on the assessment of the psychological robustness of the client to accept 
interpretations and the nature of his/her defences (Malan, 1979).
Appropriateness - age-related parameters:
However, as suggested above, the clinician is also required to include age-related parameters 
in his/her thinking on psychodynamic psychotherapy as an appropriate disposal. In practice, 
this starts with the assessment. Turner (1992), drawing on the work of Nemiroff and 
Colarusso (1985) which emphasises how every phase of development during the life cycle is 
equally important in psychological adaptation, indicates that a full lifelong development 
history should be taken, not just the early life. Niederehe and Schneider (1998) note that the 
presentation of psychological problems may differ between older and younger adults, yet 
standard diagnostic criteria ( DSM-IV, for example) are based on younger clinical samples. 
Clinicians working in any modality therefore need to adapt their thinking in order to make an 
accurate assessment for depression, for example. Again, clinicians working in any treatment 
modality will need to assess for cognitive limitations caused by illness or disease, which are 
more prevalent in older adults. Dementia, for example, causes global cognitive impairment 
which presents challenges to both psychodynamic and CBT approaches. Clinicians need to be 
able to assess for a differential diagnosis between dementia and depression.
An individualised assessment approach
Additionally, the timing of a disposal may effect whether psychodynamic or other approaches 
are appropriate. For example, Gallagher-Thompson and Steffen (1994) found that 71% of 
clinically depressed older adult caregivers treated with psychodynamic psychotherapy or CBT 
achieved symptom remission with no overall difference between treatment mode. However, 
those who had become caregivers more recently benefited more from pyschodynamic 
treatment, while those who had been caregivers for more than 3 years and six months 
benefited more from CBT. Additional factors that come into play in deciding on the
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appropriateness of a disposal for a particular treatment would include, severity of the 
condition (Gallagher and Thompson, 1983) and the setting in which the older person lives 
(studies indicate limited effectiveness for CBT for depression for residents of nursing homes; 
Kemp et al., 1991; cited in Niederehe and Schneider, 1998).
An illustrative case study:
The complexity surrounding the decision as to the appropriateness of a certain treatment 
disposal in older adults can be encapsulated in the case of Peter, cited above, who was referred 
with possible depression and executive functioning difficulties. As already stated, a 
psychodynamic intervention drawing on the work of Erikson (1959) was indicated at 
assessment. However, when the appropriateness is judged according to complex criteria which 
need to be applied when dealing with older adults -  including the clinical context in which the 
referral is made, the presentation of the condition, physical and cognitive factors - then the 
decision to treat, how to treat and when to treat becomes less clear cut. In Peter’s case the 
deciding interacting factors were timing, the referral context and the natural course of the 
disease process. Peter was recovering from a stroke on a specialist stroke rehabilitation ward. 
During the two-week assessment process, rehabilitation staff reported that Peter’s 
rehabilitation was no longer being impeded by his psychological adjustment to stroke. It was, 
therefore, decided not to offer Peter further psychological treatment at that point. There was 
the danger that the challenges involved in the psychodynamic approach would actually 
impede his rehabilitation. However, as the assessment revealed that Peter had attachment- 
separation issues, it was decided to review Peter again three weeks prior to his discharge 
home. It could be speculated that Peter’s “recovery” during assessment implicates the 
“disease” process as a factor. Cognitive recovery can be rapid in the first few weeks following 
a stroke and it is possible Peter was making a natural recovery, particularly with regard to 
executive function, which was allowing rehabilitation to progress smoothly. Clinical 
decisions regarding the appropriateness of a psychodynamic intervention need to incorporate 
this range of knowledge and understanding.
Conclusion:
Since Freud famously declared against psychodynamic approaches for older adults, times 
have changed. With the caveats of the limitations of research in this field in mind, both 
controlled clinical trials and anecdotal case studies into the efficacy of psychodynamic 
approaches have shown that psychodynamic therapy can be as effective with older adults as 
cognitive-behavioural and pharmacological treatments. There is a need -  and therefore a 
professional obligation - for psychological treatment in general to be available to older adults. 
As effectiveness studies indicate that some clients may not respond to other treatment
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approaches or by nature of the client presentation respond better to psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, it is important that the latter be offered as part of a comprehensive NHS 
provision. It has been argued that older adults may have more psychological robustness and 
motivation than younger adults to face the challenges of an insight-oriented therapy.
Empirical studies also indicate that mental inelasticity is not normal in old age and therefore is 
not an automatic bar to therapy. Likewise, the effectiveness of brief analytic approaches 
indicates that Freud’s concern with the length of therapy should not serve as a bar. 
Psychodynamic therapies may need to be adapted with older adults, but other approaches may 
also need to be modified. The "appropriateness” of a disposal to a psychodynamic therapist 
must take into account a number of age-related and non age-related factors and the key to 
getting this right is a thorough assessment of psychological, physical and contextual factors.
87
Older Adults Essay
References
Bateman, A., and Holmes, J. (1995). Introduction to psychoanalysis: contemporary theory 
and practice. London: Routledge.
Beck, A., Ward, C., Mendelson, M., Mock, J. and Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for 
measuring depression, Archives o f General Psychiatry, 42,142-148.
Dick, L., Gallagher-Thompson, D., and Thompson, L. (1999). Cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
In R. Woods (ed.), Psychological problems o f ageing: assessment, treatment and care. 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Erikson, E. (1959). Identity and the life cycle. Psychological Issues. New York: International 
Universities Press.
Freud, S. (1953) On psychotherapy. In J. Strachey (ed. & Trans.) The standard edition o f the 
complete psychological works o f Sigmund Freud (Vol.7, pp.257-270). London: Hogarth Press. 
(Original work published in 1905).
Gallagher, D. and Thompson, L. (1982). Treatment of major depressive disorder in older adult 
outpatients with brief psychotherapies, Psychotherapy: theory, research and practice, 19(4), 
482-489.
Gallagher, D. and Thompson, L. (1983). Effectiveness of psychotherapy for both endogenous 
and nonendogenous depression in older adult outpatients, Journal o f Gerontology, 38(6), 707- 
712.
Gallagher-Thompson, D., Hanley-Peterson, P. and Thompson, L. (1990). Maintenance of 
gains versus relapse following brief psychotherapy for depression. Journal o f Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 58 (3), 371-374.
Gallagher-Thompson, D., and Steffen, A. (1994). Comparative effects of cognitive- 
behavioural and brief psychodynamic psychotherapies for depressed family caregivers, 
Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 543-549.
88
Older Adults Essay
Gorsuch, N. (1998). Time’s winged chariot: short-term psychotherapy in later life, 
Psychodynamic Counselling, 4(2), 191-202.
King, P. (1974). Notes on the psychoanalysis of older patients, British Journal of 
Psychoanalytic Theory, 19,22-37.
Knight, B. (1999). Psychodynamic therapy and scientific gerontology. In R.Woods (ed.), 
Psychological problems o f ageing: assessment, treatment and care. Chichester: John Wiley.
Labouvie-Vief, G., Hoyer, W., Baltes, M. and Baltes, P. (1974). Operant analysis of 
intellectual behaviour in old age, Human Development, 17, 259-272.
Malan, D. (1979). Individual psychotherapy and the science o f psychodynamics. Oxford: 
Butterworth Heinemann.
National Service Framework for Older People, (2001), Department of Health. London: 
HMSO.
Newton, N., Brauer, D., Gutmann, D. and Grunes, J. (1986). Psychodynamic therapy with the 
aged: a review, Clinical Gerontologist, 5, 205-229.
Niederehe, G. and Schneider, L. (1998). Treatments for depression and anxiety in the aged. In 
P. Nathan and Gorman, J. (eds.) A guide to treatments that work. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Rabbitt, P., Bent, N., and Mclnnes, L. (1997). Health, age and IQ, Irish Journal o f 
Psychology, 18(1), 104-131.
Roth, A., and Fonagy, P. (1996). What works for whom? A critical review ofpsychotherapy 
research. New York: Guilford Press.
Sandler, A.. (1978). Psychoanalysis in later life: problems in the psychoanalysis of an aging 
narcissistic patient, Journal o f Geriatric Psychiatry, 11, 5-36.
Scogin, F., and McElreath, L. (1994). Efficacy of psychosocial treatments for geriatric 
depression: a quantitative review, Journal of Consulting and Clinical psychology, 62, 69-74.
89
Older Adults Essay
Steuer, J., Mintz, J., Hammen, C., Hill, M., Jarvik, L., McCarley, T., Motoike, P., and Rosen, 
R. (1984). Cognitive-behavioral and group psychotherapy in treatment of geriatric depression, 
Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53 (2), 180-189.
Turner, M. S. (1992). Individual psychodynamic psychotherapy with older adults: 
perspectives from a nurse psychotherapist, Archives o f Psychiatric Nursing, 4 (5), 266-274.
Thompson, L., Gallagher, D. and Breckenbridge, J. (1987). Comparative effectiveness of 
psychotherapies for depressed elders. Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(3), 
385-390.
Willis, S. (1996). Everyday problem solving. In J. Birren and K. Schaie (eds.), Handbook o f 
the psychology o f aging, 4th edn.. San Diego: Academic Press.
Woods, R. and Britton, P. (1985). Clinical psychology with the elderly. London: Croom Helm.
90
Clinical Section
This section contains summaries of clinical experience gained in four core placements and 
two specialist placements. Also contained in this section is a summary of the five case reports 
written for each core placement, plus one specialist placement. The five clinical case reports 
are submitted in full in Volume Two of this portfolio, along with placement contracts, 
supervisor evaluation forms and full records of clinical activity.
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Summary of Clinical Experience
Adult Mental Health Placement Summary
Core Adult Mental Health Placement 
PLACEMENT DETAILS
Dates: October 1999- March 2000
Supervisor: Dr Juan Delport, Chartered Clinical psychologist
Setting: Surrey Hampshire Borders NHS Trust
Base: Guildford CMHT
Summary of experience:
The placement provided valuable grounding in assessing and treating people individually 
within a cognitive behavioural model, and in one case using an integrated CBT and person- 
centred approach. Cases ranged from the relatively simple to the complex as most of the 
individual cases were referred via other members of the CMHT. There was ample opportunity 
to conduct psychometric assessments appropriate to this setting. I was also introduced to the 
wider professional role of the clinical psychologist in the CMHT, working jointly with my 
supervisor on assessments in the attached day hospital and in-patient facility, and directly 
observing the work both of individuals and teams (e.g. The Rapid Response Team) within an 
adult mental health setting. I began to develop formulation and intervention skills in CBT and 
through my supervisor's interest in other models was introduced to some Transactional 
Analysis. I also developed a sense of the importance of reflection and supervision.
Clinical skills and expertise:
Experience was gained with a range of presenting problems: dysthymia, generalised anxiety, 
specific phobia, panic with dual diagnosis of alcohol misuse, co-morbid PTSD with childhood 
sexual abuse and depression, and anger problems. Experience was also gained in 
psychoeducation in the context of relapse prevention in recurrent depression. A variety of 
assessment procedures were used, including the WAIS-HI, STAXI, BDI, RISC, WCST, and 
the Horowitz Impact of Events Scale.
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Core People with Learning Disabilities Placement
PLACEMENT DETAILS
Dates: April 2000- September 2000
Supervisor: Dr Dawn Thomas-Bawa, Chartered Clinical psychologist
Setting: Boumewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust
Base: St Peter’s Hospital, Chertsey.
Summary of experience:
The placement gave the opportunity to work in a number of different models and see how 
they could be applied across the mild to moderate range of learning disability. Models ranged 
from cognitive behaviour therapy to applied behavioural analysis. There was also the 
opportunity to act in a consultancy role to another health professional and to work as a joint 
facilitator in a social skills group. My neuropsychological skills were developed through an 
extended assessment of one young client. There was the chance to see the way a clinical 
psychologist fits into multi-agency working with this client group and to see some of the 
patient-related organisational issues, such as equitable access to services (in the form of trying 
to find appropriate interpreting services) and advocacy in this field. I also had the opportunity 
to present a seminar to fellow clinical psychologists and other allied health professionals. 
Supervision gave me the opportunity to reflect upon not only formulation and intervention 
skills but also team-working and some of the professional and ethical challenges of working 
with people with learning disabilities. I observed work in a range of settings from a Social 
Services’ run Day Service to voluntary-sector care homes.
Clinical Skills and Expertise:
I assessed and implemented individual treatments with people with a number of presenting 
problems, including: dementia in a person with Down’s Syndrome, challenging behaviour in a 
person with a dual diagnosis of moderate learning disability and mental health problems, 
depression, and anxiety. I also joint facilitated and devised a social skills group for people 
with a moderate learning disability. Neuropsychological and psychometric measures I used 
included a WAIS-D3, Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test, Battery for Assessment of 
Dysexecutive Function, the Halo, The Boumewood Assessment for Dementia in Down’s 
Syndrome, VOSP and TROG. I also familiarised myself with “Not a child anymore”.
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Children and Adolescents Core Placement
PLACEMENT DETAILS
Dates: October 2000- March 2001
Supervisor: Olga Watts, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
Setting: South West London & St.George’s Mental Health NHS Trust
Base: Teddington outpatients clinic (Tier 2 service).
Summary of experience:
I worked with children from less than two years old to 15 years. I worked in a variety of 
different modalities from individual therapeutic work and joint working with a 
psychodynamic psychotherapist to being part of a family therapy team and working with a 
clinical psychologist and child psychiatrist in a specialist ADHD clinic. Models of working 
included behavioural, narrative, CBT and systemic. I had the chance to observe assessments at 
a pilot tier 3 brief intervention clinic and with the family therapy team. I was given an 
opportunity to observe children in schools, at home and in nurseries and gain a great degree of 
understanding of normal child development through this and observing the work of a health 
visitor and a community paediatrician. I was involved in the life of the CAMHS team, 
attending team meetings regularly and jointly working with other team members. There were 
training opportunities to learn about recent developments in attachment theory and in theory 
and practice in autistic spectrum disorder.
Clinical skills and expertise:
I worked with a number of presenting problems: school refusal, PTSD with bereavement, 
eating problems, sleep management, behavioural problems at home, ADHD, aggression, 
truanting, depression, social communication problems and behavioural problems at school. I 
used. I became competent in direct behavioural observation and functional analysis in ADHD, 
in the Parent-Child Game, in the WISC HI and I also used the Culture Free Self-esteem 
Inventory.
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Adult Mental Health Specialist Placement 1 -  Narrative Therapy
PLACEMENT DETAILS
Dates: April 2001 -  September 2001
Supervisor: Dr Margaret Henning, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
Setting: Sussex Weald & Downs NHS Trust
Base: Outpatient Psychology Department, Adult Mental Health, Horsham.
Summary of experience:
I developed my assessment, formulation and treatment skills in Narrative Therapy by working 
solo with individual clients, working jointly with my supervisor on one case, and through 
supervision (individual, joint and in a group). I also developed skills in applying the models of 
systemic narrative therapy and structural family therapy through being a member of the 
reflecting team in the family therapy clinic. I worked with individuals, couples and families. I 
gained a greater understanding of the wider role of the clinical psychologist through observing 
my supervisor consult to a staff team and by evaluating the pilot family therapy clinic. There 
was the opportunity to develop my oral communication skills through two joint presentations 
of the theory and practice of Narrative Therapy to fellow clinical psychologists and other 
members of the pilot family therapy team. Professional development was enhanced through 
supervision and regular attendance at the AMH psychology team meetings and through 
attendance at two CMHT allocation meetings. Supervision encouraged reflection both on my 
clinical style and on the wider professional and ethical implications of using Narrative 
Therapy.
Clinical skills and expertise:
Presenting problems ranged from: anger management, depression with suicidal ideation,
OCD, specific phobia, panic, generalised anxiety disorder, marital discord, health anxiety, 
self-harming behaviour, habitual anti-social behaviour, binge-drinking and pathological 
jealousy. I used a number of clinical measures including the CORE and conducted a formal 
risk assessment devised by West Sussex Mental Health Services.
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Older Adults Core Placement
PLACEMENT DETAILS:
Dates: October 2001- March 2002
Supervisor: Dr Ian Kneebone, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
Setting: Surrey & Hampshire Borders NHS Trust
Base: Famham Road Community Hospital.
Summary of experience:
There was an opportunity to develop individual assessment, formulation and intervention 
skills in behavioural, CBT and rational-emotive therapy and Reminiscence Therapy models. I 
worked both as part of the multi-disciplinaiy team serving an acute and long-term stroke 
rehabilitation ward and as part of the team serving the Day Hospital. Neuropsychological 
skills were developed through the application of a neuropsychological assessment of one man 
and an extensive dementia assessment on another. I also developed group work skills in the 
context of running a Reminiscence Group with clients at the local Alzheimer’s Society and 
through contributing to the pilot Living with Parkinson’s Disease Group run at the Day 
Hospital. For the latter, I also consulted to other health professionals on how to establish 
evaluation measures for the group. I developed an understanding of the wider organisational 
context and my oral presentation skills through presenting to the Unit Manager the 
implications of the NSF for Older People, after attending a one-day PSIGE workshop on the 
initiative. Research skills were developed through conducting a Literature Review on a 
measures used by the service. There were ample training opportunities with training days on 
stroke, on the NSF for Older People and on rehabilitation services. I also regularly presented 
psychological information to carers of people on the stroke ward.
Clinical skills and expertise:
Presenting problems ranged from post stroke depression, Adjustment Disorder, anxiety, 
possible early dementia, aggression and fear of falling, Alzheimer’s Disease and Parkinson’s 
Disease. Psychometric measures included the CAMDEX, tests of verbal fluency, the Hayling 
& Brixton tests of executive function, the MEAMS, the NART and use of the BASDEC. I 
also familiarised myself with Doors and People.
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Specialist Placement 2 -  Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (AMH)
PLACEMENT DETAILS:
Dates: April 2002 -  September 2002
Supervisor: Dr Metka Shawe-Taylor, Consultant Clinical Psychologist
Setting: Surrey Oaklands NHS Trust
Base: Dorking CMHT and Surrey Mentally Disorders Offenders Team, Reigate.
Summary of experience gained:
The placement has enabled me to consolidate and develop my assessment, formulation and 
intervention skills in cognitive behaviour therapy with individual clients. I worked with a number 
of clients with complex presentations who often had personality issues as well as mental health 
problems. Supervision allowed me the space and time not only to explore clinical and theoretical 
issues but also to reflect on my therapeutic style. There have also been discussions of power 
differentials in therapy, organisational issues and ethical questions. Skill development was 
fostered through directed reading, direct observation of the supervisor, being observed and using 
video and audiotapes of sessions. I gained insight into a psychodynamic approach by directly 
observing a psychodynamic assessment. My CBT clients varied in age from 18 to 58 and were 
referred with a variety of presenting problems. I conducted a neuropsychological assessment as 
well as working with a Mentally Disordered Offender on a probation order and complex cases 
referred by the Community Mental Health Team. Attendance at psychology meetings and the 
CMHT allocation meeting broadened my understanding of the role of a clinical psychologist in an 
Adult Mental Health service.
Clinical skills and expertise:
Client presenting problems included social phobia, dysthymia, sickness phobia, OCD, anger 
problems, depression, bipolar disorder, body image disorder and Trichotillomania. I conducted a 
full WAIS-m and used a number of measures including the BDI, BAI, and Padua Inventory.
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Adult Mental Health Case Report Summary
Adult Mental Health Case Report Summary
Assessment and treatment of a woman with dysthymic disorder using cognitive 
behaviour therapy.
A 42-year-old white South African woman (JK) with dysthymic disorder was assessed 
and treated using cognitive behaviour therapy. JK, who was married without children, 
was referred to the psychology service at her local CMHT by a community psychiatric 
nurse. She was referred with possible depression and concrete suicidal ideation and 
feelings of isolation, alienation and hopelessness. Initial assessment involved a clinical 
interview, a self-monitoring diet of eating habits and administration of the Beck 
Depression Inventory. She presented saying she had been depressed for 20 years with 
problems with maintaining friendships, low motivation and fatigue. She also complained 
of binge-eating, which she felt was out of control. Other difficulties included maintaining 
a good relationship with her husband's family and marital problems. She scored 23 on the 
BDI, indicating moderate depression. Assessment indicated that JK fitted the diagnostic 
criteria for Dysthymic Disorder. Although she subjectively reported 'bingeing' when she 
was unhappy, she did not meet diagnostic criteria for Binge-eating Disorder. An informal 
risk assessment - in the form of questions at the clinical interview - indicated JK was at 
low risk for suicide. It was initially formulated that the cognitive model of depression 
accounted for JK's symptoms. Her depression was maintained by the triad of negative 
cognitive schema, cognitive biases and situationally activated negative automatic 
thoughts. Core beliefs centred around being unloveable and inadequate. Other 
maintaining factors included subjective binge-eating, which contributed to low self­
esteem and helplessness, social expectations and behaviour, which caused hopelessness 
and self-criticism and her difficult relationship with her husband's family, which 
reinforced her sense of loss and beliefs about being unloveable. Cognitive behaviour 
therapy was implemented over 14 sessions aimed at initially reducing binge-eating and 
challenging negative automatic thoughts. In view of the chronicity of the problem, CBT 
was also applied to identify and challenge dysfunctional assumptions and core beliefs. A 
constant theme was to 'decentre' JK from her depression through education, cognitive 
restructuring. Behavioural, educative and cognitive approaches were adopted to
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challenge beliefs about binge-eating. Cognitive restructuring techniques, including the 
downward arrow technique, Socratic questioning and behavioural experiments were used 
to identify and challenge negative automatic thoughts, intermediate assumptions and core 
beliefs. Imaginal recall was also used to explore core beliefs. Behavioural techniques 
included asking JK to keep pleasure and mastery diaries. JK's BDI score dropped to the 
subclinical range and suicidal ideation had disappeared for the first time in many years. 
There was also a reduction in the frequency and intensity of negative laden thought, an 
alleviation of low mood and reductions in motivational symptoms of depression. While 
the initial formulation stood, new evidence which emerged during the intervention formed 
the basis for a reformulation.lt was proposed that JK also had a core belief around the 
theme of control and this theme was conceptualised as having important implications for 
her interpersonal difficulties. Professional issues of how a new trainee deals with a 
complex, chronic case were discussed. The use of supervision and self-development of 
CBT skills by therapist use of Dysfunctional Thought Records were put forward as 
solutions. The issue of how to decide the focus of therapy - binge eating or depressogenic 
thinking - was also raised and the need for collaborative working was emphasised. The 
ethical issue of adopting an intrapsychological model of depression with a woman who 
had low self-esteem was also considered.
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People with learning disability case report summary 
Neuropsychological Assessment of a 17-year-old man
A neuropsychological assessment of a 17-year-old man (PE) with reported learning 
disabilities was carried out. PE, who was currently living at home with his middle-aged 
adoptive parents, was referred to assess behavioural difficulties and whether he could live and 
work outside the family home if his adoptive parents became too old to continue to look after 
him. Initial questioning revealed that the behavioural difficulties were now infrequent and did 
not now constitute a concern to his adoptive parents and the community nurse, who initially 
referred him. The referral questions were then concentrated on PE's independent living skills 
and were: "What was PE's current level of cognitive functioning?" and "Could identification 
of his cognitive strengths and weaknesses guide attempts to increase his independent living 
skills?" The initial assessment involved separate interviews with PE and his adoptive parents. 
The interviews indicated PE might have Asperger Syndrome and that he might have a 
learning disability. An extended neuropsychological assessment was therefore conducted to 
test these hypotheses and generate new ones with the aim of providing a knowledge-base 
upon which new constructional approaches could be developed. PE was assessed over nine 
sessions. His mother completed an assessment of his independent living skills, the Hampshire 
Assessment of Living with Others (Shackleton-Bailey & Hampshire Social Services, 1980), 
and he was observed on a shopping trip by the author. PE undertook tests of general 
intellectual functioning, memory, executive function, visual and spatial perception, praxis and 
communication and language abilities. The results indicated that PE did not have Asperger 
Syndrome. However, they showed he had performed at a level indicative of mild intellectual 
impairment. Dyspraxia was also indicated. The results highlighted PE's cognitive strengths 
and weaknesses, which were used as the basis for management recommendations for PE's 
adoptive parents, his college teachers and social services' staff. PE's strengths and weaknesses 
were reformulated using self-esteem protection theory (Frankel & Snyder, 1978), with 
reference to PE’s current family system and with reference to communication theory in PLD 
(Bartlett & Bunning, 1997). The assessment was critiqued in terms of the author's difficulty in 
communicating the assessment results to PE in a way that was sensitive to his fragile self­
esteem. The issues of the author requiring greater familiarity with the test materials to reveal 
increased amounts of valuable qualitative data to complement the quantitative data was 
discussed. The report also included a discussion of the ethical issue of conducting a 
neuropsychological assessment - which involve testing people on sometimes difficult novel 
tasks in the absence of normal external reinforcers - on a young man whom it was
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hypothesised already had low self-esteem. The possible harm to PE was weighed against the 
benefit such an assessment might have in terms of encouraging the appropriate development 
of his skills and in increased participation in domestic, vocational and community-based 
activities.
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Children and adolescents case report summary
Assessment and management of an 11-year-old girl refusing to attend school
The report describes the assessment and management of an 11-year-old girl, Tracey, who had 
been refusing to attend her new secondary school on any day for five weeks and who had been 
attending intermittently for the four previous weeks. Tracey was referred by her GP to the 
Child and Family Centre and had been initially assessed by a child psychotherapist as part of a 
pilot multi-disciplinary assessment project aimed at identifying urgent cases and treating them 
quickly. Further assessment included an interview with the child and her parents, a diary kept 
by Tracey's mother and telephone interviews with the child's education welfare officer and her 
headteacher at her previous school. Tracey was also assessed using the HoNOSCA Score 
sheet ,a psychiatric assessment used as a standard measure in the pilot clinic. A 
comprehensive history as recommended by Carr (1999) was taken, which included Tracey's 
attachment history, developmental history, history of the beliefs about the problem and the 
identification of school and child factors which might be maintaining the problem. There was 
no evidence of a mood disorder. Tracey's school refusal was formulated in behavioural terms. 
Negative reinforcement in the form of escape from aversive feelings - anxiety about school - 
was maintaining the problem. Additionally, the fact that Tracey's parents had been 
inconsistent in giving in to Tracey's demands not to attend school acted as an intermittent 
reinforcement schedule to the avoidance behaviour. Failed attempts to return Tracey to school 
had created a sense of learned helplessness in Tracey, her parents and school officials. 
Additionally, developmental factors and child factors, including Tracey's difficulty in 
communicating her feelings and social isolation at school were considered as vulnerability 
factors in Tracey's school refusal. An alternative formulation that Tracey was primarily 
suffering from separation anxiety was considered. A multi-component approach based on a 
functional analysis of the behaviour was adopted. Intervention focussed on extinguishing the 
avoidance behaviour through a programme of graded exposure and contingency management 
as well as improving Tracey's communication deficits through role play and brief therapy 
methods. Some narrative therapy techniques were also used to reverse the problem-saturated 
account of life held by Tracey and her parents. Relapse prevention measures were built in 
from the start of the intervention with a particular emphasis on developing Tracey's social 
network within and outside school. Cultural and age-appropriate contingencies in the form of 
money towards a mobile phone for Tracey was built into the reward system of the graded 
exposure hierarchy. A target of Tracey returning to school for two full weeks was set.
Narrative therapy techniques included extemalisation of Tracey's anxiety - which became Mr 
Anxiety - which provided a plausible model of the operation of anxiety in a case where the
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adolescent had shown no inclination to examine her beliefs about attending school. A brief 
therapy technique called Mission Possible was also used for its child-centred qualities and 
because its "project" structure mimicked some of the tasks Tracey was missing by refusing 
school. Liaison with the school to ease Tracey's return was also implemented in the 
intervention phase. At the time of writing Tracey had returned to school for eight consecutive 
days. Contextual organisational difficulties in conducting a more thorough initial assessment 
were discussed and the implications in terms of missing information about separation anxiety 
were explored. The problems of trying to balance a quick assessment with the possibility of 
wasting time on interventions based on inadequate information was considered in terms of the 
organisational needs and the needs of a child for a speedy return to education. Failure by the 
therapist to fully collaborate with the extemalisation was also discussed in terms of dangers to 
the therapeutic alliance. The difficulty of trying to integrate behavioural and narrative 
approaches was examined in terms of weakening the narrative approach and the difficulty 
Tracey had in developing a new self-narrative based on unique outcomes. The clinical 
dilemma of knowing how far to explore the role of threats of abandonment or family discord 
in school refusal was discussed in view of the current case in which the client, Tracey, refused 
to be interviewed separately from her parents. The issue is discussed in terms of endangering 
the therapeutic alliance, which is considered an indicator of a good prognosis in cases of 
school refusal.
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Specialist placement (narrative therapy) case report summary.
Narrative Therapy for a working 36-year-old man who felt the "need to escape" by 
binge-drinking.
Narrative therapy for a working 36-year-old man (Peter) is described. Peter was referred 
to the psychology department by his GP with binge-drinking, which was causing 
problems at home. Initial assessment involved a clinical interview informed by the theory 
of Narrative Therapy, and client-completion of the CORE (Clinical Outcomes in Routine 
Evaluation) Outcome Measure. Assessment revealed that Peter's binge drinking began 
soon after he married and was at its peak (with weekly hinges) soon after the birth of his 
first child, eight years previously. Since then, it had tapered off to four binges in the 
previous calendar year. At the time of referral, Peter and his wife were expecting their 
second child. Assessment also revealed that Peter had two dominant problem-saturated 
narratives. He storied his existence with the narratives 'I am unable to resist the need to 
escape' by drinking, and "I have failed as a husband and as a father and in my preferred 
view of myself.' Assessment indicated that Peter's wife also viewed him as 'unable to 
resist the need to escape' by drinking. Assessment also revealed exceptions to the 
dominant narrative or unique outcomes when Peter resisted the oppression of the 
identified problem stories. The identified exception to the first story was that Peter had 
not drunk in the four months prior to therapy, and to the second story, that he had looked 
after his eldest daugther alone when his wife was hospitalised giving birth to their second 
child. The CORE global score indicated Peter was within a clinical population of white 
European males on all domains, except in the risk domain.lt was initially formulated that 
by storying his lived experience through his problem narrative, alternative stories of 
resisting the urge to escape by drinking were left either unvalued or unstoried altogether. 
Within the wider system, there was a disjunction between Peter's preferred view of 
himself and his perception of his wife's view, creating communication problems and 
feeding the life of the problem. 'News of difference' between Peter's response to the first 
pregnancy and the second was going unrecognised because of the jontly authored story of 
Peter's 'weakness'. On a wider cultural level, Peter had been recruited by his upbringing 
and the hard drinking milieu of his working environment into attitudes and practices
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which fuelled difficulties with his wife. In particular, Peter held views of being a good 
father and a true man which were at variance to his wife's, which meant when there were 
problems at work Peter escaped by drinking rather than talking to his wife about them. 
Intervention was based on the precepts of narrative therapy (White, 1995) as well as on 
psychoeducational work on lapse/relapse in addictive behaviour (DiClemente & 
Prochaska, 1998) within a narrative therapy framework; for example, the 'need to escape' 
was refrained in terms of normality not abnormality .The use of Narrative Therapy, in 
spite of the absence of an evidence-base for this form of treatment, was discussed in 
terms of the similarities between narrative therapy and other evidence-based approaches 
and indications in the case presentation that a Narrative approach would be both effective 
and efficient. To enhance personal agency against the problem story "I can't resist the 
urge to escape' and to deconstruct the attitudes, beliefs and practices underpinning it, 
extemalistaion techniques were used. Landscape of action and landscape of 
consciousness questions were used to embed the alternative story of personal strength in 
the face of the need to escape and to highlight news of difference between the first and 
second pregnancies. Relapse prevention work focussed on psychoeducation and on 
extemalistion, with Peter reviewing the weapons he could use against the urge to 
escape.Peter began to self-generate alternative stories of strength, which indicated he was 
ready for discharge, as did a reduction of his CORE score to a subclinical level. 
Reframing of the need to escape in terms of temporarily letting go of his responsibilities 
was also used to prepare Peter for discharge. At discharge, there had been no episodes of 
binge drinking for eight months. The success of the case and information subsequently 
gained during the intervention did not indicate any need for a substantial reformulation. 
The need to have conducted a more formal risk assessment and to have involved his wife 
directly in the therapy was discussed. The clinical and ethical issue of whether to 
challenge Peter's own view of himself as not being an alcoholic was discussed in terms of 
theoretical models of change in addiction and the Narrative Therapy tenet of the therapist 
not imposing his expertise on the client in co-authoring new stories and to resist the 
cultural practice of imposing 'totalising' descriptions on individuals with multiple 
strengths and characteristics.
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Older Adults case report summary.
Assessment and management of dysexecutive function and adaptation to stroke in a 71- 
year-old man.
The assessment and management of dysexecutive function and adaptation to stroke in a 71- 
year-old man (AD) who had suffered a left-hemisphere ischaemic stroke is described. The 
man, who had suffered a stroke alone at home four weeks prior to the referral, was referred by 
a physiotherapist in the multi-disciplinary rehabilitation team serving an inpatient acute stroke 
unit in a community hospital. He was referred because he was rushing things and did not 
respond to verbal feedback on his efforts in rehabilitation. He was also irritable with staff and 
was showing signs of pathological emotionalism. Staff wanted to know if he had cognitive 
deficits of which they were unaware and whether he was depressed. A flexible, hypothesis- 
testing approach was adopted for the neuropsychological assessment. One pre-assessment 
hypothesis was that AD had dysexecutive function. Assessment measures were a short test of 
semantic and phonological fluency, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test and the Brixton 
Spatial Anticipation Test. Qualitative data from a clinical interview into AD’s possible 
cognitive problems and his emotional difficulties was also used for this part of the 
assessment. The results were not indicative of gross dysexecutive function. However, the 
findings were not in line with AD’s occupational achievements so pre-morbid functioning 
was estimated by administration of the National Adult Reading Test. It indicated AD was 
performing below his pre-morbid level and might have subtle dysexecutive function without 
insight. It was also hypothesised that AD was depressed. This was assessed through a 
psychometric measure of depression adapted for older adults and through a clinical interview. 
Neither the psychometric measure nor the clinical interview indicated AD met diagnostic 
criteria for a depressive disorder. However, he did meet criteria for acute Adjustment 
Disorder. The initial formulation was based on a biopsychosocial model of emotional 
problems and drew heavily on Ellis’ rational-emotive model of emotional disorders. The 
cognitive and physical deficits caused by the stroke were interacting with AD’s musturbatory 
beliefs about ageing and independence to create difficulties in the high-demand high- 
dependency environment of the rehabilitation ward. A multi-level intervention was 
implemented. Psychoeducation and self-instructional training (Meichenbaum, 1979) were 
used to alleviate AD’s dysexecutive problems. Psychoeducation and the development of 
problem-solving skills were used to ease the distress and embarrassment caused by emotional 
lability. AD also took part in individual rational-emotive therapy to help him adjust to the 
losses of stroke. Staff were also informed of AD’s cognitive and emotional difficulties and
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advised about their impact on his rehabilitation. There was a mixed outcome partly due to AD 
falling ill and being transferred to another hospital after four intervention sessions. Although 
there were subjective indications that AD had not taken on the precepts of rational-emotive 
therapy and some staff continued to view AD as being depressed and a difficult man, the 
overall goal of AD resuming his rehabilitation programme more constructively was achieved. 
The case was reformulated within the framework of Erikson’s life-cycle developmental 
theory (1966) and Hildebrand’s (1995) developmental theory. The role of grief and mourning 
in AD’s presentation was also considered. The difficulty with balancing the demands of the 
acute rehabilitation ward for quick answers with completing an adequate neuropsychological 
assessment were discussed and the author’s solution to this quandary was critiqued. 
Difficulties in not involving the wider system in the self-instructional training and in 
implementing the rational-emotive therapy were considered. There was also a discussion of 
the ethical dilemma of whether or not a clinical psychologist should implement a therapeutic 
intervention (in this case, grief work) which might distress a patient in the short-term in a 
setting where the client needed to be free of psychological obstacles in the short-term to help 
maximise his physical recoveiy.
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This section contains the Service Related Research Project completed on placement in Year 1, 
the Literature Review completed in Year 2, and the Major Research Project completed in Year 
3.
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expectations and experiences of trainees
July 2000 
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The supervisory process in clinical psychology training: tfie 
expectations and experiencesof trainees.
Abstract:
The expectations and experiences of placement supervision by 127 clinical psychology trainees at six 
Clin PsychD courses in the Thames area and South-East of England were examined First, second and 
third year trainees completed a postal questionnaire, which generated quantitative and qualitative 
data. Outcome measures were a codified categorisation of the trainees’ evaluation of the components 
of effective and ineffective supervision, a rank-order of their priorities for supervision and a rating of 
their experience of supervision. There was a significant difference in the importance placed on the 
domain of Skills Acquisition in supervision according to whether the trainee’s preferred theoretical 
orientation w^ s cognitive behavioural therapy or psychodynamic. Age, gender or year of training were 
not found to significantly affect rank ordering of the importance of the six domains of supervision 
examined in the questionnaire. Content analysis indicated trainees wanted to develop core
_______ competencies in a relationship in which they were valued, given constructive feedback and explicit
rationales. The findings of the study are compared with the limited literature on supervision for 
clinical psychologists and implications for the training of supervisors and trainees are considered.
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Introduction
In a review of mental health nursing in 1994, the NHS Management Executive defined clinical 
supervision qs' ...a formal process of professional support and learning which enables the 
individual practitioner to develop knowledge and competence, assume responsibility for then- 
own practice and enhance consumer protection and the safely of care in complex clinical 
situations.'
In the context of training in the psychotherapies, clinical supervision has been a key component 
since the timp of Freud (Burley, 1998). Today, it continues to be essential. The British 
Psychological Society requires that trainee clinical psychologists are supervised on placement. 
Pruitt, McCplgan, Pugh and Kiser, (1986; cited in Carroll, 1994) found that in a related field -  
psychiatry -  supervision was cited by practising clinicians as the single most influential 
experience of training. Good quality information about supervision is also important because it 
consumes so much of a qualified clinical psychologists’ time (Robiner and Schofield, 1990, 
cited in Greep, 1998).
A proliferating literature has emerged investigating models of effective supervision for 
supervisors in a range of human sciences (e.g. Brown & Bourne, 1996, cited in Green, 1998; 
for social work supervision) and for supervisors’ of trainee clinical psychologists ( e.g. Green, 
1998). Carroll (1996) has proposed a generic model for supervisors in the human sciences.
On a three-year Clinical Psychology doctorate course trainees are supervised by between five 
and six different field supervisors in five or six different settings. Nonetheless, there is little in 
the literature that draws on the experience of clinical psychology trainees themselves. Pratt 
(1999) held “informal discussions with a small number of trainees and supervisors” about 
their expectations of each other. Green (1998) used grounded theory to analyse the experience
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of 100 clinical doctorate trainees, identifying five key elements in effective supervision. Hitchen 
et al. (1997) surveyed trainees on the small Oxford Training course with an 80 per cent 
response rate, asking them to describe one helpful and one unhelpful incident in each of four 
areas of experience. The trainees conceptualised good supervision as having four areas of good 
practice: practicalities; monitoring/ teaching; the supervisory relationship; and supervisor 
awareness of the trainee-supervisor-course system.
Literature op the generic process of supervision for trainees in human sciences indicates that 
supervision may be part of a continuous educative process - the developmental model (Krause 
and Allen, 1988; cited by Carroll, 1994) - in which supervisees at different levels of experience 
express different preferences for the activities of supervision. Carroll (1994) cites a number of 
studies (e.g. Cross and Brown, 1983) which support the view that supervisory tasks change to 
meet the developmental level of supervisees. In a study of 56 cognitive psychotherapists in 
Sweden, Perris (1997) found a higher preference for theoretical issues among trainees with less 
than four years experience and a preference for process-oriented supervision in more 
experienced trainees. However Carroll himself (1994) found evidence to support the claim of 
further studies (e.g. Worthington, 1987) that there is no change in what tasks supervisees 
expect supervisors to deliver during the course of training
There is, then, a significant gap in knowledge of trainees’ expectations and experience, which, 
in view of the transactional nature of supervision (Burley, 1999) limits the utility of existing 
supervision models. The current study aims to begin the process of filling this gap in the 
empirical base needed to build models of placement supervision applicable to trainee clinical 
psychologists. There are no quantitative studies of trainee clinical psychologists which address 
whether expectations for supervision match their experience of the activity. The current study
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of 100 clinical doctorate trainees, identifying five key elements in effective supervision. Hitchen 
et al. (1997) surveyed trainees on the small Oxford Training course with an 80 per cent 
response rate, asking them to describe one helpful and one unhelpful incident in each of four 
areas of experience. The trainees conceptualised good supervision as having four areas of good 
practice: practicalities; monitoring/ teaching; the supervisory relationship; and supervisor 
awareness of the trainee-supervisor-course system.
Literature op the generic process of supervision for trainees in human sciences indicates that 
supervision may be part of a continuous educative process - the developmental model (Krause 
and Allen, )988; cited by Carroll, 1994) - in which supervisees at different levels of experience 
express different preferences for the activities of supervision. Carroll (1994) cites a number of 
studies (e.g. Cross and Brown, 1983) which support the view that supervisory tasks change to 
meet the developmental level of supervisees. In a study of 56 cognitive psychotherapists in 
Sweden, Perris (1997) found a higher preference for theoretical issues among trainees with less 
than four years experience and a preference for process-oriented supervision in more 
experienced trainees. However Carroll himself (1994) found evidence to support the claim of 
further studies (e.g. Worthington, 1987) that there is no change in what tasks supervisees 
expect supervisors to deliver during the course of training
There is, then, a significant gap in knowledge of trainees’ expectations and experience, which, 
in view of the transactional nature of supervision (Burley, 1999) limits the utility of existing 
supervision models. The current study aims to begin the process of filling this gap in the 
empirical base needed to build models of placement supervision applicable to trainee clinical 
psychologists. There are no quantitative studies of trainee clinical psychologists which address 
whether expectations for supervision match their experience of the activity. The current study
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also aims to fill this gap.
The current study will test the developmental hypothesis that supervisees at different levels of 
experience express different preferences for supervisory activity (Holloway, 1987).
Method
Design: A postal questionnaire design was used providing quantitative data (analysed using 
multivariate statistical techniques and descriptive statistics) and qualitative data analysed using 
content analysis (Day, 1993).
Participants: Three hundred first, second and third year trainee clinical psychologists at six 
ClinPsychD courses in South-East England. Respondents = 127 ( 42%).
Measures: A questionnaire was devised to evaluate the views on placement supervision of 
trainees.
a. Deriving the Questionnaire: The literature indicated six domains of supervision were 
likely to be important: Skills Acquisition, Supervisory Relationship, Quality Control,
Knowledge, Process and Practicalities (See Table 1 for definitions) 
Table 1: Definitions of the six domains of supervision
Skills Acquisition Leamingmidpractisingtechnical skills e.g. Socratic questioning
Supervisory relationship Having a constructive relationship with your supervisor
Quality control Supendsionas-a means of ensuring minimum standardsofcare
Knowledge Sharing knowledge over and above skills acquisition
Process Discussion of therapeutic processes including client-therapist 
dynamics
Practicalities Arrangements for supervision and your working environment
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A series of statements were generated by the author to reflect each domain. Subsequently, a 
workshop was held with eight first-year clinical psychology trainees on the same course as the 
author. Its purpose was two-fold; first, to check the proposed domains of supervision were 
comprehensive; second, to check that the domains were comprehensible. Secondly, the same 
trainees undertook a card-sort of 58 statements on supervision to validate their presence in 
particular dopiains. A statement was included in the questionnaire if five or more participants 
(60 per cent) categorised it into the same domain. 51 out of 58 statements reached criteria (See 
Appendix 1; Table 1). Two statements - 'In supervision I expect to discuss ethical issues’
(50% agreement level) and 'In supervision I am encouraged to reflect on my practice’ (50%) - 
were retained in the Process category despite foiling to reach criteria as it was felt their 
omission would result in the final questionnaire not reflecting important aspects of supervision. 
Another statement which foiled to meet the criterion -  ‘In supervision I discuss formulations of 
my clients’ difficulties’ -  was reworded and included in both the Skills Acquisition section and 
the Knowledge section, to which participants in the card sort had in equal numbers ascribed it. 
Again, it was felt a key aspect would be lost without it. Three separate statements referring to 
access to a ptesk, computer and telephone were linked as one as they were deemed to duplicate 
each other. The remaining statements which foiled to reach the criterion were discarded.
b. The questionnaire: Information on 'Age’, 'Gender', 'Year of training’, 'Number of 
placements’ and'Preferred theoretical orientation’was gathered. Participants were 
required to rpnk-order the importance of the six identified domains of supervision (Skills 
Acquisition, Supervisory Relationship, Quality Control, Knowledge, Process and 
Practicalities). They were also required to rank order for importance and rate, for 
frequency of delivery statements under each of the six domains. There were also three 
open-ended questions relating to expectations of supervision, and critical incidents 
(Flanagan, 1954, cited in McCrea and Milsom, 1996) of good and bad supervision. See
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Appendix 2 for a copy of the questionnaire. * Some questionnaires were misprinted with a 1 - 4 
rating scale (instead of 1 - 5) for “Quality Control”. To ensure within-domain consistency, all 
trainees’ ratings of 5 in this domain were entered as 4 cm the database.
Procedures: Approval for the project was granted by Surrey University’s Advisory Committee 
on Ethics (S^e Appendix 3). Letters requesting permission to mail participants were sent to 
Clin Psych D course directors. Two Universities out of eight declined to participate. 
Participants were recruited via these letters (See Appendix 4). There were two mailings (the 
second to increase the response rate) in April and August 2000.
Analyses: Qescriptive statistics were used to analyse the data. Non-parametric tests (Mann- 
Whitney U Test and Kruskal-Wallis) were used to test for between-group differences in 
rankings and ratings. Content analysis (Day, 1993) was used to analyse the qualitative data 
derived from the open-ended questions.
Results:
Participants:
127 trainees completed the questionnaire, which represented a 42 per cent response rate. (See 
Tables 2, 3,4, 5 and 6 below).
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Table 2: Frequencies bv age:
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid under 25 11 8.7 8.7 8.7
25-30 93 73.2 73.8 82.5
31-35 16 12.6 12.7 95.2
36-40 5 3.9 4.0 99.2
. 41 plus 1 .8 .8 100.0
Total 126 99.2 100.0
Missing System 1 .8
Total 127 100.0
Table 3: Frequencies by sender:
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid male 20 15.7 15.9 15.9
female 106 83.5 84.1 100.0
Total 126 99.2 100.0
Missing System 1 .8
Total..... ..... —...— . 127 ------- 100.0 --------------- ------------- ----
Table 4: Frequencies bv Year o f Training:
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid 1.00 49 38.6 38.9 38.9
2.00 40 31.5 31.7 70.6
3.00 37 29.1 29.4 100.0
Total 126 99.2 100.0
Missing System 1 .8
Total 127 100.0
Table 5: Frequencies bv Number o f placements:
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid 1.00 3 2.4 2.4 2.4
2.00 45 35.4 35.7 38.1
3.00 4 3.1 3.2 41.3
4.00 39 30.7 31.0 72.2
5.00 9 7.1 7.1 79.4
6.00 26 20.5 20.6 100.0
Total 126 99.2 100.0
Missing System 1 .8
Total 127 100.0
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Table 6: Frequencies by Preferred Theoretical Orientation:
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid cbt 69 54.3 55.2 55.2
systemic 10 7.9 8.0 63.2
psychodynamic 7 5.5 5.6 68.8
eclectic 10 7.9 8.0 76.8
cbt and systemic 11 8.7 8.8 85.6
other 12 9.4 9.6 95.2
7.00* 6 4.7 4.8 100.0
Total 125 98.4 100.0
Missing System 2 1.6
Total 127 100.0
^ fl>oo=’
There were t\yo trainees who failed to provide information in this section, but who were retained in
the study because they provided qualitative data which was not analysed by these demographics.
Trainees expectations of clinical supervision;
For the total sample (n=125), the most important domain of placement supervision (1= most 
important; 6 f  least important) was Skills Acquisition (mean ranking 2.56). Practicalities was the 
least important element (See Table 7 below)
Tabk 7: Raijk order in importance o f the six domains ofsupervision (most important first):
;©omain of supervision Mean ranking
ISkills Acquisition 2.56
Supervisory Relationship 2.59
Process 2.98
Knowledge 3.33
Quality Control 4.25
Practicalities 5.16
In the second part of the questionnaire trainees were required to rank order for importance a list of 
statements grouped under each domain heading. Tables 8 and 9 contain the most important and least 
important statements in each domain.
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Table 8: Themostimvortant statements in each domain with~the mean rank
Mean rank
134
2.46
1.62 
2.59
Quality Control
1. It is important that through supervision clients are guaranteed the best care 2.48
2. Supervision Kelps guarantee lam  not harming myxlients .2.78
Knowledge — -------------  -----------------
1. In supervision I-discuss formulations ofmy client’s difficulties 2.13
2. In superyision my supervisor makes explicitlheory-practice links 4.22
Process
1. In supervision lum  encouragedtOTefla^ on my practice 3.34
2. In supervision I learn howlo work with clients whenlherapy is stuck 3 D6
1. In supervision I must be supervised weekly 1.54
2. I negotiate a contract detailing my learning needs and the ways-they will be met 2.72
Skills Acquisition
1 .1 develop skills in formulating, my client’s difficulties 
2 .1-discuss liow to devise and implement treatment plans
Supervisory Relationship
1. In supervision I am given constructivocriticism
2. In supervision I am valued and respected
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Table 9: The~two least important statements in each domain~wrth Iheir mean rank
Skills Acquisition Mean rank
1 .1 role-play appropriate interventions with clients
2 .1 develop^skfllsdn how to run a group
"7.37
7.16
Supervisory relationship
1. In supervision ! am encouraged tabe a lifelong learner 
2 .1 am able toseemy supervisor outside prescribed times
6:32
5.76
tXialitv 'Control
-
1. My supervisor monitors that my personal pmhlems-are not detrfmentfllly enacted.in therapy _536
2. My superyjsorregulateshowllam managingacaseldad 4.83
Knowledge - -------  —  -
1 .1 discusswithmy supervisor theinognosisofeertainolient presentations 
2. My supejvisor is anexpert in the modeH wish to practice on placement
9.55
^.08
Process
1. In supervision I discuss power differentials in therapy
2. In supendsion I examine, my prejudices regarding clients
"8.24
7.19
Practicalities
1. My supervisor ensures I have secretarial support
2. In supervision I discuss arrangements-for-meeting other members of the team/dept.
4,76
4,50
Main effects:
Non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U Tests and Kruskal-Wallis) were run to investigate 
main effects on the rank-order of the six domains of supervision. There was a significant main 
effect for “Preferred Theoretical Orientation” on mean ranking of Skills Acquisition (Chi- 
square=16.3, df=6; p<0.05). 19 pairwise post-hoc tests were run to identify the source of the 
effect (p<0.01). A significant difference (z=3.30; p<0.01)was found between trainees who 
preferred C^T (mean ranking of Skills Acquisition = 2.26; median = l)and those, who 
preferred a Psychodynamic orientation (mean ranking = 4.57; median = 4).
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There werejio significant main effects of Age, Gender, Year of Training or Number of 
placements.
Trainees * experience o f training:
Mean ratings for each of the domains of supervision indicated that each was delivered 
“SOMETIMES” on placement (see Table 10):
Table 10: Mean rating of trainees’ exnerience of each domain within sunervision
Domain Mean ratine Ranee
Skills Acquisition 314 1.78-4.22.
Supervisory Relationship 3.61 2.00 - 5.00-
Quality Gontrol.... —...- -------  —___________ _3.10* ____L 71-3 .43 ....
Knowledge 3.31 1.92-4.92
Process 3.17 1.80 -  s-.oa
Practicalities 3.90 1:67-5.00
*1-4 rating sqale: see Method section above
There was no main effect for 'Year of Training’ or 'Preferred Theoretical Orientation’ on the 
trainees’ ratipg of their experience of supervision.
Tables 11 and 12 show the two statements representing the most frequent and least frequent 
experience in each domain (rating scale key: l=Never experienced on placement; 2=Rarely; 
3=Sometimes; 4=Often; 5=Always). There was a high degree of concordance between the 
trainees’ highest and lowest rankings and ratings for each statement.
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Table 11: Thetworstatements reoresertmg the trainees rTnostfreciuentexDerience of suDervisioirwith
their mean rating.
Skills Acauisition ^Mean rating.
1. I discuss-how to assess my clients- presenting problems 3*96-
2. I discuss-how to devise and implement treatment plans 3^88
Supervisory Relationship
1. In supervision I am valued and Tespected 4:13
2. I am able toisee my supervisor outside prescribedtimes 3.90
Oualitv Control
1. It is important lhat through supervision clients are guaranteed die best standard of care 3.57
2. Supervision helps guarantee i  mrniot barming clrents 3.44
Knowledge -
1. My supennsorshmoshis/herloiowledgedfihe.clientgroupvvith.me 4,71.
2. In supervision I discuss-formulations of my clients’ difficulties 4.11
Process Mean rating
1. In supervision! leam howto'worlcwitlr clients whentherapy is stuck 3.69-
2. In supervision I am encouraged fo reflect on my practice 3.58-
Practicalities
1. In sup^rvisionlmustbesupervised weekly 4.50
2. I negotiate tt contract detailing my learning needs ttnd the ways they willbe met 4.38
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Table 12: Thentatements representing trainees’least frequent experiences ofsupervisionTrith their
mean ranking..
The two least experienced statements in each domain-were:
Skills Acauisition Meanrating
1. I role-play appropriate interventions with clients- 1:52
2. I practicetechnical skills appropriate ter my intervention 2.34
Supervisory Relationship
1. I am encouraged to  question my supervisor about hows/he practices 2.96
2. I can arguewithmy supervisoroveraspectsoftheory andpractice 3.23
Quality Control
1. My S. monitors that my personal problems are.not detrimentally enactedanlherapy 2127.
2. My supervisor checks Lam implementing evidence-based practice . 238
Knowledge
1. I am. advised nbout alternative approaches witliout necessariiy ndoptmgthem 2.73
2. My supervisoradvises whattherapeutic-approach works for whom 2.-86
Process
1. In supervision I examine, my prejudices regarding_my clients 2.47
2. In supervisiorrldiscuss-power, differentialsiir therapy 2.5 L
Practicalities.
1. In S. I discuss arrangements formeetmg otbermembers of the team/dept 3.57
2. My supervisor onsuresaccess to a desk, computer and telephone Lor me 3.67
Qualitative data:
There were three questions on the questionnaire, where participants could express their views 
on placement supervision in their own words. These answers were analysed using content 
analysis (Day, 1993) with initial classifications generated from the data and not based on pre­
existing categories. These categories were then streamlined to major themes. These themes 
were checked for reliability in a blind rating of a random selection of 20 questionnaires by a
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qualified clinical psychologist. There was r=0.66 for question 3a (Placement gains); r=0.75 for 
question 3b (Best supervision); and r=0.33 for question 3c (worst supervision). (See Appendix 
5).
Qu. 1: What do you expect to gain from placement supervision that you do not get from any 
other element o f the course?
18 classifications were initially identified (See Appendix 6a). These generated nine categories ( 
a number of statements were classified into more than one category representing the richness of 
replies. Frequency counts are shown in brackets):
A. Putting theories and the evidence-base into practice with individual clients in real situations 
(n =110)
B. A relationship in which the trainee’s clinical competence is developed and evaluated 
(n=76)
C. Access to the unique qualities and perspectives of qualified clinicians (n=23)
D. A place to discuss process and ethical issues. (n=18)
E. A place where the trainee experiences a supportive, personal focus and can discuss 
personal development issues (n=12)
F. An opportunity to discuss different roles with different client groups (n=5)
G. An element that ensures the trainee is meeting minimum standards of clinical practice 
(n=4)
H. A relationship in which the trainee experiences organisational and service issues (n=4)
I. Where all aspects of client work are inter-woven (n-21 
See Appendix 6 for fuller descriptions of the categories
i
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Qu 2. Pleas? could you describe your best single episode o f supervision as a trainee clinical 
psychologist. Please explain why it was helpful.
23 classifications were initially identified (See Appendix 6b). Two respondents were unable to 
identify any single best episodes of supervision. Initial classifications generated eight 
categories (frequency counts in brackets):
A. The supervisor creates a supportive and risk-taking environment. (n=62j
B. Helping the trainee to develop his/her clinical skills and knowledge (n=50)
C. Helping the trainee develop generic therapeutic skills (n=3D
D. The supervisor uses role-plavs and is observed bv and observes the trainee with a client 
(n=22)
E. Encouraging the trainee to reflect on his/her practice (n=15)
F. Supervision is well organised (n=llj
G. The supervisor provides a role-model for the trainee (n=9)
H. The supervisor is restorative (n=6)
See Appendix 6 for fuller descriptions of the categories
Qu 3.Please could you describe your worst single episode o f supervision as a trainee clinical 
psychologist. Please explain why it was unhelpful.
Twenty-four initial classifications were generated by this question (See Appendix 6c). Eleven 
participants could not name any worst single experiences of placement supervision. The 
classifications generated nine categories (frequency counts in brackets):
A. Supervision lacked rigour with a lack of direction, clarity and rationales (n=40)
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B. Supervisors were considered * incompetent’ (n=23)
C. Unhelpful supervisory style (n=20)
D. Supervision was marred bv organisational problems (n=20)
E. Supervisors who did not respect and disempowered their trainees (n=17)
F. Supervisors were unaware of the trainee’s needs and level of experience (n=16)
G. The feedback in supervision was critical not constructive (n=14)
H. Supervisors offered a limited insight into the therapeutic process (n=9j
I. Technical shortcomings (11=2)
See Appendix 6 for fuller descriptions of the categories 
Discussiop:
Trainees’ expectations of what is important among supervisory elements:
The results indicate that Skills Acquisition and the Supervisory Relationship are the elements 
of supervision most highly valued by trainees. Examination of both the codified categorisation 
of the qualitative data and selected statements by trainees (See Appendix 7) complements this 
finding. Trainees want to develop core competencies in formulation, assessment and 
intervention in a relationship in which they are valued, given constructive feedback and 
explicit, clear rationales for the supervisor’s guidance. The results are broadly in line with 
findings froip other studies. For example, Pratt (1999) found trainees valued from supervisors: 
clear and explicit theory-practice links; teaching and monitoring with constructive feedback; 
emotional support; and accepting the trainee as a trainee not as an additional staff member. 
Green (1998) identified promoting experiential learning and having a strong supervisory 
alliance as two of the five elements of ideal supervision. The present study found that trainees
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place least importance on Practicalities and Quality Control. Carroll (1994) also found that 
trainee counsellors considered administrative aspects of supervision least important. By 
contrast, Hitchen et al. (1997) found trainees included Practicalities among the four elements 
identified fof good supervision. The discrepancy with Hitchen et al. (1997) could result from 
the forced ranking methodology of the current study. Indeed, the qualitative data indicates well 
organised supervision isvalued by trainees.
There is little in previous studies to indicate whether trainees value the Quality Control 
function of supervision. Only Green (1998) found trainees identified an element similar to the 
one outlined in this study. The current study found students placed the function S^txitofisixin 
importance and it is rarely mentioned in the qualitative data. This compares sharply with the 
supervisors’ perspective as indicated in many models of supervision. Proctor (1991: cited in 
Hawkins & Shohet, 1999) for example, lists the normative function, which includes quality 
control, as ope of just three major elements in supervision.
Trainees’ experience of supervision:
The descriptive statistics indicate that all elements of the complete supervision package are 
being delivered equally by supervisors. However, trainee statements relating to worst 
supervision indicate individuals can identify exceptions to this. For example, trainees (n=15) 
complained that supervision was badly organised, while others (n=10) said supervisors did not 
make explicit theory-practice links.
There was no main effect of any of the demographic variables on the trainees’ rating of their 
experience of supervision. Other studies concentrate on the expectations, not the experiences of 
trainees. While the two are obviously linked, there is no direct evidence of trainee experiences
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to compare with the current study. However, one might have predicted that supervisors’ 
themselves would at least vary the content of supervision to match the trainees’ year of 
training. The current study indicates that there is no such shift. It is possible, however, that a 
design weakness masked differences in the trainees’ experience of supervision. Participants 
showed a central tendency response bias on the Likert rating scale. This may have been avoided 
by using a s|x-point, rather than five-point scale. Additionally, the use of the Likert scale forces 
participants to average out their supervision experiences in a way that might lose the variation 
of that experjence. Never discussing formulations on one placement and always discussing 
them on another, becomes “sometimes” discussing them.
Developmental influences on the ranked importance of the supervisory elements:
The developmental hypothesis was not confirmed -  Year of Training did not significant affect 
ranking. Hoy/ever, the trainee’s Preferred Theoretical Orientation did significantly affect the 
overall ranking of Skills Acquisition. Trainees with a preference for CBT ranked Skills 
Acquisition significantly more highly than those with a psychodynamic orientation. Previous 
studies cast no light on this as they did not record the theoretical orientation of the trainees. 
The current result could be a reflection of the questionnaire design. Participants were given 
Socratic Questioning as an example of Skills Acquisition for the ranking exercise. Overt 
mention of 9 CBT skill may have biased the results (Moser & Kalton, 1985). On the other 
hand, it makes theoretical sense that trainees who are psychodynamically-oriented place 
process issues above skills acquisition. This finding has implications for training. As well as 
trainees finding out the preferred orientation of the supervisor, supervisors should find out the 
orientation of their trainees if trainee-supervisor expectations are to be matched.
Like Carroll (1994) the present study did not find support for the developmental hypothesis of
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supervision .and training for social scientist practitioners. There are two possible explanations. 
First, the design of the current study may not have been sensitive to such a model of trainee 
development. The six elements of supervision identified for comment by participants in the 
current study reflect the trainee’s ‘^ tasks’’; they mainly reflect observable and evaluated 
elements, suqh as skills in formulation, which trainees have to “pass”. However, many 
developmental models (e.g. Hawkins and Shohet, 1999) are based on psychodynamic 
principles; tfyey identify for the supervisor the intra-psychic developmental stages the trainee is 
supposed to progress through from being a novice to an expert. There is a clear mismatch 
between the (ask-orientation of the present study and the process-orientation of developmental 
models. The second explanation is that the needs of trainees do not fundamentally change over 
six placements. It could be that trainees are freed with such range and depth of experience (five 
or six different client groups ) that they remain focussed on acquiring core competencies within 
a collaborative relationship. Alternatively, as Carroll (1994) posits, trainees may not be aware 
of how they can develop through supervision and that courses need to educate trainees about 
supervision. Further research is needed in this area. Qualitative methods would be appropriate 
to tease out trainees’ thinking on this point.
Training implications:
As suggested above the current findings do not fit easily with models of supervision provided 
for the training of supervisors. For example, Proctor (1991; cited in Hawkins & Shohet, 1999) 
says supervision involves three main processes. These are formative, restorative and 
normative. The present study indicates that trainees have an almost exclusive focus on the 
formative function. Restorative functions are mainly noticed when they are absent (see 
categories ip “Worst supervision”). To many trainees, the normative function largely remains 
invisible. New models of supervision for trainee clinical psychologists need to take account of 
trainees’ strpng focus on formative/ educative processes.
t .
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Skills
l.In supervision I discuss formulations of my client’s difficulties 
2.1n supervision I am taught how to assess my clients’ presenting problems 
3.In supervision I discuss how to devise and implement treatment plans 
4.1n supervision I role-play appropriate interventions with clients
5.In supervision I practise technical skills appropriate to my intervention
6.1n supervision I learn how to generate hypotheses
7.1n supervision I discuss how to prevent therapeutic drift
8.1n supervision I am advised how to write reports for other professionals
9.1n supervision I am instructed on the use of psychometric tests
lO.In supervision I am advised how to work collaboratively with clients
11 .In supervision I learn how to run a group
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Supervisory Relationship
12. In supervision I am given honest feedback
13. In supervision I am given constructive feedback
14. In supervision I am encouraged to question my supervisor about how s/he practises
15. In supervision I am given rationales for suggested interventions
16. In supervision my supervisor is receptive to feedback from the mid-placement visit
17. In supervision I am challenged to justify my clinical judgement
18. In supervision I am valued and respected
19. In supervision I can argue with my supervisor over aspects of theory and practice
20. In supervision it is important for it to be clear how I am being evaluated
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Quality Control
21. It is important that through supervision my clients are ensured the best standard of 
care
22. Supervision helps guarantee I am not harming my clients
23. My supervisor m om torsthat I-am not practising beyond the limits o f my competence
24. Supervision ensures I am not abusing power differentials in therapy
25. My supervisor sees that m y personal problems .are not detrimentrally enacted in 
therapy
26. In supervision I examine my prejudices regarding clients
27. Through supervision I make sure I  know the range o f treatment options-available to  
clients
28. My supervisor regulates how I am managing a caseload
29. My supervisor checks that I am implementing evidence-based practice
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Knowledge
30.1n supervision my supervisor shares his/her knowledge o f the client group with me
31. In supervision I discuss with my supervisor the prognosis o f certain client 
presentations
32. My supervisor recommends appropriate readings
33. In
34. Supervision supplements my theoretical knowledge about clients
35. My superyisor^advises what therap^ itic^pprnach works for-whom
36. My supervisor gives advice on the use o f psychometric tests
37. My supervisor advises whicLassessment .and outcome measures to use
38. In supervision I am advised about alternative approaches to clients without 
necessarily adopting Jhem
I
39. It is important that my supervisor is an expert in the model I wish to practise on 
placement
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Process
40. In supervision I expect to discuss ethical issues
41. In supervision I am made aware of professional and personal boundaries in  therapy
42. In supervision I am guided on how to reflect on my relationship with my client 
j43. In supervision J  discuss my client’s relationship with-me
44. In supervision client difficulties in reaching treatment goals are identified
45. In supervisionlleam iiow to work with clients when therapy is  stuck
46. In supervision I learn how to maintain and develop a therapeutic alliance
47. In supervision I am encouraged to reflect on my practise
48. In supervision I discuss power differentials in therapy
49. In supervision J-am encouraged to-be a  life-long learner
140
Service Related Research Project
Practicalities
50. It is important to have an organised induction period
51. In supervision I  must be supervised weekly
52 .1 am able to see my supervisor outside prescribed times
53. My supervisor ensures I have secretarial support
54. My supervisor provides access to a desk for me
55. In supervision I discuss arrangements for meeting other members of-the 
team/department
56. As part o f the supervisory process I have a supervision contract spelling out my 
learning needs and the ways they will be met
57. My supervisor ensures I have access to a computer
58. My supervisor arranges access to a  telephone
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Appendix 1: ^  -’-m ; y
Table 1: Original statements about supervision and the number of subjects (n=8) who sorted them 
into proposed categories for the questionnaire. Criteria for inclusion (n=5).
* Some subjects failed to sort all statements into the existing categories.
-
-Skills
Acquisition
Supervisory
Relationshi
“Quality
Control
;Knowled^ Process Practicalities
1------------- ^4 _ _ _o - . ........... U D
2. -8 -o 0 D t) -o
3. -8 t) X) 0 d ft
4. _-7 0 0 1 0 0
5. 6 0 0 1 0 .0
6. ,6 0 0 1 0 0
7. 4 0 0 0 4 ..... 0
8. 8 0 0 o 0 0
9. 6 0 0 2 0 0
10. 3 -0 - 0 0 5 Q.
11. 6 0 0 2 0 0
12. 0 7 1 & 0 0
13. 1 7 0 0 0 0
14. 0 8- ft 0 0 0
15. 1 0 o 7 0 0
16. 0 R 0 0 0 0
1 0 . 2 3 .2 1 0
18. 0 -8 0 ft ft jO
19. ft iT 0 3 0 0
-20. ' 0 T -2 0 0 2
21. 0 0 7 0 1 0
22. ' 0^ 0 8 0 0 0
23. ft 0 8 0 0 0
24. 0 0 5 0 3 ft
25. 0 1 5- 0 2 0
26. 0 1 1 0 6 0
27. 0 0 2 6- 0 0
28. 0 0 8 0 0 0
29. 0 0 8 0 0 ft
30. 0 0 0 8 0 0
31. 1 0 0 0 6 0
32. 0 0 0 7 0 1
33. 1 0 0 7 -o 0
34. -o 0 0 S 0 ft
35. -o O -o S -o -o
36. ~5 -0 _G 3 -ft -ft
37. 1 -0 -0 6 -0 <1
38. 0 1 0 7 0 0
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39. 4 -o 4 ■ H-5 -J 0 -0
40. -0 J 4 3 -0 4 41
41 -0 -0 2 -0 4)
42. 4 0 0 0 7 4)
43. -0 -0 -0 .0 8 0
44. 4 X) 0 4 45 -0
45. JZ 0 0 0 6 -0
46. 4 0 0 0 4 0
47. ‘ T 3* 0 0 - 4................. a -00 o- 0 0 8 cr
49. ' i 5 0 1 1 0
50. & 6- 0 0 0 8
51. ' 0 1 1 0 0 7
52. o- 7 0 0 0 1
53. 0 0 0 0 0 8-
54. 0 0 0 0 0 8
55. 0 1 0 0 0 6-
56. 0 2 0 0 0 6
57. 0 0 0 0 0 8
58. 4) 0 T) 0 0 8
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Appendix 4: Letter sent to participants
Dear Trainee Clinical Psychologist
PsychD -  Service Related Research Project v
Trainee clinicaLpsychoIogists9 expectations and experience of placem ent 
supervision.
My name is Pavid-Glasman -and I-ama trainee -clinical psychologist at the University xf-Surrey. 
With the support oftheSurrey-UniversityClinPsychD Course Placement Committee, l  am 
conducting a Service Related Research Project into placement supervision. With your_help, we 
aim to give trainees throughoutthe-Thaiqes and London region a voice in the evaluation of 
placement supervision.
As part of enhancing clinical tra in ing, the Surrey Placement Committee and I-are keen to  explore 
trainee clinioalpsychQlogists, expectations and experience of placement supervision. We are 
surveying trainees who are eurrently on Clinical Psychology Doctoral courses inthe Thames-and 
London region, Thereis-aproliferatingiiterature-for supervisors on what constitutes-effective- 
supervision. JFew-studies, iiowever, have been made of the experience of trainees,.such as 
yourself, who regularly change supervisors andplacements. The aim of thexurrent study is to. 
explore the tpinees ’ perspectiveand to make -recommendations -for changes in ihe training of 
supervisors pnd trainees in the region.
Please find enclosed a -questionnaire. Lam disseminatingthis-questionnaire to all trainees in the 
region. All questionnaires are anonymous and confidential. There is, of course,, no obligation to 
take part in tjie-study. I f  you-decidenotto take, part it will in-no way affect your training.-Key 
findmgs-willbefed backto participatingcourses andtheplacement committee-attheUniversity 
of Surrey. Each form-comes witha Lreepost label and no postage is required. Could you^etum it 
by .... If yoq have any queries contact me on 01483
Thank you for your time and cooperation. I know you are busy and I much appreciate your help. 
Yours sincerely,
David Glasman, TxaineejCl inical -Psychologist
Supervised by Dr Linda Dowdney, Chartered Clinical Psychologist.
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Appendix 5
Categories genera tedin ablindrating by apractising clinical
by the researcher:
/
1. To Qu 3a on the questionnaire:
a. Skills and knowledge acquisition/ sharing; development and advice. 
Matched with the researcher’s category A. (Appendix 6)
b. Constructive feedback re. Clinical skills.
Matched with researcher’s category B. (Appendix 6)
c. Evaluatioji and quality control.
Matched with researcher’s category G.
d. Reflective process.
Matched with researcher’s category D.
e. Theory-practice links/ evidence-based practice 
Matched with researcher’s category A.
f. Different (heoretical perspectives discussed 
Matched with researcher’s category C.
g. Relevantjcase material discussions
Not matched with any of the researcher’s categories.
2. To Qu 3\> on the questionnaire
a. Theory-practice links 
Matched witji researcher’s category B.
b. Different theoretical perspectives/ ways of working
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Not matched with researcher’s categories.
c. Reflective process 
Matched with researcher’s category E.
d. Constructive feedback 
Matched with researcher’s category A.
Appendix 5 cont’d
e. Skills and knowledge acquisition/sharing 
Matched with researcher’s category B.
f. Supervisor’s qualities -  listened to, empathic 
Matched with researcher’s category categories A and H
g. Supervision style -  time allowed, structured 
Matched with researcher’s category F.
h. Relevant case material discussed.
Not matched in the researcher’s categories
3. To Qu 3c. on the questionnaire
a. Poor supervision structure 
Matched to researcher’s category D.
b. Supervisor qualities -  poor, defiant manner 
Matched to researcher’s category C.
c. Irrelevant case material discussed 
Matched to researcher’s category A.
d. Lack of knowledge and skills acquisition/sharing 
Matched to researcher’s category A.
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Appendix Ttiemes generated from-trainees1 responses to tliree open- 
ended questions about supervision on the questionnaire.
Qu. 1: What do vou expect to gain from placement supervision that you do not get from any other element
of the course?
18 classifications were initially identified (See Appendix 6a). These collapsed into nine categories, four of
which incorporated five or less responses but which did not fit easily into other categories.
A. Putting theories and the evidence-base into practice with individual clients in real situations. (1,3,4 
and 15 in Appendix 6a). The term “getting your hands dirty” came to mind when reading these 
responses. The unifying theme was of a relationship where trainees could take the elegant theories and 
test them against the roughness of distressed clients in the “real world”.
B. A relationship in which the trainee’s clinical competence is developed and evaluated. (2, 9,10, and 13 
in Appendix 6a). The emphasis here is on the trainee - not on the theories (as above). It’s about 
becoming a competent clinician and some of the ways that goal is achieved, particularly with the 
supervisqr offering constructive criticism.
C. Access to the unique qualities and perspectives of qualified clinicians. (6 in Appendix 6a). This 
category is distinct in its unique focus on the qualities of the supervisor.
D. A place to discuss process and ethical issues. (5 in Appendix 6a). This formed a separate category 
from the development of clinical competence. Respondents in this class were talking about a specific 
element of teaching which they did not expect to discuss extensively in the academic module._It was 
about meeting a teaching need, not a clinical development need; although obviously the two areas 
overlap.
E. A place where the trainee experiences a supportive, personal focus and can discuss personal 
development issues. (7,12 and 16 in Appendix 6a). This category was about the trainee as a person, 
who appreciates individual teaching and nurturing and the privacy of the supervisory relationship.
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Appendix 6 cont’d
F. An opportunity to discuss different roles with different client groups. ( 14 in Appendix 6a). This is 
distinct from C. above because it is about access to different roles and client groups not to a unique 
supervisor.
G. An element that ensures the trainee is meeting minimum standards of clinical practice. (8 in Appendix 
6a). This category is distinct from B. above in that it is not about developing competence but about 
existing competencies and supervision as a safeguard against poor practice.
H. A relationship in which the trainee experiences organisational and service issues (17 in Appendix 6a). 
This category stands alone because it draws in an agency which impinges on supervision, which is 
external to the trainee, the supervisor, the client and the course.
L Where all aspects of client work are inter-woven (11 in Appendix 6a). Respondents in this category see 
the value of placement supervision in its capacity to integrate aspects from the rest of the course, 
bringing the course together in a single, personal experience.
Qu 2. Please could you describe vour best single episode of supervision as a trainee clinical psychologist.
Please explain why it was helpful.
23 classifications were initially identified (See Appendix 2b). Two respondents were unable to identify 
any single best episodes of supervision. These generated the following eigiht categories:
A  The supervisor creates a supportive and risk-taking environment (4.5,6 and 10 in Appendix 6b). This 
category is distinguished by highlighting the climate in which trainees develop skills and confidence, 
rather than the processes by which they develop them. The environment is a distinct one ranging on a 
continuum of supervision being a place where a trainee feels safe to show his/her ignorance to one 
which is stretching and challenging Trainees are valued and respected in this climate. Constructive 
criticism both creates and epitomises this climate.
160
Service Related Research Project
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a
B. Helping the trainee to develop his/her clinical skills and knowledge (2.3,13,15 and 16 in Appendix 
6b). This category is distinct from other categories which emphasise trainee development because it is 
about skills and knowledge acquisition following client-oriented discussions between trainee and 
supervisor. It includes a number of techniques employed by the supervisor including making explicit 
theory-practice links and reformulating using different models.
C. Helping pie trainee develop generic therapeutic skills (9.12, and 18 in Appendix 6b). The 
distinctiveness of this category is it refers to trainee development prompted by therapist-oriented 
discussiqn. It includes specific strategies, such as the supervisor discussing transference issues.
D. The supervisor uses role-plavs and is observed bv and observed the trainee with a client (7 and 22 in 
Appendix 6b). Several respondents referred to specific helpful techniques. Being observed was helpful 
in two ways, allowing the supervisor to know the trainee’s level to accurately evaluate the trainee and 
when it \yas followed by constructive criticism.
E. Encouraging the trainee to reflect on his/her practice (12 in Appendix 6b). A number of respondents 
highlighted that they were made to reflect on their practice in ways in which the process of reflection 
was more important than skills building.
F. Supervision is well organised (14 and 21 in Appendix 6b). This category is self-explanatory. Examples 
cited included having an agenda for meetings, regular supervision and sufficient time to meet the 
trainee’s training needs.
G. The supervisor provides a role-model for the trainee (1 in.Appendix 6b). A number of respondents 
emphasised the personal and professional qualities of the supervisor as an inspiration to them, without 
citing specific strategies they employed. The model included being an “expert” and being “up-to-date”.
H. The supervisor being restorative (17 and 19 in Appendix 6b). This category is distinct from Aabove 
in that it refers not to an educative supportive role, but to a more personal support, containing 
anxieties and nurturing confidence.
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Qu 3.Please could you describe vour worst single episode of supervision as a trainee clinical psychologist.
Please explain why it was unhelpful.
Twenty-four initial classifications were generated by this question (See Appendix 6c). Eleven participants
could not name any worst single experiences of placement supervision. The classifications generated the
following nine categories:
A. Supervision lacked rigour with a lack of direction, clarity and rationales (9,10,11,13 and 14 in 
Appendix 6c). Participants here complained of a range of unfocussed discussions with their supervisors 
including a lack of rationales for suggested interventions and no theory-practice links. Supervisors 
appeared to be trying to assist and educate trainees but were lacking rigour in their approach.
B. Supervisors were considered 'incompetent’ (1 in Appendix 6c). This category is distinct from A  where 
supervisors \yere judged to be unfocussed rather than outright incompetent Examples of 
“incompetence” included a supervisor advising using a self-help book, a supervisor ignoring the 
evidencerbase and a supervisor being out of touch with current psychological developments.
C. Unhelpful supervisory style (5 and 6 in Appendix 6c). This category is distinct from A. in some ways, 
although it shares some characteristics, especially the sense that trainees were frustrated in their 
attempts to learn from the supervisor. This category focuses more on supervisors who closed down 
discussion by their style, rather than were unfocussed during discussions. Opportunities for the trainee 
to learn and gain in confidence were curtailed
D. Supervis|on was marred bv organisational problems (2,3,20 and 24 in Appendix 6c). Problems 
included supervisors not providing sufficient time, lack of communication between joint supervisors 
and a lack of liaison with course tutors.
E. Supervisors who did not respect and disempowered their trainees (4 in Appendix 6c). The over-riding 
theme of this category was of the supervisor not treating the trainee as a collaborator in the learning
162
Service Related Research Project
Appendix 6 cont’d
process. The tone of the responses indicated trainees felt belittled, even humiliated, not just lectured at (see
C.). There were no reported cases, however, of sexually inappropriate behaviour.
F. Supervisors were unaware of the trainee’s needs and level of experience (14 and 22 in Appendix 6c). H 
below partially overlaps with this category, with respondents citing particular areas of practice which 
were overlooked. This category is distinct, however, in that participants cited a general insensitivity to 
their needs bpth clinical and emotional. Some supervisors were accused of lacking empathy when the 
trainee needed support.
G. The feedback given in supervision was critical not constructive (11 in Appendix 6c). Focussed 
discussion did take place and the supervisor knew the trainee’s level of ability, but the supervisor was 
critical and not constructive, which made learning difficult and left the trainee feeling unconfident.
H. Supervisors offered a limited insight into the therapeutic process (16.18 and 19 in Appendix 2c). The 
missing element for trainees with these supervisors were discussions about therapeutic process and 
ethical issues. The category also included those who felt insufficiently intellectually challenged in 
supervision.
T Technical shortcomings (21 in Appendix 6c). Two trainees complained of not observing their 
supervisor.
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Appendix4a: 
Original jdassificatidnsof responses to 4he<juestion: wWfiatndo you 
expect to gain from placement supervision tKat you do not get from 
any othep -element o f tfie course?”
1. A chancelo testihe-theories in practice
2 . A place to develop my individual therapeutic style
3. A chance to look at specific cases in-depth
4. Exposure to the realities of workingas a clinical psychologist....
5. An opportunity-todiscussprocess and ethical issues which are not taught-extensivelyin 4he 
academia module.....
6 . Access to the unique qualities andperspectives of qualified clinicians
7. Access toapersonal,intenseeducativeexpeiience
8 . An element that-ensuresTam meeting minimumstandards (Quality.control) of-clinical 
practice >
9. A place where I am encouraged to reflect on mypractice
10. A place to receive accurate constructive feedbackmmy clinical development
11. Where alhaspectsof client work .are , interwoven j
12. To have my ^ confidence. boostedand given support........
13. A relationship in which my clinical competence is developed and evaluated
14. An opportunitv-to discuss differing roles with differentclient group s
15. A relatiopshipin which thepsychologicalevidence-baseistestedinpractice
16. A relationshipwherepersonaLdevelopment issues-are addressed..
17. A relationship where you discuss organisational and service issues
18. A place where I get advice on case studies and the service-related project
164
Service Related Research Project
Appendixes: 
Original plassifications-of-^esponses fo^lie^iiestioii : “Please^ould 
you describe your Sest smgIe^pisodepf «upei^Mon as a Clinical 
psychologist. P4ease ^ plain why it was helpful.”
1. The supervisor-provided a role-modelIbrjneto follow.
2. The supervisormadeclearand-explicit theory-practicelinks
3. Useful new knowledge was impartednndskilkdeveloped
4. The supervisor-criticisedme constructively.
5. The supervisor wassupportive-and -created a “safespace”-in whichtoshowignorance-and 
make mistakes
6 . I was respected and mycontribution was valued
7. I was observedhy-orlobservedmy-supervisor.with clients.......
9. The supervisor was-fecihtativenot didactic.
10. Supervision was.intellectually.challenging
11. .My-supervdsor highlightecLa dynamic process between myself and the client
12. My supervisorencouragedreflexive.practice
13. My supervisor-discussed ajcasewith me prior to me intervening, broadening my 
understanding.
14. My supervisorgave sufficient time to-discuss client work
15. My supervisor reformulated a-case using a-different model than the original formulation
16. My supemsor iisedexphcitevidence-based-practices.
17. My supervisor provided a “containing” environment for my anxieties
18. When stgckonaxase, jnyjsupervisoraised-giiideddiscovery to-enable me-tomoveforward
19. JMy _supervisornuitured-my self-confidence....
20. My supervisor respected-myleveLofexperience
21. Supervision was well structured, including records, agendas and contracts
22. My supervisor illustrated issues by using role-plays
165
Service Related Research Project
Appendix-6c 
Original classifications ^ >f responses to 4he^[uestidn: "Please oould you
describe your worst single ^ pisode ofsupervisionas a trainee clinical 
psycliolbj^st. Please explain wby4t was unhelpful.
1. My supervisor was incompetent
2. There was a  lackof supportfrom thecourse team
3. Supervision was badly organised
4. My supervisordidnotrespectmeanddisempoweredme
5.
6. My supervisor was didactic, and did not listen to me........
7. My supervisor was anxious .and treated me as if I wasauper\dsing.him/her
8 . My supervisorfeiledtoobservejne.with clients..
9. Supervision was chattyandwTthout structure
10. My supervisor did notmaketheory-practice links
11. My supervisor always said ‘I  was doing fine” without giving xmstructive criticism 
lX-My-supervisor concentrated on my weaknesses, .without reinforcing my strengths .
16. My supervisor, never talkedabout therapeutic process .
17. My superwsor .commented xanjny dress sense
18. Supervision was not intellectually challenging
19. Supervision was superficial y
20. There was a jnismatch between whatwas-being taught en the courseand what the 
supervisor-had to offer.
21. I didnotpbseivejnysupervisor
22 . My supervisor gave me too heavy a workload
23. My supendsor broke samedistressinguewsabouta client without tact or support
24. I had two supervisors who gave me conflicting advice on a case
13.
14. My supervisor didnot providexlear guidance..
15.
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Appendix 7;
Illustrative statements by trainees about best supervision:
“Supervisor was very knowledgeable about theory and practice in the field and made continual 
links throughout supervision.”
techniques, gather than stating from the outset how to do it.
“Supervisor agreed to observation (both ways) and openly identified his own mistakes -  helped 
challenge my ideas about it not being acceptable to make mistakes.”
“Throughout my-supervisor was jcomplimentary, positive nndexcellent, while giving 
constructive criticism which left me feeling more skilled arid confident.”
“She listened to my worries and asked me a series of questions which guided my thinking about 
each of the assessments.^andhelpedmeclarify my thoughts,-so I could seethe aims and value 
in what I wasxloing. I leftjsupervision feelingfr etter.about mywork-and feel ing empowered.
My supervisor hadhelpedma answer my own questions,, which increased my confidence. She 
did this without being judgmental or directive.”
‘^ upendsicMLprovided up-to-date theory in more than onemodel, guidance of how to integrate 
it into my workxreatiyely„. inihexontextofn relationship which wasveryjencouraging, 
reflective, treated as a fellow colleague -  believed in and trusted.”
Illustrativestatementsbvtraineesonworstsupervislon:
“Having a supervisor who. insisted on checking nndxoirectirg eadi jeport at Jeast lhreelimes 
before allowing me to send it. I felt demeaned and deskilled and also didn’t feel like I was 
learning anythingirom thejexperiencens-many.ofthexhanges-inyxlved changing my.style of 
writing...”
“Supervisor was nearly always critical and aloof. I felt frightened to bring issues to supervision 
and thought fhat points I considered important were dismissed. I lost confidence in my skills.”
“Support from college but no changes made re. The placement for future trainees.”
“Being told what to assess and what intervention to use without discussion. Also experience of 
supervisor formulating for trainee. No scope for learning, generation of own ideas.”
“One supervisor was rather vague in her formulations and advice for intervention. She 
generally suggested I 'wonderwith’ people. Thiswas .unhelpfulbecause my.personal 
.preference was for more active interventions and because of the lack of any explicit rationale 
for this approach.”
“No support,^not listened to,-dumped with.cases.nobody.else wanted.-No-guidance.cmfrow.to 
manage, assess, intervene -  worked in a way I thought sensible as given little other help... No 
understanding of my needs... shattered my confidence with a client group.”
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Feedback sent to participating courses -  summary of findings
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SRRP: David Glasman, Trainee ClinicalPsychologist
Supervised by Linda Dowdney, Course Director, Psych D;Glin Psych, University of Surrey and 
Victoria Hill, Psychology Lecturer, University of Surrey.
The supervisory process in clinical psychology training: experiences 
and expectations of trainees. 
Summary method andfindings.
Method
Design: A po t^alquestionnaire design was usedprovidingboth quantitative data analysed rising 
. multivariate^tatistical techniques and descriptive statistics, and also qualitative data analysed using 
content analysis.
Participants: Three hundred first, second and third year trainee clinical psychologists at .six 
ClinPsychD courses in South-East-Englan<L Respondents = 127 (42%);, of whom 93 (73.2%) were 
aged 25-30 and 16 (12.6%) wereaged31-35. Women made up 106 of the sample (83.5%), which is 
representative of national figures for trainee clinical psychologists. Participants came from all-three 
years of training, with 49 first-years .(3 8.6%), 40_second-years (31.5%)_and 37 third years j(29.1%). 
-Gogmtive-behavioural therapy (GBT) was the preferred theoretical orientation of 69 participants - 
(54.3%), with “CBT/Systemic” the uext most popular orientation with 11 .respondents (8f7%) oflhe 
sample.
Measures: A questionnaire was devised to evaluate the views on placement supervision of trainees,
a. Deriving the Questionnaire: The literature indicated six domains of supervision were likely to be 
important; Skills. Acquisition, Supervisory Relationship, Quality Control, Knowledge, Process
and Practicalities (See Table 1 for definitions) .......
A series of statements were generated by the author to reflect each domain. Subsequently, .a workshop 
was held with eight first-year chnical psychology trainees on the same course as the author Its 
purpose was two-fold; first, to check lheproposed domains ofjsuperyision .were comprehensive; 
second, to check- that the domains were comprehensible. Secondly* the same trainees undertook a 
card-sort of 58 statements on supervision .to validate theirpresence in particular domains A statement 
was included-in-the questionnaire if fiveor participants (60 per cent) agreed it fell into the same 
domain. 51 statements reached criteria. Two statements - Tn supervision T discuss ethical issues’
(50% agreement-level) and'In supervisionLam encouragedto reflect on my practice’ (50%)-were 
retained despite.failing to reach.criteriaas.it wasfelt their omission would result in the final 
-questionnaire not reflecting important aspects of supervision .Another statement which-failed to meet 
the criterion -  .‘In supervision I .discussformulations of jnyxlients’ .difficulties’ -  was reworded and 
included in both the Skills Acquisition section and the Knowledge section, to which participants in 
the card sort had inequal numbers.ascribed it.. Again, it was felt two. key .aspects would be. lost without 
it. Three separate statements referring to access to a desk; computer and telephone were linked as one 
as they were deemed to duplicate each other.
-The-auestionnaire; Information on'Age’, 'Gender', 'Year of training’, 'Number of placements’ and 
'Preferred theoretical orientation’ was gathered. There was a list of six domains (see Table, l.helow), 
validated in the card -sort, which participants were required to rank order. Respondents were also 
required to rank order in importance and rate - for frequency of delivery - statements about 
supervisory activities, generated by the literature and validated by the card-sort. There were also three 
questions relating to expectations of supervision, and critical incidents of good and bad supervision.
Analyses: Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the data; Non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney 
U Test and Kruskal-Wallis) were used to test for between group differences in rankings and ratings. 
Content analysis (Day, 1993) was used to analyse the qualitative data.
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Table 1: Definitions of the six domains of supervision
Skills Acquisition Learning and practising technical skills e.g. Socratic questioning
Supervisory relationship Having a constructive relationship with your supervisor
Quality control... Supervision as a means of ensuring minimum standards of care..........
Knowledge Sharing knowledge over and above skills acquisition
Process Discussion of therapeutic processes including client-therapist 
dynamics
Practicalities Arrangements for supervision, and your working environment
Executive Summary of findings:
1. Skills Acquisition.and the.quality of.the SupervisoryRelationship jammost valuedby trainees.
2. Qualitativedataindicates thattrainees value Skills Acquisition and the Supervisory Relationship 
most when they interact. Thisstudy indicates, that all trainees, regardless of year oftramingjmd 
preferred orientation (with -one exception -  see 7. Below),see supervision placement as a place to 
develop core competencies in formulation, assessment and intervention in a relationshipin which 
they are valued* given honest and constructive feed back and explicit, clear rationales for the 
supervisor’sguidance.
3. Trainees alsovalue supervisors who are supportive.
4. What trainees regard as unhelpful supervision is generally The mirror image of what is valued. 
Unhelpful supervision isriescribed as one in which core competencies are not developed and the 
trainee feels unvalued, and that s/he is given destructive criticism. Unhelpful supervisors .also, do 
not give clear^and explicit rationales for their guidance.
5. Additionally, trainees indicate that it is  jinhelpful wien jaipervisoraare unaware ctfihe trainees 
emotionakandtraining needs.-
6. What trainees want from placement supervision does not changeaccording to their.stage in  
-.training..
7. The trainees preferred theoretical orientation didaffect -  in one way -  what they wanted from 
training. Trainees with a psychodynamic orientation placed significantly less emphasis on Skills 
Acquisition than those with a  CBT orientation.
8. Supervisors-are delivering all elements of the supervision practice equally, although individual 
trainees can identify exceptions to lhi&general picture.
9. The high level of concordance between rankings and ratings indicates supervisors are delivering 
what trainees want.
10. Trainees areJess concerned with-the Quality Control-aspccts o f supervision.
.1L Trainees place relatively little value on evidence-b^sed practice and supervisors raraely check on 
this aspeGtofthc trainees work;
12. In terms of therapy Process, trainees place more importance on reflective practice and making 
interventionseffective than discussing power differentials or ethical issues. .............
13. Discussions of power differentials and ethical issues are being marginalised in supervision.
14. Supervisors are delivering Roughly the same training package regardless of the trainee’s year of 
training.
15. Current mod^ls-of supervision-do not-fit -comfortably-with4rainees’-expectations of supervision. 
For example, Proctor (1991) argues supervision involves three main processes. These are 
formative/edijcative ( where skills, understanding and ability is-developed through reflection on 
and exploration of the trainee’s work with his/her clients); restorative (where supervisors respond 
to the inherent stresses of work) and normative (where the trainee is developed as an NHS
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. em ploye standards are monitored and the supervisor interfaces with the wider organisation). 
The present studyindicates trainees have-a strongfccus on formative/educative processcs, while 
the normative.fimction ofsupervisionxemains largely invisible to them. Additionally, in the 
rsetorativ^ JEunction, trainees want-moreihanxontainment, Jhcywant-active encouragement-and 
support.
16. In view of-the4ransactional oature-of£upervision, fhture-research-might concentrate on 
qualitatiye analysis of trainees and supervisors discussing training together.
A sample of illustrative statements bv trainees about best supervision:
“Supervisor wasveiy knowledgeable.ahouLtheoiy and practice in the field and made continual links 
throughout supervision.”
“Supervisor gave me space to reflect and discuss different hypolheses, formulations andlechniques, 
rather than stating from the outset how to do it.”
“Supervisor agreed to observation (bath ways) andopenly identified his own mistakes -  helped 
challenge my: ideas about it not being acceptable to make mistakes.”
“Throughout, my supervisor was complimentary, positive und .excellent, while giving conslmctive 
criticism whi<jth left me feeling more skilled and confident.”
“She listened to my worries and asked me a series of questions which.guided my tliinkingubout each 
of the assessments-... and helped me clarify my thoughts,- so I could see the aims and value in what I 
was doing. I left supervision feeling better uboutmy workund feeling empowered. My supendsoriiad 
helped me answer my own questions, whichjncreased my confidence. She did this without being 
judgmental or directive.”
“Supervision provided up-to-date4heoiy4n-more4hanonemodel, £uidanGe-of howtointegrate4t4nto 
my work creatively... in the context of a relationship which was very encouraging, reflective, treated 
as a fellow colleague -  believed in and trusted.”
A sample of illustrative statements bv trainees on worst supervision:
I
“Having a supervisor who insisted on ehecking-and-corrccting each report at least three-times before 
allowing me 10 send it. I felt demeaned and deskilled and also didn’t feel like I was learning anything... 
from the experience as many of the changes involved changing my style of writing...”
“Supervisor was. nearly always critical and aloof. I felt frightened to bring issues to supervision and 
thought that points I considered important were dismissed. I lost confidence in my skills.”
“Support from college but no changes made re. The placement for future trainees.”
“Being told what-to-assess and what intervention 4o use without-disGussion. Also experience of 
supervisor formulating for trainee. NO scope for learning, generation of own ideas.”
“One supervisprwasrather vague in her formulations andudvice-fbr intervention. She generally 
suggested I 'wonder with’ people. This was unhelpful because my personal preference was for more 
active interventions and because of the lack of any explicit rationale for this approach.”
“No support, noUistened to, dumped with cases nobody else.wanted. No guidance on how to manage, 
assess, intervene—worked in a way l4hought sensible as gtvenIittle-otherhelp...No~understanding-of 
my needs...shattered my confidence with a client group.”
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How useful has the Health Belief Model been in predicting 
treatment adherence in clients with severe and/or chronic 
mental health problems?
Introduction:
Non-adherence* to treatment is a major problem in modem healthcare both in physical 
illness and for people with mental health problems. It has a personal cost. There is also 
a cost in time and resources for the NHS. Relapse has been linked to poor medication 
compliance (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; cited in Keck et al., 1997) leading sometimes 
to hospitalisation or referrals for further therapy. Although there is now a challenge to 
the view that non-adherence rates to medication regimes by clients with mental health 
problems (Blackwell, 1997) are greatly higher than for those with physical disorders, 
improving non-adherence in mental health is a major challenge with great potential 
benefits. Cramer and Rosenheck (1998) in a review of 10 studies estimated that clients 
took on average 65% of prescribed antidepressants with a range of 40-90% (compared 
with adherence rates to medication regimes for physical disorders of 76%, with a 
range of 60-92%). Non-adherence in conditions requiring long-term treatment is 
especially problematical. Lin et al. (1995) found that non-adherence to antidepressant 
medication increased from a rate of 28% in the first month to 44% in the third month. 
Non-adherence to anti-psychotic medication has been estimated to be higher still, 
although there is debate as to the level and to the reasons with Cramer and Rosenheck
(1998) concluding that it might be due to the inaccuracy of methods used to measure 
compliance in this client group. Buchanan (1992) reported in a two-year prospective 
study of treatment compliance of people with schizophrenia that 50% of his sample 
were poorly compliant two years after discharge from hospital, while in their review 
study Cramer and Rosenheck (1998) reported a mean compliance rate of 58% (range: 
24 - 90%).
* Although there are different definitions of “adherence” and “compliance”, in the 
current review the terms will be used interchangeably, because they are used in this 
way in many studies under review.
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A number of social cognition models have been developed which aim to explain and 
predict both what makes people act to prevent ill health and whether they will adhere 
to treatment for acute and chronic illness. One of the first and most highly researched 
models is the Health Belief Model (HBM), developed by Rosenstock in 1966 and later 
by Becker and his colleagues through the 1970s and 1980s (Janz and Becker, 1984). 
The model was, however, developed with physical disorders in mind (Rosenstock, 
1966) and research into its predictive utility has largely concentrated in health 
promotion areas such as dietary compliance and in medication adherence in chronic 
physical conditions, such as diabetes (Ogden, 2000). In recent years there has been 
considerable interest in developing intervention strategies to overcome non-adherence 
in psychological therapies (for example with the development of Motivational 
Interviewing and Compliance Therapy) and a number of researchers have studied the 
utility of the HBM in predicting non-adherence in people with mental health problems. 
The current paper aims to review the existing literature in the area and answer: does 
the HBM provide a useful model for predicting treatment adherence behaviours in 
people with mental health problems? If it does, are particular behavioural determinants 
as set out in the HBM more predictive than others are? If it does not, does the HBM 
need modification for mental health behaviours or is a new model required? And, 
finally, does any model of adherence in the field of mental health need to be disorder- 
or treatment-modality specific?
Method of review:
PsycINFO and Medline was used to search literature from 1967 to the present. 
Keywords used in the search were 'health belief model’, 'treatment compliance’, 
'treatment adherence’, 'psychiatric illness’, 'psychiatric disorder’, 'mental health’, 
'psychological illness’, 'depression’, 'schizophrenia’, 'bipolar disorder’ and 'affective 
disorder’. Additional papers were selected from references in the studies identified in 
the search. The search indicated a need to limit the current review in two ways. First, 
that it concentrated largely on adherence to physical treatments for functional 
psychological conditions in the form of medication. There were no studies that 
attempted to consider the HBM’s utility in predicting compliance in psychological 
therapies as measured solely by, for example, attendance in therapy or homework
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completed in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. Second, that the present review 
concentrated on severe and chronic mental health problems. Again, the weight of the 
literature considering the HBM focuses on this particular population sample.
The Health Belief Model:
The HBM is a social cognition model designed to identify the variables that underlie 
health-related decisions, and to assess their ability to predict behaviour (Armitage and 
Conner, 2000). Originally, it included five determinants of health behaviours; 
perceived susceptibility to illness, perceived severity of illness, perceived benefits of 
treatment, perceived costs or barriers to treatment; and cues to take health action {cues 
to action). Since its development, Rosenstock and Becker have added two more 
determinants; the degree to which one is motivated to remain healthy; and the degree 
to which a person believes he/she can control their health behaviours (Ogden, 2000). 
All components are regarded as independent predictors of health behaviour (Armitage 
and Conner, 2000).
Methodological difficulties in conducting the current review:
One of the criticisms levelled at the HBM is that the determinants are not 
operationally defined (Stroebe and Stroebe, 1995). This lack of definition means care 
must be exercised in comparing results between studies. For example, Smith et al., 
1999, in a study on adherence with anti-psychotic depot medication define the benefits 
component of the HBM as including secondary benefits of medication, such as being 
more calm and able to socialise, whereas other studies do not indicate whether they 
include this in the term or just refer to primary benefits of symptom relief. In the 
current study, differences in the HBM component definitions will be noted where they 
are apparent.
As noted above, the model itself has evolved to include extra components. As the 
authors of most studies do not give a detailed account of which version of the model 
they are using, it can be difficult to compare studies with confidence.
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A further difficulty, which has been the subject of a number of separate reviews (e.g. 
Cramer and Rosenheck, 1998), has been how adherence is defined and measured 
between studies. Adherence has been defined and measured in terms of blood serum 
lithium levels, pill counts, attendance at outpatient clinics, patient self-report and 
his/her doctor’s opinion, and microelectronic monitoring systems. As Cramer and 
Rosenheck (1998) note no system has proved completely reliable. Self-report 
measures, for example, generally give an overestimation of compliance (Cramer and 
Rosenheck, 1998). These problems also apply to medication adherence measurement 
with physical disorders. Such inconsistency in measurement again makes comparison 
of studies hazardous. The current paper will note how studies have tried to measure 
adherence, with the caveat that no method of measurement has been found to be 
highly reliable (Cramer and Rosenheck, 1998).
Differing definitions of adherence also cause difficulties of comparison. For example, 
Budd et al., 1996, used a different way to identify compliers to antipsychotic 
medication than Pan and Tantam (1989). The former’s definition may have lead to 
very clear differences between compliers and non-compliers, thereby maximising the 
health beliefs underlying the differences. Budd et al., 1996, produced conflicting 
results to Pan and Tantam’s (1989) study, possibly as a result of this difference in 
adherence definition.
Studies into the HBM and treatment adherence in affective 
disorders:
There have been two major studies (Connelly et al., 1982; Adams et al., 2000) which 
have explicitly tested hypotheses about compliance in affective disorders using the 
HBM as a theoretical framework. Additionally, there have been a number of studies 
which have examined determinants of compliance in ways that could be equated with 
the HBM. One of those studies has been included in this review: Lin et al.,1995, 
because it is a well-designed recent study, which extends the sample population by
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drawing participants from a primary care setting. Unlike other studies excluded here, it 
also specifically examines the cues to action determinant.
Connelly et al. ,1982, used the Health Belief Model framework to determine how the 
perceptions of patients receiving lithium carbonate maintenance treatment for mood 
disorders with regard to their illness, treatment, mood and side effects related to 
medication-taking and appointment-keeping behaviour. It is an important study 
because it is one of the first to use a standardised measure of the HBM. The sample 
consisted of 24 men and 24 women randomly admitted to two US outpatient clinics. 
Perceptions of treatment were measured by structured questionnaire -  the 
Standardised Compliance Questionnaire -  which measures the severity, costs , and 
benefits HBM determinants . The authors also devised a self-rated scale to measure the 
client’s mood at the time of completing the questionnaire. The results were analysed 
using multiple regression and correlation analyses.
The authors found that severity, costs and benefits were not significantly correlated 
with adherence levels, but being married, and the perception that the participant was 
receiving continuity of care were significantly correlated with adherence. Regression 
analyses indicated that the HBM components accounted for 7% of the variance in 
adherence behaviour; taking into account the mood of the client brought the figure up 
to 15%.
The study has a number of strengths. It is a prospective study with adherence levels 
measured both before and after participants completed the questionnaires, thus 
avoiding problems caused in retrospective studies on adherence of memory biases and 
also avoiding possible bias against poor adherers by physician-raters. Additionally, it 
used two separate measures of adherence; serum lithium levels and attendance at 
outpatients’ clinics. Adherence was defined as the maintenance of therapeutic serum 
lithium levels and attendance at 75% or more outpatient appointments over a 9-month 
period. While there are drawbacks to both methods (e.g. see Cramer and Rosenheck, 
1998, on problems of therapeutic drug monitoring), using two adherence determinants 
provides more certainty that adherence is being measured accurately. Additionally, this 
study by examining two adherence methods -  and finding that some participants were
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adherent in one domain and not another - highlights that adherence is a multi-faceted 
concept and can be operationalised in different ways that reflect the complexity of the 
treatment regimes offered to patients. It challenges the idea that for this sample 
population medication compliance is the only measure of adherence.
The study has a number of weaknesses, however. There is no power analysis but the 
sample is small and may lack power to detect an effect of the HBM determinants on 
adherence behaviour. Participants in the sample were receiving a variety of modalities 
of service, which may have impacted on health beliefs and adherence levels. These 
were left uncontrolled in the design. Additionally, some clients were taking other 
medication, which might affect perceptions of side effects {costs) and benefits of 
adhering to medication.
Adams and Scott (2000) is the most recent study investigating the utility of the HBM 
in predicting compliance among patients with affective disorders. It should be noted, 
that the study again uses service-delivery criteria for selecting a sample population, on 
the basis of clinical utility. Participants were selected from UK outpatient 
departments for patients with severe and disabling mental disorders. They are included 
in this section because the majority (67 %) has affective disorders. It should be noted 
that 33 % have schizophrenic illnesses and no attempt is made to analyse the results 
according to diagnosis.
Thirty-nine participants meeting a diagnosis of chronic and disabling mental disorder, 
in receipt of disability benefit and being prescribed long-term prophylactic medication 
for mental disorder took part in the study. The authors measured components of the 
HBM using a reliable and valid instrument, and used a standardised questionnaire to 
assess the side effects of medication. However, the authors had to add questions on 
susceptibility, severity and cues to action as these were not measured on the HBM 
measurement instrument. Adherence was measured by written and verbal self-report 
and an assessor blind to all other study data analysed the adherence information to 
categorise participants into High, Partial or Non-adherers. Dysfunctional attitudes, 
personality traits and health locus of control were measured as potential modifying 
factors on adherence behaviour. Non-parametric analyses were used to identify
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variables that differentiated between High and Partial-adherers categories, with a strict 
significance level (p<0.01) to reflect the small sample size. Multiple regression 
analyses and logistic regression analyses were also run.
Adams and Scott (2000) found that severity and benefits significantly differentiated 
between high and partial-adherers. These two HBM components accounted for 43% of 
the variance in adherence behaviour. They also found that factors outside the HBM 
significantly differentiated adherence behaviours. Participants scoring high on 
“dependency” and “need for approval” scales were high adherers, as were those with 
an external health locus of control.
The study has a number of strengths. It generally uses measures with good reliability 
and validity. The authors defend their use of self-report measures for adherence, by 
pointing out that no measure is perfect and that the level of adherence reported by 
subjects was in line with adherence measured in other ways and in other studies.
There are problems with the study, however. The most important is that the authors 
themselves devised three questions on the susceptibility, severity and cues to action 
components of the HBM. There is no indication of whether and how they were piloted 
and no reliability and validity data for the questions are given. Given the finding that 
severity was a good predictor of adherence, this is a worrying omission. Another 
problem is that this is a small sample for linear regression analysis. Despite the 
authors’ protestations, the reliance on self-report measures of adherence as the only 
measure is a weakness and falls short of the gold standard of triangulation.
Lin et al.. 1995, studied adherence to antidepressants in a US primary care population. 
The authors did not directly test the HBM but they did look at the effect of educational 
packages and medication side-effects, which could be described as “external cues to 
action” and “costs” respectively.
The sample consisted of 155 adult participants, who were diagnosed with depressive 
disorders and had been prescribed antidepressant medication which they were 
supposed to take for at least three months. The majority of the sample were women
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(72.3%) with a mean age of 47 years. The participants were split into two groups for 
the benefit of comparative analysis -  early adherers (those who adhered for less than 
30 days) and late adherers (those who adhered for between 30 and 90 days).
Adherence was measured by participant self-report.
The authors found that side effects {costs) were associated with early nonadherence at 
severe levels but not at mild or moderate levels. However, side effects did not predict 
nonadherence in late adherers. External cues to action, in the form of educational 
messages regarding medication usage and behavioural strategies, were also associated 
with good early adherence. For late adherers, however, the only significant predictor 
was whether the participant had used antidepressant medication previously.
The study has a number of strengths. It uses a community sample and is designed to 
examine medication adherence with some complexity. Chiefly, it employs a 
longitudinal design which allows the authors to compare short-term adherence to 
longer-term adherence.
There are a number of weaknesses, however: the sample is educationally above 
average limiting the study’s generalisability; adherence is measured through self- 
report, which is unreliable; and the patient report of care, side effects and adherence is 
based on recall which may be subject to memory bias.
However, the study illuminated a number of problems with other studies into the 
HBM. It demonstrated that the model is too static. For example, Lin et al., 1995, 
found that the side effects of medication (costs) affected adherence in a complex way 
which was dependent both on the time side effects were experienced, what side effects 
were experienced and how many. The HBM does not allow for such complexity 
making it difficult to interpret the results of studies which support or counter costs as a 
significant factor of medication adherence. Additionally, the study indicates that 
elements not included in the model can be significant predictors of health behaviours 
(in this case, previous experience of using medication).
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Summary of findings:
Due to the very limited number of studies explicitly using the HBM framework, it is 
impossible to make firm statements about the determinants of HBM in medication 
adherence behaviour in affective disorders. However, based on the above studies and 
on information from a review study into the utility of the HBM in predicting 
medication adherence in affective disorders (Cohen et al., 2000), a number of trends 
emerge. Susceptibility and costs are poor predictors; severity is a good predictor; for 
benefits and cues to action the evidence for and against predictive utility is evenly 
balanced.
Other factors that are correlated with medication adherence in 
affective disorders:
A number of other determinants of adherence to medication regimens in affective 
disorders have been identified in the studies in this review.
Patient-related factors:
Connelly et al., 1982, found that married patients were significantly more likely to 
adhere to lithium carbonate than patients who were single. Adams and Scott (2000) 
found personality characteristics and beliefs about locus of control were significant 
predictors.
Illness-related factors:
While Keck et al., 1997, did not find any association between elevated mood and 
lithium adherence, Connelly et al., 1982, did find that elevated mood was associated 
with greater non-adherence.
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D r u g - r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s :
Lin et al., 1995, found that people who had used anti-depressants before were likely to 
be more compliant. Keck et al., 1997, found that in-patients with bipolar disorder who 
were hospitalised for acute mania were more likely to be non-compliant to 
combinations of mood stabilising drugs.
Other factors:
In a review article, Cohen et al., 2000, found a number of studies that identified 
doctor-related factors, such as continuity of care, to be predictive of adherence 
behaviour. Additionally, social influences and normative beliefs have been 
highlighted. For example, in bipolar disorder, what friends, family and spouses believe 
about medication has been found to be a good predictor of adherence to a medication 
regimen. Positive attitudes to medication in the patient and his/her significant others 
has been highly associated with good adherence (Jamison et al.,1979).
Studies into the HBM as predictive of medication adherence with 
patients with schizophrenia.
Considering the reported efficacy of antipsychotic medication in easing positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Shepherd et al., 1989, cited in Roth and Fonagy, 1996), 
the seriousness of the consequences of non-compliance in many cases and the high 
rates of non-compliance (see above), there are remarkably few studies which use the 
HBM framework to predict adherence behaviour in people with schizophrenia. All 
four have been included in this review.
One of the most important is the study by Budd et al., 1996. It is important because it 
seeks to readdress some of the shortcomings of other studies into this model; 
especially the issue of the reliability of measures of the HBM and the criteria used to 
measure compliance.
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Budd et a l.-1996, recruited 20 compliant and 20 non-compliant people meeting DSM 
III-R criteria for schizophrenia from two depot neuroleptic clinics in South Wales. The 
groups were matched on key demographic characteristics. Participants completed two 
questionnaires on Health Beliefs and Health Locus of Control, which reliably 
measured three HBM components {susceptibility, severity, and benefits). Reliability 
coefficients indicated that costs was not reliably measured by the instruments. 
Compliance was measured according to an accepted research definition (Curson et al, 
1985; cited in Smith et al., 1999) on the basis of appointment attendance records and 
acceptance of medication at those appointments. The results were analysed using 
stepwise discriminant function analysis.
The authors found that only susceptibility  significantly differentiated between 
compliers and non-compliers on its own. However, the authors found that severity  and 
benefits were highly intercorrelated with susceptibility  leading them to conclude that 
compliance was highest in those participants who believed they were susceptible to 
relapse, also believed the relapse would be severe and that medication helped prevent 
relapse.
As noted above, this study has the advantage of using reliable, operationally defined 
measures of the HBM and of compliance. However, the smallness of the sample 
inhibits claims about the generalisability of the findings.
One of the biggest studies which examined the utility of the HBM in predicting 
adherence behaviour was by Kelly et ah 1987. The sample population was 107 
psychiatric outpatients with chronic mental health problems and who were prescribed 
maintenance antipsychotics. They had been living in the community for less than one 
year following discharge from hospital. 72% of the participants was diagnosed with a 
schizophrenic illness; while 14 % had affective disorders. All participants were ex- 
servicepeople with a psychiatric disability related to their military service. Five 
components of the HBM were operationally defined and measured by structured 
interview. Medication adherence rates were estimated using separate self-report 
measures on long-term compliance and errors in taking medications in the seven days 
prior to the interview.
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Kelly et al., 1987, ran Pearson correlations on the HBM components and ran 
multivariate regression analyses to see the degree of variance in adherence behaviours 
explained by combinations of HBM components. The regression analyses revealed 
that 20% of variance in reported long-term compliance was explained by cues to 
action, susceptibility  and benefits, while 17% of variability in reported errors in 
medication taking was accounted for by the determinants susceptibility, severity  and 
benefits.
One of the study’s strengths is that it gives a clear operational definition of the HBM 
components. This makes it easier to compare with other studies which define the 
HBM components. Additionally, the authors use multivariate analysis techniques, 
compared with many studies (e.g. Connelly et al., 1982) which just consider bivariate 
relationships between individual components of HBM and adherence behaviour.
The major problem with the study is that the specificity of its sample population 
makes it difficult to generalise its findings. Not many psychotic clients, even in the 
US, are veterans of the Vietnam War. It’s possible that, as ex-soldiers, compliance 
rates may be artificially high, or that as ex-servicemen with disability payments linked 
to illness that they may exaggerate the strength of their beliefs in the susceptibility to 
illness and severity of illness categories.
Pan and Tantam 11989) used the HBM to test a series of hypotheses about the 
medication adherence behaviour of patients on depot neuroleptic maintenance 
treatment for schizophrenia. A group of 40 regular adherers -  measured by attendance 
records and medication charts -  was matched with a group of irregular adherers. Their 
health beliefs were measured by a four-part questionnaire, devised by the authors.
Only items achieving a test-retest reliability correlation coefficient of 0.6 were 
included in the questionnaire after initial piloting.
The authors found that neither severity, susceptibility, benefits or costs (side effects) 
was predictive of adherence behaviour. The only thing that distinguished the two
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groups were that the irregular attenders were significantly more depressed than regular 
attendees.
The significance of this study, which appears to cast doubt on the utility of the HBM 
for people with long-term psychoticism, is severely weakened by the selection of the 
sample population. By using the selection criteria they did, non-attenders were missed 
out completely, while irregular attenders may not have been particularly irregular 
attenders. For example, it was possible that their last missed appointment was as late 
as four months before the study. In other words, Pan and Tantam’s (1989) findings 
may have been subject to ceiling effects with their measures of health belief unable to 
distinguish between regular and irregular attenders.
In the most recent study, Smith et al.. 1999, investigated a matched sample of 20 
compliant and 20 non-compliant UK outpatients who had been diagnosed as 
schizophrenic at least two years before the study began. Compliance was measured 
according to the criteria of the Budd et al. study (1996) above. Smith et al.'s study
(1999) was qualitative. Health beliefs were gauged in a semi-structured interview and 
the results were analysed using content analysis.
The authors found that susceptibility predicted adherence behaviour, with compliers 
more likely to perceive themselves as susceptible to relapse than non-compliers. 
Benefits also differentiated the two groups. Compliers were more likely to talk about 
the benefits of taking medication. Non-compliers were significantly more likely to talk 
of costs, especially in terms of medication side effects.
The strength of the study lies in introducing qualitative methodology to this area. For 
example, it revealed that compliers did have costs to taking medication, spontaneously 
reporting medication side effects. However, the content analysis revealed that for 
compliers, it was beliefs about perceived susceptibility to illness that over-rided costs 
concerns. Despite analysing the results in terms of the HBM, the authors also avoided 
HBM-framed bias in the participants’ responses by having a highly open-ended 
interview based on motivational interviewing techniques.
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Although, the methodology was sound, there is concern that the small size of the 
sample limits the generalisability of the findings. However, it could be argued that the 
sample selected from a South Wales outpatient clinic is typical.
Summary of findings:
Based on the above studies, one review study on HBM and schizophrenia (Hughes et 
al., 1997) and one general review of medication compliance in schizophrenia (Fenton 
et al., 1997), the following summaries can be made about HBM components.
Susceptibility:
Three studies (Budd et al., 1996; Kelly et al., 1987; and Smith et al., 1999), which 
directly examined the HBM, found this dimension of the model was a good predictor 
of adherence behaviour. However Pan and Tantam (1989) did not find susceptibility to 
be a good determinant.
Severity:
There are equivocal results from the studies. Budd et al., 1996, found severity was 
predictive but added little to the variance when susceptibility was included in the 
analysis. However three studies (Kelly et al., 1987; Pan & Tantam, 1989; Smith et al.,
1999) did not find severity differentiated between compliers and non-compliers.
Costs:
The weight of the evidence points to costs not being predictive of adherence 
behaviour. Three studies (Budd et al., 1996; Kelly et al., 1987; and Pan and Tantam, 
1989) found it was not predictive, compared with one that did (Smith et al, 1999).
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Benefits:
Three studies (Budd et al., 1996; Kelly et al., 1987; Smith et al., 1999) found high 
perceived benefits of medication was correlated with high adherence with anti­
psychotic medication. One study (Pan and Tantam, 1989) contradicted this finding. 
Fenton et al., 1997, also cite studies which include benefits as a good predictor of 
adherence.
Cues to action:
This area has rarely been studied. Only Kelly et al., 1989, looked at external cues and 
found their presence or absence was predictive of adherence.
Other factors:
In a major review of the empirical and clinical findings of the determinants of 
medication compliance in schizophrenia, Fenton et al., 1997, cite studies which 
indicate factors not addressed in the HBM account for some of the variability in 
adherence behaviour. The major ones are the existence of a dual diagnosis; the 
strength of environmental factors, such as adequate service provision; and clinician- 
related factors, especially the strength of the therapeutic alliance between doctor and 
patient (see Fenton et al, 1997, for citations).
Does the HBM provide a useful model for predicting adherence 
behaviours in mental health?
Bearing in mind the caveat that the review covers a limited range of mental health 
problems, a number of comparisons can be made. The review above indicates that for 
none of the determinants of the HBM is there unanimous support. This compares 
unfavourably with the model in the domain of physical illness (see Ogden, 2000, for a 
review). However, in the domains of susceptibility, benefits and costs there is a trend
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towards predictive utility. How does this compare with findings from the physical 
domain? Studies in the physical domain (cited in Ogden, 2000) indicate there is a 
mixed picture for susceptibility predicting adherence behaviour. As in affective and 
schizophrenic disorders, benefits is a good predictor. Costs in the physical domain has 
proved a good predictor of compliance, compared with the present review which 
indicates it is not helpful in determining medication adherence in affective and 
schizophrenia disorders. In the physical domain the literature (cited in Ogden, 2000) 
indicates that cues to action is a good predictor of compliance health behaviours, 
whereas the present review indicates that this determinant has generally been ignored 
in mental health and more studies are needed which include this component.
Conclusion;
The above review indicates that the HBM model as it stands needs to be modified and 
developed to have clinical utility in predicting compliance behaviour in mental health. 
For example, the review indicates that a generic model may not be appropriate. 
Different determinants of the model appear to be significant as predictors of adherence 
behaviours depending on the disorder under examination. Additionally, individual 
determinants, for example costs, appear to affect adherence in a complex way, which 
includes temporal factors, rather than in a simple linear way (see Lin et al., 1995). A 
number of studies (e.g. Kelly et al., 1987) indicate that the factors interact in a way left 
unexplained by the HBM.
There are also indications (e.g. Pan and Tantam, 1989) that a number of other factors, 
not included in the model, are important determinants of adherence behaviour. These 
appear to relate to wider systemic factors, such as the views of significant others to 
adherence behaviour ( e.g. Connelly et al., 1982) and lay constructions of illness and 
health behaviours particularly where the diagnosed condition is chronic and the 
treatment is on-going (e.g. Pan and Tantam, 1989).
The above review may be of limited use in deciding the utility of the HBM in mental 
health interventions, where psychological treatments as well as, and in combination 
with pharmacotherapy are common. However, the present review lends support to the
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hypothesis that for conceptual reasons the HBM may have limited value in predicting 
adherence behaviours to psychological regimes. The model does not accommodate, for 
example, the difference in salience and perceived cause and effect between physical 
and mental health problem “symptoms”; and cultural issues, such as stigma around 
mental illness which might inhibit action and shape health beliefs.
Implications for future research:
There is a great need for more standardisation in quantitative studies of the HBM 
model. For example, health beliefs are measured in different ways in each of the 
reviewed studies. Yet, Ludwig et al., 1990, report that there exist two measures of the 
effect of health beliefs on compliance (The Compliance Self-Rating Scale; Bender et 
al. 1986; and the KK-Scala; Linden et al., 1988; cited in Ludwig et al., 1990) which 
have high reliability and moderate concurrent validity in predicting adherence 
behaviours. These could be used to help standardise studies and aid comparison 
between studies.
\
There is scope for further qualitative studies. Only one (Smith et al., 1999) has been 
undertaken and this revealed a degree of complexity around one domain in the HBM 
model {costs) otherwise obscured in quantitative studies. Qualitative data from other 
studies (e.g. Lin et al., 1995), which is included in the results but not analysed in a 
rigorous way, indicate that lay perceptions of illness concepts in mental health are 
complex and need to be considered in the development of a health compliance model 
for mental health.
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Abstract
Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) has been recommended in recent Department of Health 
initiatives as one of the treatments of choice for depression. CBT has been shown to be 
effective both at posttreatment and at follow-up. One of the chief aims of CBT is to enable the 
client to become a CBT self-therapist (Beck, J., 1995) following CBT treatment for 
depression, which is now recognised as commonly being a chronic condition. Yet there have 
been no studies of whether adults who have had CBT for depression actually become CBT ; 
self-therapists, despite the proliferation of theories on CBT’s prophylactic qualities. The 
current exploratory study used qualitative methodology to answer the questions: “Do adults 
who have had CBT for depression use CBT after completing treatment? If they do, how is 
CBT used to self-manage their mental health? What hinders or helps people as self-therapists? 
And what is the experience of being a self-therapist after CBT for depression?” Nine adults 
who had received either individual or group CBT for recurrent/chronic depression in NHS 
adult mental health psychology departments were interviewed. Interviews were conducted at 
the participant’s home using a semi-structured interview schedule at least three months after 
s/he completed therapy. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA: Smith, 1996) was 
used to analyse the data. Eight of the nine participants were actively using CBT techniques in 
some shape or form. Four superordinate themes emerged (The experience of being a self­
therapist; The use participants made of CBT; Challenges to doing self-therapy; Fitting self­
therapy into the wider picture). The results indicated that complexity marked the use made of 
CBT. Each active self-therapist used techniques directly related to CBT or engaged in self- 
therapeutic activities which were idiosyncratically adapted from the therapy. A number of 
factors hindering the use of CBT as self-therapy were identified. Participants found being a 
self-therapist hard work, and experienced emotional disturbance with regularity and expressed 
continuing fear of the power of depression. Adaptation of CBT for self-therapeutic purposes 
rested on a number of factors, which included the participant’s self-beliefs, his/her view of 
CBT, his/her view of what s/he most needed when therapy began, and his/her prior and 
ongoing experience of depression. The results are discussed in the light of theories about the 
mechanism of change in CBT and social cognition models of health behaviours. With the 
caveat against generalising from qualitative studies, it is tentatively concluded that the results 
lend support to the compensatory skills model of CBT (Barber and DeRubeis, 1989) and 
Teasdale’s “decentering” model (2000) for this particular clinical and therapeutic group. The 
results also indicate that social cognition models may aid understanding of self-therapeutic 
processes following CBT for depression. A number of implications for clinical practice, 
especially the importance of end-of-therapy plans and booster sessions in the maintenance 
phase of CBT treatment for depression, are discussed.
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The use adults make of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for 
recurrent/chronic depression after completing therapy: an 
exploratory study using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.
NB: Some of the identifying details of this research have been changed to maintain client 
anonymity and confidentiality.
1.0 Introduction
1.1. The problem of depression: severity, recurrence and chronicitv:
Each year in Great Britain one woman in 15 and one man in 30 will be treated for depression 
(Meltzer, Gill, Petticrew & Hinds, 1994). Depression is a major risk factor in suicide and in 
cardiovascular disease. It has also been associated with chronic illness and with 
developmental problems in the offspring of depressed mothers (National Service Framework 
for Mental Health, HMSO, 1999). Globally the World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
predicted that mood disorders including depression will rise from the world’s fourth greatest 
cause of illness burden (a composite based on mortality and morbidity) to second by the year 
2020 (WHO, 1996, cited in Frank & Thase, 1999). In addition to the high incidence, there are 
high rates of recurrence in depression. It has been estimated that more than 80% of patients 
experience repeated episodes, with an average of four lifetime episodes of major depression 
lasting 20 weeks each (Judd, 1997). Depression is also marked by chronicity. In the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Collaborative Depression Study, a prospective study of 
almost 1,000 depressed patients who were treated at five US centres, 25% of the first 316 
patients reported having a pre-existing minor chronic depression, which had lasted for at least 
two years before the onset of the index episode of major depression (Keller & Hanks, 1995). 
Forty-two percent of these "double depressed" reported chronic minor depression lasting 10 
years or more. Furthermore, the observed course of double depression indicated a higher and 
faster rate of relapse: repeated episodes of major affective disorder were more likely in 
patients with double depression compared with major depression alone (Keller & Hanks, 
1995).
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1 . 2 .  E f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  C B T  i n  t r e a t i n g  d e p r e s s i o n  a n d  p r e v e n t i n g  r e l a p s e :
Depression is now a priority target for the NHS. For example, in the National Service 
Framework for Mental Health (NSF for Mental Health; HMSO, 1999) NHS trusts at primary 
care level are charged by the Department of Health with developing assessment and 
management protocols for depression. In the document’s guidance notes, NHS trusts are 
advised that cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) is among the structured therapies that are 
effective in treating depression. In a review of 28 studies CBT was found to be superior to 
waiting list control, antidepressant drug treatment, behaviour therapy and other 
psychotherapies (Dobson, 1989). However, methodological weaknesses mar Dobson’s 
analysis. For example, it included a number of nonrandomised studies and studies which may 
have been unduly influenced by researcher allegiance (Robinson, Berman & Neimeyer, 1990). 
However, further studies, which do not share the same methodological weaknesses, indicate 
CBT’s effectiveness. In a meta-analysis of 48 controlled studies, which only included trials 
that had randomised groups, Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat and Blackburn (1998) concluded 
that at the end of treatment CBT achieved significant symptom reduction compared with 
waiting list, antidepressants and a group of miscellaneous therapies. The authors found no 
superiority for CBT compared with behaviour therapy. In a review of nine meta-analyses, 
Sanderson and McGinn (1999) conclude that all indicate a clear superiority for CBT over no 
treatment or wait list controls and that six found significantly greater treatment effects for 
CBT compared with other psychotherapies.
In the NSF document (HMSO, 1999), CBT is also singled out as being the one psychological 
therapy for which there is evidence that it reduces relapse rates in depression. In the Gloaguen 
et al. meta-analysis cited above (1998), eight studies involving 132 patients diagnosed with 
either unipolar depression or dysthymia, and comparing CBT with pharmacotherapy not just 
at the end of therapy but at 12 and 24 months post-treatment, were analysed. CBT 
significantly delayed relapse compared with pharmacotherapy in five out of the eight studies, 
with a non-significant trend in the same direction in one of the other trials. On average, only 
29.5% of patients treated with CBT alone or in combination with medication relapsed after 12 
months compared with 60% of those treated with antidepressant medication alone. Robinson 
et al. (1990) found in their meta-analysis that in the nine studies that conducted follow-up 
studies, posttreatment and follow-up effect sizes were very similar, indicating durable 
treatment effects for CBT for depression. Despite the methodological problems of follow-up 
studies and one major study indicating no improved relapse rates at 18-month follow-up for 
CBT compared with impiramine, placebo plus clinical management and interpersonal therapy 
(Shea, Elkin, Imber et al., 1992), a recent review concluded that the majority of studies
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indicate CBT provides protection against symptom relapse or recurrence and may have lower 
relapse rates than pharmacotherapy (Sanderson & McGinn, 1999). For clinical and 
organisational reasons, therefore, it is important to try to understand more about how 
cognitive therapy works and what might be the processes underlying its prophylactic powers. 
The current study aims to illuminate the CBT client’s post-treatment perspective with a view 
to exploring the prophylactic process in CBT.
1.3. Current status and knowledge of self-therapy in depression following CBT:
A key assumption about CBT’s effectiveness in delaying relapse is that it enables clients to 
develop techniques which they continue to use on the completion of therapy. As one leading 
CBT author put it: “The goal in cognitive therapy is to facilitate the remission of the patient’s 
disorder and to teach the patient to be her own therapist, not for the therapist to solve all her 
problems.” (Beck, J., 1995). Clinicians should, then, help clients develop as self-therapists. 
Clients should develop end-of-therapy plans (Beck, J.,1995) and self-therapy “blueprints” 
(Wills & Sanders, 1997). J. Beck, for example, recommends client and therapist discuss how 
the client can do self-therapy by holding at home sessions which parallel the structure of a 
clinic CBT session. Topics for self-therapy include homework setting, problem-listing and 
possible cognitive restructuring or problem-solving to resolve difficulties (see Appendix 1). 
However, despite the emphasis in CBT placed on self-therapy, the questions of whether 
clients with depression become self-therapists at all on termination and what it means to be a 
CBT self-therapist have not been studied. Traditional quantitative outcome studies 
(Blackburn, Eunson & Bishop, 1986; Evans, Hollon, DeRubeis, Piasecki, Grove, Garvey & 
Tuason, 1992) do not, for example, test the first question, and therefore it is not possible to 
say whether improvements credited to CBT are attributable to the initial therapy “curing” 
depression, or to clients maintaining their own symptom reduction by the activity of being a 
self-therapist, or a combination of the two. Such traditional approaches have not therefore 
thrown light on whether there is any connection between becoming a self-therapist and the 
onset of relapse. Other outcome studies (Rush, Weissenburger & Eaves,1986; Williams & 
Falbo, 1996)) using quantitative methods have sought to test various hypotheses about the 
specific prophylactic ingredients of CBT (such as whether there have been changes in clients’ 
dysfunctional attitudes at discharge and whether these have been maintained at follow-up). 
But again, these studies do not show whether self-therapy activity has taken place, its 
frequency, its form, its content, its degree of success and whether it is linked to the 
maintenance of protective cognitive schemata.
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1 . 4 .  C u r r e n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s  o f  C B T  f o r  d e p r e s s i o n :
Cognitive behaviour therapy for depression is 'an active, directive, time-limited, structured 
approach...based on an underlying theoretical rationale that an individual’s affect and 
behaviour are largely determined by the way he structures the world’ (Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979). A. Beck (1989) argues that the key cognitive content in depression is 
characterised by the client perceiving experience in terms of negative beliefs about 
him/herself, the world and the future. This triad of negative cognitive schemata, hypothesised 
to develop because of an early experience of loss and triggered by a later loss, is used to 
organise perception and to govern and evaluate behaviour (A. Beck, 1989). Cognitive 
therapists also theorise that an individual’s cognitive structure is organised at three different 
levels: unconditional core beliefs at the deepest most ingrained level; intermediate conditional 
assumptions and, at the level most available to consciousness, automatic thoughts (Brewin, 
1989). Traditional approaches to CBT for depression have focussed on a range of strategies 
aimed at challenging the content of intermediate beliefs and automatic thoughts. Cognitive, 
behavioural, a mixture of cognitive-behavioural, and preventative strategies have been 
indicated (Fennell, 1989). More recently, clinicians have stressed the importance of trying to 
either modify or provide alternative cognitive schema at the level of core beliefs, particularly 
where the depression is chronic* and linked to personality structures (e.g. Young, 1990; 
Padesky, 1994). Teasdale (1997) has presented a model of depression hypothesised to explain 
the condition's high rate of recurrence. He proposes that, during a major depressive episode, 
patients make repeated associations at the cognitive and neuronal level between depressed 
mood and negative thinking, which come to characterise thinking patterns when the recovered 
patient experiences low mood. Reactivation of these patterns during low mood intensifies the 
depressive feelings, which are then maintained by "self-perpetuating cycles of ruminative 
cognitive-affective processing" (Teasdale, 1997). Teasdale and his team (2000) have 
developed mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) from this theory as adjunctive 
therapy to prevent relapse following a pharmacological intervention in the acute stage of the 
condition. Unlike traditional CBT the emphasis is on changing not the content of the client's 
thoughts but his/her relationship to them.
*Chronic major depression is diagnosed when full criteria for a major depressive episode is 
met continuously for at least the past two years; dysthymia is characterised by a chronic 
depressed mood that is present more days than not for at least two years but with symptoms 
less severe than those of major depressive disorder. (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994)
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1 . 5 .  W h a t  a r e  t h e  p r o p h y l a c t i c  i n g r e d i e n t s  o f  C B T  f o r  d e p r e s s i o n ?
Since its inception, debate has raged as to what constitute the active ingredients of CBT for 
depression. Arguments have been made for specific CBT factors and for general therapeutic 
factors being the active and prophylactic ingredients. Among the theorists interested in the 
specifics of CBT, Hollon, Barber & DeRubeis (1988) propose three possible mechanisms; that 
CBT modified depressogenic beliefs and or cognitive processes involved in the maintenance 
of the beliefs (the accommodation model); that it does not induce schematic change but rather 
leads to the deactivation of depressogenic schemata and the activation of pre-existing benign 
ones (the activation-deactivation model); that CBT leads to patients acquiring a set of skills to 
curtail negative thinking, including meta-cognitive skills in planning or problem-solving (the 
compensatory skills model). Barber and DeRubeis (1989) then elaborated on these theories, 
suggesting that the compensatory skills model best described what happened in CBT for 
depression. Alternatively, Williams (1997) and Teasdale (2000) argued that cognitive therapy 
for depression was effective at delaying or preventing relapse in depression by breaking the 
previously strong connection in the client between mood disturbance and the elaboration from 
it of large amounts of negative self-referrent cognitions. In addition CBT lessened the client’s 
use of mood as "a criterion of the truth of negative thoughts, assumptions and fears.” 
(Williams, 1997).
Such cognitive accounts have been challenged, however. Some have argued that it is the 
behavioural components of CBT that are essential. Early acceptance of the treatment rationale 
allows clients to change their behaviour in such a way that enables them to come into contact 
with positive reinforcers in the environment (Jacobson & Gortner, 2000). This claim has been 
backed by a component analysis of CBT (Jacobson, Dobson, Truax, Addis, Koemer, Gollan, 
Gortner & Prince, 1996) in which depressed patients were randomly assigned to one of three 
treatments, believed to represent one of three possible prophylactic ingredients of CBT: 
behavioural activation (BA), where only interventions designed to increase patient activity 
without challenging thinking were allowed; an automatic thought treatment, where activation 
and thought modification was attempted; and full CBT, where activation and modification of 
core beliefs and intermediate assumptions was attempted. None of the three treatments was 
more effective than the others at the end of the acute treatment phase. At 2-year follow-up, 
there was even a trend towards the BA treatment being more effective than full CBT at 
preventing relapse. Other authors have offered different accounts of the mechanisms of 
change in CBT. Shaw and Segal (1999) have concentrated on the specificity of techniques 
promoted by CBT and its emphasis on self-help promoted by within-therapy homework. 
Bordin (1979) argues that a strong therapeutic alliance is the active ingredient. Shaw and
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Segal (1999) conclude that the active ingredients of CBT for depression are not yet known 
with certainty.
These theories have implications for clients with depression as self-therapists following CBT. 
For example, if Hollon and colleagues’ (1988) accommodation model is correct one would 
not expect clients to become self-therapists, while with the activation-deactivation model one 
would predict little self-therapeutic activity except in the face of key depressogenic schemata 
activating events such as “loss” events. By contrast, under the compensatory skills model one 
would expect to see high self-therapeutic activity with clients actively trying to overcome 
dysfunctional thoughts and engaging in problem-solving. If Williams’ (1997) and Teasdale’s
(2000) hypothesis is correct one would expect clients to be self-therapists because they would 
still be experiencing mood disturbances but not experiencing an overwhelming 
accompaniment of negative thoughts. When negative thoughts did occur, clients would use 
rationality and reality testing rather than emotion as the criterion by which to judge them. 
Similarly, with Jacobson and Gortner’s model (2000) one would predict that clients, while 
undertaking self-therapeutic activities, would not place any emphasis on making cognitive 
challenges in overcoming distressing situations. At the level of practice, if self-therapy 
becomes a mirror of within-therapy activity, one would expect to see clients, for example, 
challenging thinking patterns, possibly at the core belief level (J. Beck, 1995), facing rather 
than avoiding activities, testing and evaluating beliefs, and problem-solving (Padesky & 
Greenberger, 1995). However, given the importance within CBT theory of an idiosyncratic 
conceptualisation of clients' problems (Clark, 1999) and the collaborative nature of CBT 
(J.Beck, 1995), it is not possible to predict the specifics of self-therapeutic activity for any 
given individual. The current study, then, will not actively test out the theories and the link 
between theory and practice, but will use these to inform the Discussion section.
1.7. Other possible theoretical approaches to the activity of being a self-therapist:
Whatever the prophylactic ingredients of CBT, it is hypothesised in the current study that 
being a self-therapist is best conceived of, not as a static state, but as a dynamic process. Other 
theoretical models of behaviour aimed at understanding health changing behaviour have 
implicated that clients undergo a dynamic process ( e.g. the Transtheoretical Approach to 
Change; DiClemente & Prochaska, 1998).However, there are currently no process models 
which allow one to predict who amongst people who have a mental health problem would use 
psychological therapies after they have finished therapy and how they would use them. The 
nearest we have are social cognition models of health and illness behaviours, which were
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originally and primarily developed to account for behaviour to maintain physical well-being 
in a healthy person (a “health behaviour” as defined by Kasl and Cobb, 1966, cited in Ogden,
2000) and for behaviour when a person is experiencing symptoms of a physical illness (e.g. 
Levanthal’s illness-representation model, 1980). Two models are of particular interest for the 
current study: the Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock, 1966; Janz & Becker, 1984) and 
Self-Efficacy Theory (SET; Bandura, 1977), which has been superceded by the Health Action 
Process Approach (HAPA; Schwarzer, 1992).
The HBM was designed to identify the variables that underlie health-related decisions, and to 
assess their ability to predict behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2000). Originally, it included 
five determinants of health behaviours: perceived susceptibility to illness; perceived severity 
of illness; perceived benefits of treatment; perceived costs or barriers to treatment; and cues to 
take an action to maintain health {cues to action). Since its development, Rosenstock and 
Becker have added two more variables (Ogden, 2000): the degree to which one is motivated to 
remain healthy; and the degree to which a person believes s/he can control his/her health 
behaviour. All components are regarded as independent predictors of health behaviour 
(Armitage & Conner, 2000).
The HBM has a number of weaknesses and has been criticised for ignoring the irrational in 
decision-making in favour of a rational cosi/benefit approach (see Ogden, 2000 for a review). 
However, it is relevant to the current study on two counts. It is the most widely studied of all 
the social cognition models of health behaviours and therefore has the widest evidence-base 
and, of all the models, it is the one that has been most widely used to study areas of mental 
health including long term medication compliance in affective disorders. There are significant 
differences between being a self-therapist following CBT for depression and taking 
antidepressant medication for an ongoing often severe mood disorder (for example, clients 
taking medication are “managed” by a doctor on an ongoing basis, not left to manage alone). 
However, there are some similarities; for example, both groups will have experience of mood 
disorder and be required to perform a “health behaviour” in order to maintain their mental 
health. The strengths, weaknesses and findings of the studies into medication adherence in 
mood disorders are reviewed elsewhere in this Portfolio (See Literature Review). In summary, 
however, the limited number of studies does not allow for definitive statements about the role 
of HBM variables in medication adherence in affective disorders, but a number of trends 
emerge. Susceptibility and costs are poor predictors; perceived severity of illness is a good 
predictor; for benefits and cues to action the evidence for and against predictive utility is 
evenly balanced. In addition, medication adherence behaviour in affective disorders is 
influenced by a number of other variables, including patient-related factors, illness-related
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factors and drug-related factors. For example, previous use of antidepressants was 
significantly associated with adherence to antidepressant medication (Lin, von Korff, Katon, 
Bush, Simon, Walker & Robinson, 1995). Service-related factors -  such as continuity of care 
-  have been found to be predictive of adherence behaviour (Cohen, Parikh & Kennedy, 2000) 
as have positive attitudes to medication among significant others in the client’s life (Jamison, 
Gemer & Goodwin, 1979). Different determinants of the HBM are significant depending on 
the disorder under examination. Additionally, individual determinants, for example, costs, 
appear to affect adherence in a complex rather than a simple linear way, with the amount of 
time in receipt of medication a significant factor (see Lin et al., 1995). There are indications 
that the seven determinants in the HBM are not independent variables but interact in ways not 
specified by the model (Kelly, Mamon & Scott, 1987).
There are considerable gaps, then, in one of the major theoretical models of health-related 
behaviour (the HBM) as an explanatory or predictive tool of treatment “adherence” in long­
term psychological therapies without the overt support of the therapist. The empirical 
evidence lends support to the hypothesis that the HBM may have limited value in predicting 
adherence to psychological -  not medical - regimens for conceptual reasons. For example, the 
model does not accommodate: the difference in salience between physical and mental health 
problem “symptoms” as cues to enact a “health behaviour”; cultural issues, such as stigma 
around mental illness which might inhibit action and shape health beliefs; the predicted 
increased importance of the prior therapeutic alliance between doctor and patient where 
therapy involves talking as opposed to prescription (see Fenton, Blyler & Heinssen, 1997, for 
citations on the importance of the therapeutic alliance in adherence behaviours in 
schizophrenia); and the role of irrationality and emotion in turning health intentions into 
health actions (Ogden, 2000).
Although the HAPA (Schwarzer, 1992) has not been applied empirically to study behaviours 
that regulate mental health, there are conceptual and empirical reasons for considering it may 
be helpful in understanding self-therapy in the context under consideration in this study. It is 
based on ideas of psychological and behavioural self-regulation (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), 
which themselves have there roots in a theory widely used to inform practice in clinical 
psychology including cognitive behaviour therapy - social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). 
Bandura (1977) posited that people were motivated to change dysfunctional beliefs and that 
human motivation and action are regulated by forethought, that is by beliefs about what 
people expect to happen (“expectancies”). Three expectancy beliefs underlie health actions: 
situation-outcome expectancy; action-outcome expectancy and self-efficacy expectancy 
(Conner & Norman, 1998). Situation-outcome expectancies represent beliefs about what
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outcomes will occur without interfering personal action; action-outcome expectancies 
represent the belief that a behaviour will or will not lead to a given outcome; and a self- 
efficacy expectancy represents a belief that a behaviour is within or not within one's self 
control. Self-efficacy Theory (SET; Bandura, 1977) has been tested in situations akin to (but 
not the same as) being a self-therapist. Strong self-efficacy beliefs have been found to be a 
key factor in patients with arthritis engaging in physical exercise in a self-management 
programme (Holman & Lorig, 1992; cited in Schwarzer & Fuchs, 1998). Outcome- 
expectancies and self-efficacy beliefs, along with other lifestyle changes and a network of 
social support, have also been found to be key cognitive variables in successful dieting and 
weight control and in predicting relapse prevention in addictive behaviours (see Schwarzer & 
Fuchs, 1998, for a review). The latter area -  addiction -  has parallels with being a self­
therapist for depression. Most addicts involved in empirical studies would have had 
psychological therapy and face daily issues of psychological and behavioural self­
management. SET, however, concentrates on explaining the intention to act but fails to 
recognise that intention and action are not always correlated (Schwarzer, 1992). The Health 
Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 1992) was therefore developed. It is a two-stage model 
proposing different variables and interactions at two stages of a health action; the motivational 
stage (where a person chooses a health goal) and a volitional stage (where a person plans and 
enacts the behaviours required to attain the goal). In the motivational stage clients draw on 
self-efficacy and outcome expectancies to help form an intention to adopt a precautionary 
behaviour or to change a risk behaviour. At this stage, it is also necessary for clients to 
perceive they are at risk. In the volitional phase, a number of variables are important. Clients 
form detailed action plans with proximal goals and algorithms of action sequences. Self­
regulation through cognitive processes is then required to maintain the action. For example, 
self-efficacy beliefs determine the amount of effort and persistence in attaining health goals 
and help keep competing activity at bay. At the volitional stage action plans and action control 
through self-regulatory cognitive processes are also required for a person to refrain from a risk 
behaviour.
It is this emphasis on the processes underlying the volitional stage that is of interest in the 
current study. CBT self-therapists, who have completed therapy for depression, are 
conceptualised as being in the volitional stage in this two-stage process. The HAPA, however, 
has not been tested on mental health behaviours and has been little tested on behaviours 
designed to maintain physical well-being. The limited studies on healthy-eating behavior 
(Schwarzer & Fuchs, 1998) and self-examination for testicular cancer (Barling & Lehmann, 
1999) indicate that the HAPA might prove a useful model for predicting behaviour in the
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volitional phase and that self-efficacy expectancies could be a key variable maintaining 
ongoing health-related activities.
1.8. The research questions:
There are, then, no studies into the specific question of whether clients who have cognitive 
therapy for depression become self-therapists after therapy and whether they do so in the ways 
predicted by the theory and practice of cognitive therapists themselves. Additionally, there are 
no studies examining the applicability of social cognition models of health behaviour to this 
context. The present study aims to redress this gap in our knowledge.
It explores the following research questions:
1. Is CBT actively used by a group of adults after they have been discharged from CBT 
treatment for long-term depression?
2. If it is used, how is it used to self-manage mental health?
3. What hinders or helps participants be self-therapists?
4. What is the experience of being a self-therapist in this context?
These questions were explored qualitatively through an examination of the first-hand accounts 
of a group of adults who have had CBT for depression. The accounts focus on the experience 
of managing depression without the support of a therapist at least three months after treatment 
has finished. The interpretation of the data was informed by, but did not seek to test, the 
Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1966) and the Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 
1992), as well as by the theories of change mechanisms in CBT outlined above.
1.9. Why use qualitative research methodology?
The current study adopts a qualitative approach for a number of reasons. The epistemology of 
qualitative approaches acknowledges that meanings and actions are linked to contexts (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) and provides a research methodology which allows access to the creation of 
meanings and actions within a social context (Willig, 2001). Social cognition models of health 
behaviours and illness representations indicate that clients are not simply passive recipients of 
medical or psychological treatments, but actively create meanings based on the information 
they receive (Levanthal, Meyer & Nerenz, 1980). Their beliefs and attitudes towards a range 
of factors including self-efficacy, attitudes towards health, beliefs of susceptibility to illness, 
affect how they interpret and use information in a medical context (Ogden, 2000). Compared
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with medical consultations, clients and therapists engaged in psychotherapy are involved in 
even more complex processes where information and meanings are negotiated, not simply 
exchanged (Elliott & Shapiro, 1988). A research methodology which can capture meaning- 
making in context is therefore appropriate to answer exploratory questions about becoming a 
self-therapist; that methodology is qualitative.
Qualitative methodology is also indicated where, as has already been noted, there is little 
extant research (Turpin, Barley, Beail, Scaife, Slade, Smith & Walsh, 1997) and an 
exploratory study needs to be done. Given the complexity of a psychotherapy treatment and 
the complexity of depression as a mental health problem, it would be difficult in the absence 
of a theoretical base to isolate particular variables as required by quantitative methodology. 
Variables affecting “adherence” to CBT treatment for depression are likely to be numerous, if, 
for example, factors dictating medication adherence in clients with schizophrenia (arguably a 
less complex process) is taken as a guide (Fenton et al., 1997).
A qualitative research approach is particularly pertinent in health service research (Dingwall, 
Murphy, Watson, Greatbatch & Parker, 1998). It can bridge the gap between the nomothetic 
approach embodied in randomised control trials into the effectiveness of particular treatments 
and the idiopathic delivery of those treatments to individual clients: “the more individualised 
the intervention becomes, the greater the role that qualitative work is likely to play in its 
evaluation.” As noted above, CBT requires an individualised approach (Clark, 1999). It is 
only by understanding what happens at this nomothetic- idiopathic gap and by understanding 
through qualitative research the processes by which therapeutic work is sustained and 
reproduced can a service -  in this case, the delivery of CBT for depression -  become more 
efficient and effective (Dingwall et al., 1998). There is, therefore, a service imperative for 
adopting a qualitative approach which explores factors that influence the effectiveness of CBT 
interventions for depression in adults at the level of individual clients.
As has already been noted, there are no current models or theories for how people become 
self-therapists after CBT for depression. Social cognition models of health behaviours have 
been devised with physical health behaviours in mind (Ogden, 2000). This absence of theory 
provides a fourth reason for adopting qualitative research methods. Although Glaser and 
Strauss’ claim (1967) that qualitative approaches largely utilise inductive rather than 
deductive methods of acquiring knowledge of the world has been challenged (Dingwall et al, 
1998), it is widely agreed that on the whole qualitative methodology encourages theory 
generation (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992) in a way that quantitative approaches do not. Where 
there is no existing theory -  or where existing theories are likely to need to be substantially
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challenged -  as in the area under consideration in the present study, a qualitative approach is 
indicated to allow the beginning of theory-building. Specifically, the methodology in the 
current study should help to explore the gaps in the theories of health behaviours in the 
context of mental, as opposed to physical health.
2.0 Method
2.1. Participants:
Five men and four women who had each had cognitive therapy for depression were recruited 
for the study. For detailed exclusion and inclusion criteria see Appendix 2. Adults aged over 
18 were chosen because for children depression often manifests itself differently than for 
adults (Carr, 1999) and is subject to either different psychological approaches altogether or to 
adapted cognitive therapy approaches. Selecting only working age adults, therefore, reduces 
the number of confounding factors in drawing conclusions about the relationship between the 
therapy, depression and the experience of being a self-therapist. It also allows the findings to 
be applied to mainstream NHS adult services and a key standard in the National Service 
Framework for Mental Health (HMSO, 1999). Clients with psychotic features and with dual 
diagnosis were also excluded for the similar reason that CBT for these groups is markedly 
different than for those with either depression or co-morbid anxiety and depression (Beck, 
Wright, Newman & Thiese, 1993; Birchwood & Tarrier, 1995).
Any clients judged to have been depressed following a one-off loss or other life event with 
good prior adjustment were also excluded. The main reason for this was practical. The 
phenomenon under investigation was "self-therapy" after CBT and it was hypothesised that 
those with a more recurring pattern of depression would be more likely to be continuing to use 
the techniques. Patients who report chronic minor depression have a significant likelihood of 
experiencing relapse, recurrence, chronicity and residual subsyndromal symptoms in the 
interval between full criteria episodes of illness (Keller & Hanks, 1995). Additionally, a 
recurrent presentation is more representative of depression (Judd, 1997) than a single episode 
presentation with good prior adjustment. Selecting participants on the grounds of chronicity 
therefore strengthens the study's "applicability", a key quality criterion in qualitative research 
(Conrad, 1987, cited in Smith, 1996). The inclusion criteria did not stipulate selection on the 
basis of strict research definitions of depression because in clinical practice clinicians do not 
use them. The inclusion criteria selected thus best meet the qualitative quality criteria of 
"applicability". Taken together the inclusion and exclusion criteria produced a sample which 
was "homogenous" in key aspects of depression and of service provision as recommended for
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good Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (Smith, 2002). Exclusion criteria regarding 
self-harm and research participation were required by the presiding ethical committees in the 
trusts at which the research was conducted.
For participants’ demographic details, see under Analysis.
2.2. Procedure:
2.2.1 Recruitment strategy:
Once ethical approval was obtained (Appendix 3), participants were recruited via 
psychological therapists -  chartered clinical psychologists and community psychiatric nurses 
specialising in CBT -  working in adult mental health psychology departments and community 
mental health teams in two NHS trusts. Participating therapists were asked to identify all 
clients who met the selection criteria from either their current workloads or from clients they 
had discharged within the last three months. Potential participants were then sent information 
on the study (Appendix 4) with an opt-in slip to be sent directly to the researcher. When 
describing the study care was taken not to convey to participants that the research was 
centrally concerned with establishing how they had used cognitive therapy since completing 
treatment for fear of altering their self-therapeutic activity by priming. The study was 
described as concentrating on “how people cope after they have been treated with cognitive- 
behavioural therapy for depression", a form of words approved by each trust’s ethics 
committee. Potential participants were then contacted directly by the researcher with no 
further involvement of the participants’ former therapists. To try to ensure clients had been in 
receipt of recognisable CBT, participating therapists were required to complete for each 
participant the Cognitive Therapy Skills Checklist (Padesky & Greenberger, 1995) devised to 
help therapists evaluate their clients' CBT skills development (Appendix 5). A score of 5 out 
of 15 was set as a criterion of the participant having had CBT, as such a score indicates that, at 
the very least, therapists tackled the role of negative automatic thoughts in depression and 
explained the model and rationale of CBT for depression. Each therapist scored 12 or more for 
each participant, indicating that participants received CBT which covered the three levels of 
cognition in A. Beck's depression model (automatic thoughts, intermediate beliefs and core 
beliefs).
2.2.2 Interview procedure:
Participants were interviewed face-to-face in their homes. Written consent to be interviewed 
was obtained before the interview and at the end of each interview (Appendix 6 ).The
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researcher used a semi-structured interview (Appendix 7) which lasted between 50 and 80 
minutes. Interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim (see Appendix 8 for a sample 
transcript).
2.3. The interview schedule:
The interview schedule (Appendix 7) was constructed by consulting with a current clinical 
psychologist with a specialist knowledge of cognitive therapy and with a senior research tutor 
on the doctorate in clinical psychology course at the University of Surrey; by drawing on 
literature relating to interview construction (Moser & Kalton, 1977): and by drawing on 
literature relating to social cognition models of health behaviour (Conner & Norman, 1998).
A semi-structured interview format was used. The interview started with questions regarding 
demographic information and proceeded to open-ended questions on the participant’s 
understanding of CBT, their current use or non-use of CBT and their beliefs and attitudes 
regarding depression. Participants’ were prompted to consider specific examples of their use 
of cognitive therapy and to consider any limitations or restrictions on current use (see 
Appendix 7).
2.4. Analytic strategy:
The data was analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA; Smith, 1996; 
Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999). IPA has been used to analyse qualitative data on a range of 
topics relating to health and well-being (Jarman, Smith and Walsh, 1997; Smith, 1999). IPA is 
phenomenological in that it is concerned with establishing the essence or nature of the 
phenomenon under question (Willig, 2001), in this case, the essence of the clients' experience 
of managing their mental health after having had cognitive therapy for recurrent depression. It 
is also phenomenological in that the data analysis is grounded in the participants’ accounts, 
which are privileged over the account given by the researcher (Smith, 1996). One of EPA's 
aims is to allow the researcher to gain an “insider’s perspective” of the phenomenon (Conrad, 
1987, cited by Smith, 1996). However, it is also acknowledged in IPA that the process and 
end product of research inevitably represents a co-construction between the researcher and his 
research material (Smith et al., 1999).
An idiographic case-study approach to EPA was employed as recommended for sample sizes 
of 15 or under (Smith et al., 1999). Two transcripts selected at random were read and re-read 
and margin notes were made of key phrases or processes. An initial list of subordinate themes
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was generated. Two transcripts rather one were selected because it was felt that as the aim was 
to generate commonalities in accounts (while preserving their individuality) this aim could 
only be served by comparing two accounts. Smith et al.,(1999), acknowledge that IPA is a 
new method and there are no hard and fast rules to how it is applied, as long as themes are 
shown to be grounded in the data and the aim of generating rich, diverse specific 
instantiations of the psychological phenomenon under scrutiny is achieved (Osborn & Smith, 
1998). A research group of four other clinical psychology doctorate researchers and a senior 
research lecturer at the University of Surrey also looked at one of the transcripts and generated 
themes independently, which were compared and contrasted with the themes identified by the 
main researcher as part of a process of triangulation. The main researcher and his academic 
research supervisor then checked the initial theme list to ensure it was grounded in the data, to 
check for idiosyncratic interpretations and to generate superordinate themes. The main 
researcher then read the remaining seven transcripts to look for comparisons and differences 
with the initial set of identified superordinate and subordinate themes and a final list of themes 
was generated. The research supervisor then read the emerging analysis to ensure themes were 
grounded in the participants’ accounts.
3.0 Research quality checks:
The criterion of quality measures in research should match the epistemological stance 
underlying the research (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000). In the current case, quality criteria 
should fit IPA’ s contextual constructionist epistemology. Therefore, quality in EPA should be 
measured on two main criteria: the degree to which the research has grounded observations in 
the contexts that have generated them; and the degree of researcher reflexivity (Willig, 2001). 
Using Elliott, Fischer and Rennie’s (1999) guidelines the latter two criteria, can be translated 
into four criteria: “Owning one’s perspective”, “Situating the sample”, “Grounding in 
examples”, and “Providing credibility checks.”
3.1.1 Owning one’s perspective - the main author's interpretative stance:
IPA acknowledges that participants’ accounts are not only constructed by the participants but 
have to be interpreted by researchers to bridge the gap between the idiosyncratic account and 
the wider scientific community (Smith, 1996). The researcher’s values and assumptions and 
conceptions are necessary preconditions for making sense of the participants’ narratives. In 
the present study, the main researcher is a trainee clinical psychologist, who has a particular
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interest in CBT. There are four values and assumptions held by the main researcher which are 
pertinent to the present study. The main researcher shares the realist ontological stance, which 
underlies IPA, that there is a meaningful (although not direct) link between what a person says 
about an experience and the experience itself. As a clinical psychologist I have imbibed the 
“positivist” values underlying the scientist-practitioner model and am concerned with looking 
for “lawful” connections in experiences. As a trainee clinician, I have developed the 
assumption, based on clinical experience, that there will not be a clear linear transfer of skills 
and understanding from the cognitive therapist to the client Finally, drawing on my own 
experience of trying to change behaviour I hold the assumption that being a self-therapist will 
be a complex experience governed by “holistic” considerations such as the participants’ past 
experience and future visions and a raft of competing demands and psychological, 
environmental, social and physical needs.
These values and assumptions have shaped the research at every point. In trying to find a 
research question the main researcher was influenced by his position as a trainee clinical 
psychologist trying to learn about the theory of CBT and trying to master its practice. He was 
considering questions which paralleled to some degree the questions a client faces when 
having CBT for depression; in particular, “How do I become a (self)therapist?” and “How do I 
learn this thing called cognitive behaviour therapy?” In practical terms, the main researcher 
tried completing forms to challenge negative thoughts as recommended by CBT authors (e.g. 
J. Beck, 1995) to develop his skills as a cognitive therapist. In this sense, the trainee position 
should help the author take the “insider’s perspective” required by IPA (Conrad, 1987; cited 
in Smith, 1996). At the research design stage, the culture of clinical psychology training with 
its focus on the scientist-practitioner model influenced the generation of the wording of the 
interview schedule (with its emphasis on the techniques and ways of thinking in CT rather 
than the feelings that go with managing depression). At the data collection stage, there were 
indications that the main researcher was perceived by participants as being connected with the 
mental health system the latter had just passed through (participants were enlisted via their 
cognitive therapists), which may have influenced how they answered questions. One 
possibility was that they would try to appear “model” clients. At the data interpretation stage, 
the main researcher was influenced by his assumptions that there would be a non-linear 
connection between the therapy learned in session and its implementation in practice and by 
his assumptions about “holistic” concerns shaping CBT’s use. It is possible that the main 
researcher was primed to pay attention to data that appeared to support an emergent theme of 
“Fitting therapy into the wider picture” and to look for complexity in the superordinate theme, 
“How cognitive therapy was used by the participant”. To counter this possibility, themes are
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operationalised and illustrated by quotations from the participants’ accounts, allowing peer 
interrogation of the interpretations made (Elliott et al., 1999).
3.1.2 Situating the sample:
Researchers should describe participants and their life circumstances in some detail to allow 
readers to assess the applicability of the findings (Elliot et al., 1999). In the current study 
relevant participant details are described under Demographic details. The list contains some 
personal details to allow the reader to situate each participant in context and to preserve the 
individuality of accounts which characterises the IPA method (Smith, 1996). The accounts 
given in the Analysis section contain narrative changes to preserve the anonymity and 
confidentiality of clients as required for ethical reasons, but are preserved in such a way as to 
allow the participants’ context to be understood.
3.1.3 Grounding in examples:
Examples of the data should be used to allow readers to assess the fit between the data and the 
researcher’s interpretations (Elliott et al., 1999). The current study has attempted to meet this 
quality criterion.
3.1.4 Providing credibility checks:
The researcher endeavoured to ensure the credibility of his analysis and avoid idiosyncratic 
interpretations (Elliott et al., 1999) by having one transcript read by a group of four fellow 
trainee clinical psychologists engaged in using IPA in their research. The group identified 
themes from this interview, which were discussed and incorporated into the emerging 
analysis. A senior research psychologist read a draft of the analysis along with a number of 
transcripts. The aim was to ensure that identified themes were supported by the data.
4.0 Analysis
4.1.1 Participant demographic and therapeutic information:
IPA’s epistemological concern with understanding meanings and experience in context 
requires an individualised approach to participants’ demographic details (Willig, 2001).
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Table 1.gives participants' demographic details. Full employment details have been omitted to 
help preserve confidentiality.
Age Ethnic Origin Employment Marital status
Bob 51-55 White-British Yes Single
Jan 31-35 White-British Yes Single
Meg 26-30 White-British Yes Partnered - not 
co-habiting
Harry 66-70 White-British Retired Married
Peter 46-50 White-British Yes Married
John 56-60 White-British Yes Married
Mary 46-50 White-British Yes Married
Sarah 51-55 White-British Yes Single
Terry 36-40 White-British Yes Single
Table 1: Participants1 demographic information
Table 2 gives participants' therapeutic details. Seven (78%) had been in receipt of individual 
cognitive therapy, two (22%) had taken part in group cognitive therapy. The length of time 
that had elapsed since therapy ranged from three months to 10 months (mode: 4 months and 
mean: 6.5 months). The length of time the participants described themselves as being 
depressed prior to having cognitive therapy ranged from two years to 20 years, indicating that 
each participant fulfilled the selection criteria for having a chronic depression. Six of the 
sample (67%) had received previous “talking” therapies for depression or services from a 
community mental health team. Therapies included individual CBT, twin counselling, 
Christian pastoral counselling and the support of a community psychiatric nurse. Two (22%) 
were currently taking anti-depressant medication.
213
Major Research Project
Mode of 
therapy
Length of 
therapy
Time elapsed 
since therapy
Time depressed 
prior to therapy 
(Client estimate)
Previous
therapy
On anti­
depressant 
drugs
Bob Individual
CBT
4 months 6 months 5 years None No
Jan Group CBT 2 months 4 months 15 years Yes: anxiety 
management
No
Meg Individual
CBT
6 weeks 4 months 7 years Yes: indiv. 
CBT
No
Harry Group CBT 2 months 6 months 20 years Yes: indiv. 
CBT
No
Peter Individual
CBT
6 months 7 months 2 years None No
John Individual
CBT
4 months 9 months 10 years None Yes
Mary Individual
CBT
6 years 3 months 15 years Yes:
counselling
No
Sarah Individual
CBT
5 months 10 months 7 years Yes: CPN No
Terry Individual
CBT
5 months 9 months 14 years Yes: Indiv. 
dynamic
Yes
Table 2: Participants* therapeutic details
4.1.2 Summary of themes
Four superordinate themes emerged from the interviews - the experience of being a self- 
therapist; how cognitive therapy was used by the participant; challenges to doing self-therapy; 
and fitting self-therapy into the wider picture. Subordinate themes were identified which 
elaborated the superordinate themes and sought to identify the commonalities while retaining 
the complexity and diversity of the participants' experience (Smith, 1996).
* In the present study, when quotations are cited empty brackets ()  indicate where material 
has been omitted; information in square brackets [ ] has been added to clarify material; and 
ellipsis points (...) indicate a pause in the participants’ speech. Pseudonyms have been used 
and some details have been changed to preserve anonymity.
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4.2 The experience of being a self-therapist.
4.2.1 Holding in mind the idea o f being a self-therapist
Underpinning all the activity described in the later sections is the evidence that eight of the 
participants (89%) did actually hold in mind a concept of themselves as actively engaged in 
maintaining their own emotional well-being. None of the participants, however, 
conceptualised his/her activity as the medical activity implicit in the term “self-therapist”. 
None used the term or described what s/he was doing as “treating” her/himself. However, two 
participants (22%) did describe some of their use of the techniques in the language of doing 
experiments on themselves as expected by the discourse of cognitive therapy. Sarah described 
using the techniques with increasing confidence the more she “tested” them and Mary 
described thinking in advance of approaching anxiety-provoking situations as challenges to 
test her new skills.
Identifying oneself in the self-therapy role was directly linked to the ongoing use of practices 
associated with the therapy. Harry, the one participant who did not use active strategies after 
therapy, described his post-therapy life without any reference to being aware of a role as a 
self-therapist. He referred to using distinctly non-therapeutic skills -  identified as being 
diplomatic with others -  when asked whether he ever dwelt on depression and the stresses 
caused by other people:
...now it just doesn’t occur to me that something could set me off again because Ifeel 
confident enough to deal with them diplomatically or occasionally I  can evade things, but 
above all diplomatically...
Rather than being a self-therapist Hany saw himself as a potential therapist to others, saying 
he felt he should join the Samaritans. In contrast, Mary indicated that she thought of therapy 
even in the most intimate moments of her life when she referred to holding her seven-year-old 
daughter’s hand in public as a “safety behaviour” (a technical term from CBT). Sarah referred 
to initiating self-therapeutic activities as using “tools” that she carries everywhere she goes.
John described the tools and skills he gained in cognitive therapy as ‘a part of my life, it’s a 
thing I do, it’s a way of life.’ John, who said he believed depression could not be “cured” but 
that one could learn to manage it, described how for him holding therapy in mind is a
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conscious task compared to “non-depressed” others. Holding therapy in mind was a necessary 
condition of enacting self-therapy. Referring to coping with life’s problems, he said:
You [researcher] don’t think about it, I  do think about it. I  have to think about it in order to 
make the process start. Like this morning when I  woke up in an absolute... I  felt really, really 
low, and then one has to consciously drag yourself up out o f here and begin to think straight 
and put things on paper if  necessary and things like this.
Although, no participant used the term "self-therapist", further evidence that therapy was held 
in mind was evident in participants’ expressions of responsibility for the management of their 
own moods. Meg remembers that a key moment in therapy was when she was taught that it 
was her responsibility to be an active self-therapist:
But it was interesting, it was, "Actually Meg no-one else can do this for you, you have to do 
this, this is your responsibility, " and that is what he [cognitive therapist] taught me as well.
4.2.2. Being a self-therapist is hard work
Keeping self-therapy in mind and then enacting it, however, were not easy. Meg personified 
how much like hard work it was:
I f  lam  not listening to myself because the negative thoughts are so loud in my head, I  
physically have to speak to myself to stop them.
It is as if she is wrestling with some demon that is threatening to overwhelm her. Throughout 
her narrative, there is a sense of fragility in her confidence in the success of the self-therapy 
enterprise. She spoke as if she was struggling in the space between wellness and illness:
There are times when I  sit in the car and start getting really quite low and physically have to 
talk out loud and say, “Meg, grow up. You are fine, you have everything going for you. ” I  
have literally got to physically talk myself out o f it. Sometimes I  have to hear myself do it.
Jan described being a self-therapist as “mentally draining”, John described overcoming a 
period of low mood alone as having to “consciously drag” himself out of it and Mary 
described how it took a “few days” to “get to grips” with one particularly painful episode 
using self-therapy.
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A number of factors underlie the degree of struggle, including the degree a person views 
her/himself as susceptible to relapse and the degree to which the tenets of CBT appear to fit 
with the participants’ own beliefs and views of themselves. For example, although Jan finds 
being a self-therapist hard work, she is able to relieve the pressure by having time off from the 
role. Less threatened by the possibility of relapse than Meg, she does not have to be on her 
guard all the time:
Sometimes if  lam  here on my own o f an evening and I  am feeling particularly relaxed I  will 
just switch off from everything and do whatever I  want, eat what I  want, do what I  want, um, 
and don V worry about it.
Bob found it hard to maintain the role of self-therapist because he experienced an 
uncomfortable fit between what the therapy was steering him to do -  say “No” to other 
people’s demands -  and his strong sense of responsibility to others. Failures to be assertive 
since therapy had resulted in difficult emotions:
I  sometimes feel, I  won’t say guilty, but disappointed that I  can’t maintain or match whatever 
it is that I  need to do.
In contrast, Peter, who often referred to how the therapy was a good fit for his pre-existing 
skills and his disposition towards rationality, defined cognitive therapy not only in terms of 
his understanding of it but also in terms of its degree of difficulty:
It means trying to assess what it is that is behind this [depression] and to find methods, ideas 
if you like to try and find a way to get out o f it. Little exercises you can use when you are in a 
situation where you are under stress, which are easy to do.
As with all work, however, participants experienced being a self-therapist as an ongoing 
project, not one that could be forgotten or resolved. Meg described needing to keep working 
to build on the changes she experienced in therapy:
I  can V rest on my laurels: I  have to work hard on my thoughts because that is actually what 
affects my relationships with people.
John explained why he had not been as disturbed by the termination of CBT sessions as he 
was when one of his previous attempts to overcome depression came to an abrupt halt:
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...the therapy hasn 7 ended. The therapy is still going on because I  am still using it.
The attitude that keeping depression at bay requires ongoing work on their part is related to 
the participants' beliefs about depression and their ongoing experience of emotional 
disturbance. Jan’s ongoing self-therapeutic activity is driven by her experience of depression:
Depression is not something you can control by taking a couple o f months off and hoping it 
will go away or going on holiday and you will come back de-stressed. I t’s something you have 
got to work on. And a lot o f it is the way you think and you have got to work on it over a 
period o f time.
Earlier she had described how she had unsuccessfully attempted to overcome depression by 
quitting her job and going on holiday.
Additionally, each participant in the group -  with the exception of Harry -  described their 
continuing use of self-therapeutic techniques in the context of ongoing emotional difficulties. 
For example, Peter used the techniques when he became upset when his parents’ house was 
burgled; Mary used them when she was “knocked...every single way, mentally, emotionally 
and physically” by reminders of her unhappy childhood.
However, despite the general difficulty in maintaining the self-therapist role, most participants 
continued to use it because they identified the techniques with successfully keeping 
depression at bay. Asked why s/he continued to use some of the therapeutic techniques 
months after completing therapy, each active user (89% of the sample) said it was because it 
worked.
4.2.3 Still living in the shadow o f depression.
The experience of being a self-therapist was framed by the participants’ ongoing experience 
of depression. Despite the study excluding participants who did not benefit from therapy, each 
participant expressed at least some ongoing vulnerability to having a depressive relapse and to 
experiencing depression as a kind of constant companion. None of the active participants 
talked of “curing” depression through CBT, only of managing it. This sense of living in the 
shadow of depression appeared to underlie health action, as predicted by the “susceptibility” 
element in the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1966). However, subtle differences between
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the model and the current accounts emerged. Implicit in the model is the sequence that the 
susceptibility belief comes first and the action follows in a neat linear way, but in the current 
study participants’ therapeutic activity and their experience of depression came together. In 
this study, susceptibility to depression is an experience, not a belief. It is felt sometimes 
constantly and sometimes in a crisis. John described the daunting presence of depression in 
his life:
It is like there is a big weight there, which is there all the time. You have to actually work at it 
to...not to get out o f it, you have to work to get over it. You have to push yourself beyond the 
limit o f this depression in order to function throughout the day, to function normally.
Depression here has the physical quality of an obstacle standing between John and a “normal” 
life. Literally, it requires effort to overcome. For others, the feeling of susceptibility springs to 
life in a crisis. Peter experienced the shadow of depression when his parents’ house was 
burgled:
It was awful, absolutely awful. I  felt dreadful about it, but () I  thought, “Damn it, I ’m not 
going to let it get me this time, I ’m not going to do it... ”
Every participant described depression in personality terms. Meg is typical in ascribing to 
herself “depressive tendencies”. Such descriptions of themselves might be predicted from the 
selection criteria for the study, which focussed on people with more than one depressive 
episode. The descriptions are also loaded with indications that not only do participants 
consider themselves susceptible to depression but also that the experience of depression was 
personally frightening. Again this would be predicted by the severity dimension outlined in 
the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1966). Meg combined the two dimensions -  severity 
and susceptibility -  when she described why she was a self-therapist, despite the hard work it 
required:
I  know how low I  was and I  know how quickly I  could get there if  I  don 7 use it [the self- 
therapy]. And when I  am at a low state...I think I  have almost like, depressive tendencies.
Indeed, how participants experienced depression in the past and how they continue to 
experience it appeared to shape the form in which they become self-therapists. For example, 
Peter, who described how the main benefit of CBT was that it re-taught him how to “stop and 
think” in difficult situations, experiences depression as inhibiting his rationality:
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I  think the big thing about depression () is that they [other people] feel you ought to be able to 
get yourself out o f it, pull yourself together, shake yourself up, sort it out, but the real thing is 
that you can ’t do that, it ’s not possible to do it. You lose the ability to think rationally - 1 
certainly do — and I  just totally lose it.
Jan, on the other hand, had a self-therapeutic style characterised by activity scheduling and 
maintaining incremental “improvements” across all parts of her life including housing, dieting 
and smoking. In the past, she experienced depression as the result of losing control of 
individual aspects of her life:
I  am aware that it [depression] could come back, I  am not kind o f thinking I  am immune to it 
now. But I  have to be in control all the time. I  think I  am quite vulnerable still and I  think 
unless I  keep control o f aspects o f my life, like work and keeping myflat in order and paying 
the bills and all sorts o f things, I  have to be in control. But it is the only way I  can cope with 
it, but in the past, um, I  haven *t had that control and when its gone out o f control, then things 
went wrong.
Sarah’s experience of depression was different again and her use of the therapy appears 
connected with this experience. As a Church missionary she believed it was “wrong” to be 
depressed and admission of depressive feelings was tantamount to “failure”. Unsurprisingly, 
she experienced depression as a sudden collapse which appeared to come out of nowhere:
I  don7 think I  really knew I  was depressed before and I  didn 7 even recognise that I  was 
depressed until somebody told me I  was, the doctor that told me I  was depressed. I  said, “No, 
I*m not. ”
As a self-therapist Sarah’s style is characterised by being able to identify her feelings and 
judging how appropriate they are in the situation in which she finds herself not by trying to 
stop them before they arise. She believes that she has a “tendency” to be depressed but that 
that no longer should carry a stigma:
Being depressed isn 7 wrong and I  thought it was wrong: I  thought I  was a total failure, but 
now I  understand that it isn 7, it isn 7 wrong, it’s an illness, the same as anything else; that it 
can be dealt with.
Harry, on the other hand, while graphically describing the depth and severity of his 
depression, believed that it was not a threat to him now:
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Since [therapy], I  have gained confidence enough to think I  can tackle just about anything 
and everything that is going to come at me provided I  am one step ahead.
Keeping one step ahead, as noted above, referred to being diplomatic with people or avoiding 
difficult situations, not with being an active self-therapist. His current experience of 
depression -  as not being a threat now -  may have contributed to his ongoing self-therapeutic 
inactivity.
4.2.4. Believing "Ican do it":
A sense of self-efficacy is a variable in a number of social cognition models which predict 
whether a person will enact a health behaviour or not (For example, the Health Action Process 
Approach; Schwarzer, 1992). A number of participants openly voiced self-efficacy beliefs 
with regard either to being competent at doing “therapeutic” activities or in “changing” 
themselves in relation to depression.
Asked about why he implemented a range of techniques based on his therapy, John said:
I t’s come about...my mind is more settled, I  suppose, that’s what it is. Iam able to work it 
better. I t’s like changing the oil in a gearbox, everything seems to work better.
Peter echoed this sense of improved self-efficacy and linked it directly with his improved 
ability to manage his depressive behaviours by facing difficulties rather than avoiding them as 
he did in the past:
Because most o f the time things happen to you everyday, they may seem bad at the time, but if  
you think, "Well, hang on let’s put this in context. This is not really so bad, this is not really 
so great and it’s not a problem, I  can handle this. ” And what it [therapy] did do was give me 
the ability to say, "I  can handle this; I  can handle stuff. ”
Sarah talked about how the sense of self-efficacy had grown outside therapy as she came to 
use the techniques for herself and see that they worked:
As I  was using it and testing it out and finding it was working then, you know, Ifeel I  can use 
this() I  have got more confidence in it and more confidence in myself that I  know I  can make 
it work for me.
2 2 1
Major Research Project
By contrast, Terry, who did not use self-therapy outside the parameters of those he had 
discussed specifically with his therapist, appeared to look to others to instil him with a sense 
of self-efficacy:
I  also have a problem with self-confidence and there again lam  looking for backup from 
other people, friends and family etcetera and if that doesn’t go right then the depression kicks 
in again.
On the other hand, Harry, who was the one participant who was not an active self-therapist, 
also showed high self-efficacy as indicated by his confidence in wanting to be a therapist to 
others. However, his lack of activity appeared to have been prompted by have high self- 
efficacy linked to a strong inclination to discount the risk of relapse. High self-efficacy is 
sometimes associated with underestimating risk and reducing the intention to enact a health 
behaviour (Schwarzer, 1999).
4.3 How cognitive therapy was used by the participant.
This theme explores how the therapy experience was translated into the experience of being a 
self-therapist months after CBT had terminated. Clinical practice of cognitive therapy and 
studies of therapeutic process (Elliott,) lead one to predict that there would not be a neat linear 
relationship. The current study indicates that some techniques were directly translated from 
therapist’s office to the participant's home. However, in many instances, neither techniques nor 
cognitive models are consistently translated in easily recognisable ways. This theme illustrates 
that each individual participant uses therapy in a variety of ways (none uses one specific or 
general technique alone). It also highlights that self-therapy for this group of people is seldom 
CBT in any pure form. It can be less than CBT: less systematic, comprehensive and specific.
It can be more than CBT: involving other knowledge and skills, involving general feelings of 
self-efficacy, and placing less emphasis on using techniques than on changing relationships.
4.3.1 Using specific CBT techniques without any obvious adaptation
Each participant, with the exception of Harry, used at least one recognisable cognitive 
behavioural technique or drew specifically on the educative aspects of the approach. Mary 
provides a good example. She described a number of techniques to overcome the anxiety
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aspects of her condition and rated graded desensitisation (she uses the term herself) as the 
most useful. She also makes use of the educative aspects of CBT:
[The therapy] helped me realise that any mother with a child like this would be anxious -  
that’s normal. So there’s anxiety that is normal, anxiety that is not all bad. When it reaches a 
certain level, yes; when it starts effecting your life, yes.
Faced with a particular occasion when distressing negative memories of her own childhood 
are generated by a parenting class on creating positive memories for her own child, Mary 
described the process of identifying negative thoughts, writing them down, challenging them 
and coming up with alternative statements:
I  sat down and wrote down the negative things I  was feeling, what it had churned up yet 
again, um. It hadn’t churned up anything new. So I  dealt with that and then I  saw the situation 
o f how it is today and how really I  have got to learn to live and put that on one side and then 
think about positive things, what sort o f memories we are creating for our own daughter, and 
over a few days really got to grips with it.
The specific technique creates a space for Mary to see the situation in a new perspective and 
to experience cognitively mediated affective change. Alongside challenging negative 
automatic beliefs, participants mentioned the following recognisable and specific cognitive 
techniques for managing depression: tackling “errors of thinking” (Meg), learning to be 
assertive (Bob), using problem-solving techniques (John) and activity scheduling (Jan).
Universally, however, the use of specific techniques shaded into an idiosyncratic use hinted at 
in Mary’s extract above, where the thought challenge is supplemented by other considerations. 
In Mary’s case this involves needing time to “get to grips with it” and a self-appraisal of what 
her crisis has taught her; that she “has got to learn to live.. .and think positive things.”
4.3.2. Using CT-adapted or CT-inspired self-therapeutic approaches
Despite the reported use of specific cognitive techniques, the participants more commonly 
reported using approaches either idiosyncratically adapted from therapy or directly inspired by 
the therapy. In the latter category, therapy is experienced as a springboard to approach 
difficulties in ways that they had not been approached before. The renewal of self-confidence 
would come into this category. In the former, the germ of specific cognitive skills is
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recognisable in a self-therapeutic approach, but unlike in 4.3.1 above, it is either so simplified 
or so altered as to not count as the use of a specific skill or knowledge acquired in therapy.
4.3.2.1 Using CT-adapted self-therapeutic approaches
In keeping with the underlying theory of cognitive therapy - that depressive emotional and 
behavioural responses are mediated by cognitions, which become the focus of therapy - a 
number of participants identified that, since therapy, they had changed the way they used 
thinking. However, some participants do it in ways not predicted by the theory (J. Beck,
1995). At least three participants (33% of the active self-therapists) used “physical” means to 
intercede between experiencing negative emotions in the old depressogenic way and 
instigating rational cognitive challenges. Peter, for example, spoke of needing to engage in 
some activity to “break the [negative emotional-behavioural] loop”. Describing a recent time 
when he had made a mistake at work and had to instigate self-therapy, he said:
I  got into a stage where I  was just sitting there at my desk, totally frozen by this thing, I  was 
just so horrified by it and at that point, I  just thought, “No, sit down, analyse this thing, what 
can I  do about it, there is no point worrying about this and how can I  get out o f this. ” So I  did 
find myself doing that. Actually what I  did was I  just got up from my desk, went out o f the 
building and took a walk. And then I  came back and started thinking quite rationally.
Later he described his habitual way of dealing with depressive emotions:
...when Ifeel something coming on I  actually try to get out o f the loop and I  think, "Stop, let's 
just get out sideways " and go and do something I  want to do or just pick up a book and read 
for a bit or do something to just stop the cycle and that gives me a breathing space to think 
about it and that increasingly is enough.
Jan, too, describes using physical activity to break “ a negative cycle of thinking”. She said:
I  know now that I  have to kind o f do something physically to switch off. For example, I  might 
get involved with a film on tele, whereas normally it wouldjust be on in the background, or, I  
have got a bike, so I  could go out on my bike, or I ’d groom the cat, or something like that.
This physical riposte to the negative thoughts would be done in conjunction with consulting 
her CBT notes and questioning whether what she was thinking was “really true”. As noted 
above, Meg’s struggle to switch to rational thinking from the realms of her emotions requires
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a physical intervention on her part. She has to “physically.. .talk myself through”; she has to 
speak aloud questions asking for evidence for and against her negative automatic thoughts. 
She described that before therapy she would not have tried to disengage with the emotion but 
would have gone “into [her] little hole”. But now:
I ’m sort o f a bit more grown up, I  guess, I  say, "Calm down, gentle breathing, what’s the 
truth here, what’s actually going on here, what is meant here, how are you reacting? God, 
look at your reaction and the impact. ”
She has to try to physically relax to begin the cognitive process.
Although Sarah does not have to use physical means to intercede between emotions and 
reasoning, she does highlight that not “dwelling on” negative emotion is her key use of CBT. 
Using CBT in this way is idiosyncratic in that she does not seem to need to follow the 
detachment from emotion with any active cognitive challenges:
I  don’t know if you can control the [depressive] feelings. I  think you can control the way you 
react to feelings. Our feelings come, um, you can’t always stop the feelings coming. The 
difference is how I  now react to it, rather than... to just dwell on the feeling andfeel even 
worse would take me into depression, but to be able to deal with in ways I  have learnt to deal 
with it can bring me out and help me get on a different path.
Later she described overcoming low mood by recognising that she had good reason to be tired 
and tearful and then saying to herself, “Stop, OK, time-out... and just give yourself a 
breathing space.” She did not actually take any time out in the form of having a break from 
the situation. It was sufficient to use CBT as a guide to recognise that she needed to not dwell 
on the emotion. Therapy has taught her to "stop and think", rather than act on emotion as if it 
was the criterion of truth (Williams, 1997). Using rational thinking of any sort -  rather than 
the disputational thinking of weighing up the evidence for and against automatic thoughts and 
core and intermediate beliefs encouraged in CBT -  is Sarah’s main weapon against 
depression:
I  am just able to stop and say, "Just hold on a minute; just sit and think about things and don't 
let this get on top o f you and push you under."
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Other forms of adaptation of CT strategies are also evident. Mary shows an adaptation of 
avoiding withdrawing and instigating thinking when she describes how she has learned to 
"just talk to friends" so "it wouldn’t all go up then like a pressure cooker".
4.3.2.2. Using CT-inspired self-therapy
This theme reflects the fact that although no participant claimed to be "cured" by therapy, 
changes had taken place in therapy which were recognised by the client and attributed to the 
cognitive therapy. These changes which were inspired by therapy continued to be used post­
treatment. Mary talked about how she had built on the gains she made in therapy as well as 
the gains she had made as a self-therapist:
While my hushcmd was away I  went outfor lunch in town with a friend o f mine. That's the first 
time I ’ve done that. I  wouldn’t have taken that risk o f doing it, but I  did. I  did think about that. 
I  didn't know whether she would drive or I ’d drive, because when I  am anxious I  like to drive 
because I  know where Ilike to park and it will be the nearest place. I  just went with it. 
Beforehand I  did think, "Whatever happens lean cope with it," and I  did and we had a good 
meal out. I  was slightly anxious at one point but thought, "it’s OK.".
Although she does evoke a couple of self-efficacy statements, this can hardly be called a 
direct use of CBT techniques and rationale. Instead, there is a strong sense of acting rather 
than thinking ("I did (take a risk)"; "I just went with it."). She compares the pre-treatment 
Mary (“I wouldn't have taken that risk”) with the Mary she is now (“but I did”). The risk can 
be taken because she has changed. At the same time the risk-taking constructs and confirms 
the activity of doing self-therapy. She is using therapy-inspired changes to overcome 
difficulties.
Meg uses the metaphor of the therapy and the therapist giving her the key to unlock the door. 
Without the cognitive therapist she would still be faced with a locked door. Therapy showed 
her the way and she is using that now:
...he almost unlocked the door, he gave me the key to unlock it and now I ’ve almost opened it 
and am walking through. He didn't give me a huge amount but he started me on the road to 
find out.
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Her image of being currently engaged in the process of opening a door unlocked by another 
suggests how the therapy continues to inspire her and guide her now, even though she has 
taken over the work.
John describes how he can now face things problems rather than "running away " for days on 
end without telling anyone. Again although he developed specific techniques, for him the key 
thing therapy gave him was "confidence" even though his confidence was not specifically 
targeted in therapy. Its return is the chief benefit of the therapy and it underpins the specific 
strategies he does use:
What I  neededfrom the therapy and what I  got, I  believe, is the confidence, which has 
returned.
For Bob the therapy was used in a way that freed up other resources and reinforcements, in the 
form of giving him the "backing" and "encouragement" to take up a job after years working at 
home as a single father. The therapy and the alliance with the therapist were used directly in a 
way that still has positive repercussions for how Bob is as a self-therapist.
4.3.3. Using the “presence o f the knowledge ” o f CB T
This theme refers to the use participants made of a psychological model of their difficulties, 
which was understood and provided sufficient knowledge and reassurance in previously 
problematic situations that no specific distress-relieving strategies were required.
Peter described how he habitually overcomes situations now which previously he would have 
found overwhelming and conveyed how often it was sufficient just to have the knowledge of 
the cognitive model:
I  don't actually say, "What's this stage, what’s that stage?", I  don't do it. I  think it is almost at 
a subconscious level. I  feel the presence o f the knowledge, if  you like. It sounds odd to say it, 
but I  feel it is there.
He went on to describe how he made use of the cognitive model of depression not directly but 
as "stored knowledge in the back of my mind" which enabled him to overcome feelings of 
helplessness when faced with difficult situations.
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Sarah appeared to have accepted a psychological model for the existence and maintenance of 
depression, which allowed her to accept her feelings and not feel" a total failure” and to 
protect herself more effectively in the future:
Now I  understand that it [being depressed] is not wrong, I  would be willing to ask for help 
sooner.
For Jan, too, a new psychological knowledge enables her to see that she must not just ignore 
stresses at work. But again, rather than necessarily enacting a specific strategy, the new 
psychological knowledge and self-knowledge of what triggers her depression are often 
sufficient to cope. Referring to how she now copes with a stressful time at work, she said:
Whereas in the past I  wouldn't have addressed that I  would have just carried on. [Now] I  
wouldn't take my notes [CT challenges to negative thoughts] but it is still in the back o f my 
mind.
4.3.4. Remembering the cognitive therapy and/or therapist.
A number of participants used memories or images of the therapy or their therapist either as a 
moral support for the experience of being a self-therapist or as a guide to how to be a 
successful self-therapist when faced with a particularly challenging situation. The experience 
of the therapy/therapist which lay in the past was brought into the present via memory.
When she was asked about whether her view had changed on whether depression was 
manageable, Meg remembers what Barry, her cognitive therapist, had said to her:
Yeah. It is easy when you know how. I  remember Barry saying that to me.
She is using her memory of therapy to inspire her and support her sense of self-efficacy in the 
face of depression. She also draws on the memory of what her therapist said to provide a 
rationale for her being a self-therapist:
One o f the things Barry said to me was you have to continue doing this; it isn't something that 
you are going to be cured, it is like putting an elasterplast over a scratch, like putting a 
plaster on an amputation. You know, you have to keep nursing it.
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The memory is recalled as a guide when faced with the obstacle that being a self-therapist is 
hard work. Likewise Mary drew on her relationship with her therapist to support her 
increasing sense of self-efficacy. Her interpretation of her therapist putting her forward as a 
possible research participant allowed her to face the research interview and continue to tackle 
her anxiety:
Obviously I  built up a great trust and confidence in a therapist and then I  thought, "Well, she 
must feel I  would be able to do it [the research interview], in order to put me forward, " and 
that finished the issue for me, really.
For Mary, though, remembering therapy was not always helpful. She remembered the awful 
feeling when she attempted in therapy to conquer her anxiety about using escalators. The 
memory ("I hated every second of it”) is used to explain why she had not tried to tackle this 
particular fear as a self-therapist.
Participants who used therapy in this way commonly had a positive experience of therapy and 
more particularly of having formed a strong therapeutic alliance. Peter united the two ideas 
when he described how he tackles current problems:
I  do think, "IfI was sitting with Clifford [cognitive therapist], what would he say to me?" and 
I  try to think o f it that way because I  ended up having a great deal o f trust in this guy()and I  
thought, "What would he say, if he was in this situation," and I  would try to put myself into his 
situation. This may sound strange, I  talk to myself as if lam  him and thinking, "how would he 
do this?"
This is not just about thinking what strategy he needs to use. Peter is drawing on his trust in, 
and his memory of an individual therapist to guide his self-therapy.
4.5 Challenges of doing self-therapy
This theme refers to the fact that each participant reported that there were times when they 
faced crises or lapses in their self-therapeutic activity. Often these moments of crisis were 
linked to perceived limitations of the CBT model as a way of coping with the complexity of 
the participants' everyday lives.
4.5.1 Dealing with crises or lapses
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Each active self-therapist reported having to deal with a crisis or lapse. A common process 
emerged when dealing with a crisis. A crisis was identified when the participant experienced 
emotions or recognised situations and behaviours that signalled the threat of a depressive 
relapse. Self-efficacy beliefs and/or attitudes regarding the need to keep working as a self­
therapist were invoked, along with a self-therapeutic activity. Typically the latter consisted of 
a brief self-statement around the need to think - the most fundamental and distinctly 
recognisable cognitive technique - and face the situation rather than act on the emotion of 
being overwhelmed and then avoiding the problem.
Maiy recalls the experience of dealing with the emotional crisis of thinking about her 
childhood; an experience which "had really hit me and thrown me, knocked me every single 
way..." She said:
The next day that was still very much with me, but I  definitely used the therapy, challenged my 
thoughts - 1 didn't make contact, that was the first thing to think, "I'll phone somebody at 
Bowden Hall [where cognitive therapist works]," but I  thought, No. I  really saw it as an 
opportunity to use things. I  have felt as bad as that before but with professional help have 
come to terms with it. But I  thought, "No, I  know there is nothing more that can be said to me, 
I  know what to do." So I  sat down and I  wrote down the negative things that I  was feeling, 
what it had churned up yet again, um...it hadn’t churned up anything new. So I  dealt with that 
and then I  saw the situation o f how it is today...
She draws confidence from her sense of self-efficacy and couples this with invoking notions 
that it is her responsibility now (a theme which was shared by a number of others, including 
Meg). This is followed by the use of a specific recognisable cognitive therapy technique. For 
Maiy, the whole episode affirmed her efficacy as a self-therapist and encouraged her to keep 
using the techniques: "I had really achieved something".
Meg too uses emotional cues - about feeling unhappy in her relationships - to take stock and 
reinstate self-therapy. She then talks to herself, invoking the attitude that it's her responsibility 
now to be a self-therapist and that keeping depression at bay will require ongoing work:
My God... it was like actually, "Meg, it's not about them, it's about you and thinking, "Right, I  
really need to start working again. "Ihad lapsed.
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Bob talked about how he woke up one day feeling particularly bad and immediately was 
scared he might relapse; "The day I was particularly bad actually feared <sic> me a bit 
because I thought, "Oh no, I hope I'm not going back." He followed this by becoming active - 
going to work when he did not feel like it - and then later using a recognisable cognitive 
strategy of "evaluating" what had made him so "stressed" that day.
4.5.2. Reaching limits on the utility o f cognitive therapy in self-therapy
Each participant identified situations in which it was either not possible to use the therapy or 
where cognitive techniques seemed ineffectual. The essence of being a self-therapist for this 
particular group was that cognitive therapy did not provide the whole answer.
Three participants, a third of the sample, cited occasions when they simply did not recognise 
the need to implement self-therapeutic techniques. They then found that the emotion or 
anxiety they were experiencing was too great to implement thinking strategies. Maiy provides 
an example where she became overwhelmed by anxiety when faced with going to the airport:
I  suppose I  didn't jump on it quick enough, looking back on the situation, my initial negative 
thoughts, I  didn't stop them quick enough so physicalfeelings came on board as well and then 
I  was like floundering and took the very easy option out then.
Sarah and Peter also talked about failing to recognise the warning signs and then being "too 
far gone" into the area of negative emotion to implement self-therapy. Peter said: "You’ve got 
to have a certain amount of rationality left to use these tools."
Emotional closeness or intimacy was a barrier for a number of people, who described the 
difficulty they had using thinking strategies when faced with their immediate family. 
Participants described not being able to break familiar well-rehearsed patterns and responses 
with family members. Terry talked about always in the past finding his family too smart for 
him, and how when he now went home he was immediately drawn into the familiar role of 
being "pushed aside". Meg, who is very close to her mother and twin sister, described her 
difficulties with them:
I  do use it [self-therapy techniques], but it doesn't have the same impact, it's not strong 
enough almost, I  kind o f need an injection o f something when lam  with them, because they 
kind o f have an impact on me.
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The medicine of self-therapy is not strong enough in this intimate circle with its lifetime of 
patterns of interacting.
Peter noted that he felt that the intrapsychic focus of CBT, which precluded direct 
involvement of his wider social system, placed limitations on it. For him, it would have 
helped if his wife understood and experienced the therapy.
Bob, also had problems with using the techniques with his family but for different reasons.
His had to do with his sense of discomfort with adopting the approach advocated in therapy - 
sometimes saying "No” to requests. Again, it was the closeness of the tie that made this 
particular use of the self-therapeutic technique especially uncomfortable. He described having 
to refuse his daughter’s request to visit him. He could not tell her himself but made his son tell 
her instead: "I didn't want to upset anybody", Bob explained.
Finally, three participants said that implementing cognitive strategies as suggested in therapy 
was simply not practicable given the time and circumstances. Sarah sometimes felt she did not 
have the quiet and space to "stop and think" because she lived in cramped accommodation 
with her mother. Jan could not use the techniques when she was waitressing because there 
simply was not sufficient time, though she tried to "be aware of it (the therapy)” and might 
make notes later. Peter, too, said the pressure of the moment did not always allow the time or 
space required to apply the techniques properly:
It's not something that you draw on quickly and say, "Right, here we go, here is my set o f tools 
and let’s use it. "It is something that comes from contemplation afterwards.
Sometimes, the therapeutic mode is simply forgotten. In Mary’s case, other psychological 
preoccupations -  in the form of wanting to lose weight — drove the self-therapist role from her 
mind. Recalling how she failed to challenge negative thoughts and emotions during a period 
of a week, she said:
I  think it was just me getting too obsessed with the weight again. Iwasn V prepared to think 
about anything else but the fact that I  must lose weight...
4.6 Fitting cognitive therapy into the wider picture
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This theme reflects the participants' accounts of CBT as something experienced within the 
wider context of their lives. It introduces the idea that the participants had therapy at a 
particular point of time in their lives and the meaning of the therapy - and how it was used - 
was shaped by the participants’ views of life before and after therapy. It also reflects the 
participants’ accounts of shaping their use of therapy in the light of the other knowledge and 
skills they bring to therapy, including their knowledge of their own style of doing things and 
their personality. Additionally, the theme highlights that participants considered other 
resources aided them as self-therapists apart from what was learned in therapy.
4.6.1. Adapting therapy to me
Many participants adapted therapy in ways that suggest their development as a self-therapist 
was heavily influenced by a number of factors: by their prior experience of trying to tackle 
depression; by their aims for therapy; and by the beliefs which shape their personality. Meg 
expressed a common theme that adapting therapy was necessary to become a self-therapist. 
For her, it led to a sense of ownership. She said it would be impossible to be a self-therapist 
without adapting the therapy to her personality:
I t’s [her version o f cognitive therapy] a lot stricter than Barry's [cognitive therapist]. I  know 
what I  will listen to and what I  will not listen to and Barry’s to a degree was quite 
touchy/feely and quite a nice way o f doing it, but I  think I ’m quite...the way I  talk to myself in 
my head is very direct, very black and white, which is me anyway (). Yeah, I  think it is 
important to put Meg’s stamp on it [the therapy], because you understand, you understand 
yourself
Her adaptation was based on her self-knowledge but it created tension because seeing things 
in black and white does not fit well with the cognitive therapy model, in which black and 
white thinking might be classified as an “error of thinking” which needs altering (Beck, 
1989). Despite the tensions, Meg was a self-therapist who used recognisable cognitive 
techniques. Putting the “Meg stamp” on the work created difficulties but it underpinned her 
activity as a self-therapist.
For Bob, the single father, such was the mismatch between his core beliefs about life and the 
exhortations of the cognitive model, that there were times when he appeared not to be able to 
adapt the model at all to meet his goal of overcoming depression. He had lived his life under
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the precept of always putting others before himself and the pressure of being assertive 
encouraged in therapy sat uneasily:
I  wouldn’t want to be a hard man or be nasty to them [other people] or be rude to them.
That ’s not always easy.
For Bob, adapting cognitive therapy was a struggle. By contrast, Peter, who did not find 
self-therapy hard work, saw a clear fit between his personality and the emphasis on rationality 
in the therapy. He admitted to only having to consciously draw on cognitive therapy 
techniques 10 per cent of the time six months after completing therapy and equated his ability 
to use “the presence of the therapy” with its fit with his personality. He described himself as 
“a fairly rational person” who “liked” approaching problems rationally. The therapy also 
reinstated his pre-existing skills of problem-solving which he had used when in the Navy. The 
form in which he practised as a self-therapist (challenging negative thoughts, problem­
solving) is closely linked to his personality and skills prior to entering therapy. Likewise, John 
spoke of how, in therapy, he rediscovered his old skill of breaking an apparently 
insurmountable task into a series of surmountable mini-tasks. As a self-therapist, it was this 
skill, which he had in his repertoire but had temporarily lost, that he most commonly used.
In Terry’s case, the use he made of therapy was both closely adapted to his current need and 
also to his perception of the purpose of therapy. Therapy focussed on his goal of being more 
at ease at work. In that it succeeded:
Ifeel more confident definitely and it has helped me with other people, but mostly with the 
work environment, because I  am there in this job for such a long time, I  have really focussed 
on that...
But nine months after the end of therapy Terry identified his “real” problem as his relationship 
with his family. He felt inadequately resourced by the therapy to deal with that and had 
reverted to taking anti-depressant medication. The difficulty in generalising therapy appeared 
linked to his belief about the nature of his problems and its connection to therapy, of which he 
had had a number of forms over 14 years. He looked back over his past and his therapy 
history and said:
I  had so many different issues at one point, you know, where do you start? And gradually 
filtering it through and sorting it... it’s like sorting outfiles and a filing cabinet...gradually I
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sort out, we [me and my therapists] sorted out quite a bit, but the last lot [problems with his 
family], um, is getting a bit too much for me.
He has adapted his use of therapy to match his conception of it as sorting out one file at a 
time. However, this was limiting his ability to be a self-therapist, especially with regards to 
generalising the cognitive therapy skills he had acquired.
John, though, had a more positive experience of taking from therapy (and using as a self- 
therapist) exactly what he wanted when he began it. He needed the return of “confidence” and 
that was “what I (John) got”.
4.6.2. Using other resources to maintain well-being.
Participants drew on a range of other resources to maintain well being apart from what they 
had learned in therapy. In some cases, these resources were already available before therapy 
started, in others therapy helped make available additional sources of strength.
For Peter, CBT swept away the stigma of admitting to others that he had problems. He 
became free to talk to friends about his problems in a way that was an integral part of his 
activity as a self-therapist. Using cognitive techniques was the way he started to solve his 
problems but final resolution was achieved by talking to trusted friends:
I  do actually think it [the cognitive therapy] makes me thinkfirst. But that just gets me off the 
bottom, it doesn't actually take me much further than that and it’s after that that you talk to the 
friends and that’s where you resolve the thing completely...
Bob used therapy as a support to get a full-time job, although he had made the decision to 
apply before therapy. At the time of the research interview, he had begun work and rated it as 
important to him in maintaining his well being (because it boosted his "self-confidence") as 
techniques he drew directly from the therapy. For Jan, too, having a job with a company that 
recognised her mental health needs was as important as doing the therapy. She had started 
work before she began therapy.
Other individuals valued other resources. John considered that what he learned in therapy 
helped maintain his well being in conjunction with his use of anti-depressant medication. 
Neither was more important than the other was. Others, like Peter, considered medication
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unhelpful. While Sarah, a devout Christian, regarded her religious faith as equally important 
as therapy.
It was notable that Teny, who said since therapy had ended he had started to take anti­
depressant medication again, was unable to identify other resources that helped him overcome 
depression. He said that "family and friends" would have helped but he did not have any close 
enough or understanding enough to support him.
4.6.3 Cognitive therapy as one part o f a long-term process o f change which includes other 
beneficial strategies
Three participants identified that they had already begun the process of learning to manage 
depression before going into therapy. John identified that he had gained control of his 
drinking and had been on anti-depressant medication, which had allowed him to gain 
sufficient control of his emotions to "know that I wanted more than this". CBT was the next 
step. Being a self-therapist (along with medication) was how he continued on his road of 
managing depression. Jan, too, traced her ability to manage depression back beyond the start 
of therapy. Before then she had started to get "a bit of routine in (her) life". This routine forms 
part of her view of her recovery - along with using CT techniques - in the present and far into 
the future.
5.0 Discussion
5.1 Summary o f findings
Eight of the nine participants in the current study (89%) were using CBT in some shape or 
form and in some situations at least three months after completing therapy.
Each active participant held in mind the idea of him/herself as a self-therapist; in other words, 
each saw him/herself as needing to do things differently than in the past and related this 
activity to managing his/her own mental health. For most participants, self-therapeutic activity 
felt like hard work. Additionally, each self-therapist still regularly experienced emotional 
disturbance or regularly appraised situations in ways that required self-therapy. For some this 
occurred daily. The active participants still felt they were highly susceptible to depression, 
with each identifying depressive feelings or low mood as characteristic of his/her personality. 
In addition, the active self-therapists expressed a strong belief in their ability to use specific
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therapeutic skills or to change past behavioural patterns associated with being depressed. 
Depression was viewed not in terms of cure, but in terms of ongoing management.
Complexity characterised how CBT was used to self-manage mental health. Each active 
participant used specific CBT techniques, rationales and understandings of depression and its 
maintenance. However, they also used idiosyncratic adaptations of the techniques; for 
example, at least three participants (33%) interceded physical activity between experiencing 
low mood and activating cognitive challenges to their depressogenic thinking. Additionally, 
some participants used the changes they underwent in therapy - in terms of self-confidence 
and feeling supported - to disrupt depression-maintaining patterns in the present. The 
knowledge and skills gained in therapy and held in mind were sufficient for some to self- 
manage their mental health. At other times, memories of the therapy and the therapist were 
invoked to either encourage or guide self-therapeutic activity. Seven of the nine participants 
(78%) employed resources and knowledge other than those derived from CBT as part of their 
self-therapeutic activity.
Supplementing this habitual use of CBT, seven of the participants (78%) used CBT as part of 
their way of dealing with crises. Crisis management involved identifying a situation with 
possible depressive relapse; invoking self-statements about self-efficacy and determination to 
maintain well-being; and implementing a CBT-derived technique. For some, it also involved 
evaluating after the event the benefits of implementing the new CBT techniques.
A number of factors hindered effective self-therapeutic activity. Participants identified that 
they sometimes lacked the skill to effectively appraise a situation as emotionally disturbing. 
They then found they were “too far gone” with their emotional reaction to activate effective 
cognitive challenges. Interpersonal intimacy, especially with emotionally-close family 
members, was also identified as a limit to being a self-therapist at times. Wider systemic 
limits, such as Peter’s wife not understanding what CBT meant to him, were also identified. 
Participants also cited practical limitations on CBT use, especially not being able to 
implement strategies because of other real-world demands on time and attention. Participants 
also had simply forgotten some techniques. Additionally, one participant, Sarah, described 
how competing psychological demands - her desire to lose weight -  led her to not keep in 
mind her role as a self-therapist for depression.
In the current study what helps a participant be a self-therapist was not directly identified as a 
superordinate or subordinate theme, although a number of trends emerged. It appears 
important for a participant to have in mind that s/he is a self-therapist and that CBT provides
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an effective basis for that activity. It helps if there is a good fit between the precepts and skills 
of CBT and the client’s own belief system, self-identity and pre-existing skills. Being an 
active self-therapist was also underpinned by a sense of self-efficacy.
The analysis also highlighted two other areas of importance. First, some participants viewed 
CBT as a process of self-improvement which began before therapy and which contained other 
change elements. Second, all participants adapted the techniques and precepts of CBT in ways 
that were shaped by specific factors. Adaptation was moulded by a participant’s view of 
himself and how to behave in the world; by his/her view of what CBT was and the purpose of 
psychological therapy; and by the participant’s view of what s/he most needed when s/he 
entered therapy (which was, in some cases, dictated by the participant’s prior and ongoing 
experience of depression).
5.2 Implications for theories about the mechanism of change in CBT
There was little evidence for or against significant change at the level of core beliefs about the 
self, the world and the future as proposed in the accommodation model (Hollon et al., 1988). 
Where there was some evidence of belief change was in the area of self-efficacy (“I can 
handle this”, as Peter said) and in the area of personal responsibility with regards to both 
implementing CBT techniques and overcoming low mood and past behaviour patterns. This 
accords more closely with hypotheses about therapeutic change mechanisms in the learned 
helplessness theory of depression (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1978), in which cycles 
of depressive behaviour are established as the patient appraises s/he has insufficient resources 
to change low mood cycles, rather than die more complex model proposed by Beck (1989). 
However, sampling issues and interview schedule design may account for this finding. A 
number of participants had extremely brief cognitive therapy (Jan and Meg, for example, had 
between six and eight sessions). Padesky (1999) argues that to achieve change at the core 
belief level, therapists may need to work with clients weekly for more than one year. 
Additionally, although participants were encouraged through open-ended questions to 
elaborate their thoughts and feelings underlying self-therapeutic activity, they may have felt 
socially constrained about talking about negative core beliefs. Clinical practice suggests that 
some clients take many hour-long sessions before disclosing such beliefs. In addition, if one 
follows Potter’s idea of interviews representing co-constructions in a particular context, 
participants may have expressed self-efficacy beliefs for the rhetorical purpose of impressing 
an interviewer identified with the service provider (Potter, 1996).
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The activation-deactivation model (Hollon et al., 1988) received little support in the current 
study. The participants reported experiencing the negative emotions which prompted self- 
therapeutic activity on a sometimes daily basis. For this group of participants being a self- 
therapist was characterised by a strong sense of the imposing presence of depression. 
Although it was not explicitly evident in the accounts, it can be safely inferred that 
depressogenic schemata were not deactivated. As above, this may be accounted for by 
sampling isssues, including the length of treatment. In addition, the current sample consisted 
of clients who reported chronic or recurrent depression problems. That depressogenic 
schemata were still present accords with literature on the recurrence of depressogenic 
symptoms and depressogenic cognitions continuing following treatment especially in clients 
with dysthymia or double depression (Keller & Hanks, 1995).
The current study does fit the compensatory skills model (Barber and DeRubeis, 1989). Some 
participants used CBT in ways that fitted this model. John used problem-solving and Mary 
used planning to curtail negative thinking, as predicted by the model. However, the current 
study lent greatest support to Teasdale’s (2000) & Williams’s model (1997), which argue that 
clients develop through CBT a different relationship to their negative thoughts, learning to 
"decentre" from large amounts of negative thought and feeling associated with low mood. 
Peter specifically referred to knowing he has to “break the loop” when faced with being 
overwhelmed by a mistake at work, while Sarah spoke of knowing she must not “dwell” on 
negative emotions but react differently than she did in the past to them. For these participants 
practising self-therapy involves trying to stop mood disturbance setting in train large amounts 
of negative self-referrent cognitions. Additionally, however, self-therapy involves disrupting 
not only self-referrent cognitions but also negative patterns of behaviour. John and Peter, for 
example, spoke of effective self-therapy as not only thinking differently but also not 
withdrawing in the face of low mood (as they would have done prior to therapy). In this 
context, CBT can be seen as promoting changes in coping styles (Billings & Moos, 1984). 
Some participants changed from an emotional discharge coping style to coping styles marked 
by affect-regulation, and appraisal-focused and problem-focused coping*.
*Billings & Moos (1984) identified a number of coping responses in people with unipolar depression when under 
stress. Emotional discharge coping involved six responses including tried to reduce tension by drinking, eating or 
smoking more, or by taking increasing doses o f medication, or by taking feelings out on other people. Affect- 
regulation involved six responses including trying to see the positive side of things, telling self things that helped 
self feel better and exercising more to reduce tension. Appraisal-focused coping involved logical analysis of the 
stressful situation and included considering several alternatives for handling a problem and stepping back from a 
situation and being more objective about it. Problem-focused coping involved seeking out more information about 
a problem (including discussing a problem with a friend or other informed person) and problem-solving (including 
making an action plan and following it, and not acting too hastily or following a first inclination).
2 3 9
Major Research Project
The finding that participants rated engagement in activities as an important component of 
being a self-therapist lends support to Jacobson's and Gortner's contention (2000) that 
behavioural elements are active prophylactic ingredients of CBT. The present study did 
indicate, however, that the cognitive shift envisaged by Teasdale (2000) was not one that was 
easily achievable. It was not easy to switch "minds" from a negative configuration to the 
configuration developed during therapy. As four participants (44% of the sample) indicated, 
they adapted CBT by interceding a physical activity between the recognition of depressogenic 
feelings and the activation of specific CBT techniques to challenge and evaluate negative 
thoughts. There needed to be a physical act to set in motion the mental process of “breaking 
the cognitive cycle” believed to underlie the effectiveness of CBT for depression (Fennell, 
1989). This finding can perhaps be understood in the context of depression acting at 
emotional, physiological and behavioural levels as well as cognitive levels and accords with 
new directions in cognitive therapy in which affect and physiological response are considered 
essential targets for intervention (Padesky & Greenburger, 1995; Mills & Williams, 1997), 
such as in Barnard and Teasdale's (1991) Interacting Cognitive Subsystem approach. It also 
begs the question whether depressogenic thinking in people with long-term depression is a 
habit and requires the creation of routines -  sequences of behaviours repeated on a regular 
basis -  as advocated by Sutton (1994) to change addictive behaviours. CBT could be seen as 
establishing alternative routines to the routines associated with depressogenic thinking.
5.3 Implications for social cognition models o f health behaviour, especially the Health Belief 
Model (Rosenstock & Becker, 1974) and the Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 
1992).
Of the six independent variables said to underlie intention to maintain health in the Health 
Belief Model, five were mentioned in the current study. The participants’ experience of being 
a self-therapist was characterised by experiencing a vulnerability to relapse and by a belief 
that depressive “tendencies” were a stable part of their character, which is equivalent to 
susceptibility in the HBM. Although each had a different experience of depression which 
could be objectively described as being severe to moderate, each experienced his/her 
depression as subjectively severe and indicated this by fearing relapse. Severity and 
susceptibility therefore provided the frame in which self-therapeutic activity took place. Costs 
and benefits also underpinned self-therapy, as indicated by how often fear of relapse and 
identification of current gains was cited as a motivating thought in reactivating CT techniques 
in the face of a crisis. “Cues to action ” was also an important factor in activating self- 
therapeutic behaviour. Cues took many forms but most common was emotional disturbance.
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No participant mentioned using a self-therapy session or self-therapy blueprint as a cue for 
action. There were also times when participants failed to recognise a “cue for action” until it 
was almost too late (for example, Sarah with her anxieties about her weight).
However, a number of other variables, not included in the model, also appeared to mark the 
experience of being a therapist. These included self-efficacy and the perception of a good 
therapeutic alliance as evidenced by the theme, “Remembering the cognitive therapy and/or 
the therapist”. Additionally, participants showed just as much concern about what they saw as 
the limits of therapy as its costs. Many of these limits centred around self-efficacy, especially 
in the face of emotional intensity. In clinical terms, therefore, as with health promotion in the 
field of HIV prevention (Abraham & Sheeran, 1993), it might be better to focus interventions 
on promoting self-efficacy rather than highlighting costs, as indicated by the HBM. Finally, 
although participants did weigh up the costs and benefits of self-therapy as predicted by the 
HBM, decisions to act were also influenced by other factors, often laden with emotion. In this 
study, maintaining mental health is often associated with hard work, reacting to crises and 
acting out of strong fear of a depressive relapse (as Meg does).
The Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 1992) is differentiated from other social 
cognition models of health behaviour in its emphasis on the importance of self-efficacy 
expectancies, and on health behaviour taking place in two distinct phases (the motivational 
phase and the volitional phase). Self-efficacy was associated in the current study with 
persistence in maintaining self-therapy, as has been shown by previous research (Locke & 
Latham, 1990). The type of self-efficacy identified in the current study was “coping self- 
efficacy” (Schwarzer & Fuchs, 1998), which refers to a person’s believing in advance of a 
lapse that they could cope with high risk situations. However, there was little sign of the 
predicted “recovery self-efficacy” (Schwarzer, 1992), which refers to the belief that after a 
lapse one will recover and not have a full relapse. Conceptually this may be because in areas 
such as alcoholism, to which the HAPA has been applied, a lapse is clearly indicated by 
having a drink or getting drunk, whereas relapsing into depression is a less discrete event 
making it difficult for participants to label and therefore instigate “recovery self-efficacy”. 
There was also an apparent contradiction between the participants’ experience of “coping self- 
efficacy” and their experience of self-therapy as hard work and subject to feelings of 
vulnerability to relapse. This suggests, perhaps, that for people with long-term depression the 
feeling of self-efficacy following treatment is fragile and possibly not static and 
comprehensive (as implied in the HAPA model). In addition, self-efficacy expectancies did 
not appear to be the key variable underlying self-therapy in this context. As indicated earlier, a
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number of other variables including situation-outcome expectancies (in the form of expecting 
to experience a relapse in the face of certain internal and external pressures) were highlighted 
in participants’ accounts.
The current study lends some support to Schwarzer’s two-stage model of health behaviour 
(Schwarzer, 1992). Participants by taking part in and completing therapy showed they had 
passed through the motivational stage. In the volitional stage (which is the subject of the 
current study) participants did enact detailed action plans with proximal goals (e.g. John drew 
up lists of his tasks before each working day with the aim of reducing his anxiety about being 
unable to cope) and did use self-efficacy beliefs to bolster persistence. However, there were 
differences in emphasis from the two-stage model proposed by Schwarzer (1992) who argues 
that in the maintenance phase of a health behaviour -  the volitional phase -  concerns about 
severity and susceptibility should be relatively distal and inactive. The current study indicates 
that, in the context of people trying to maintain mental health following CBT for chronic 
depression, the volitional stage -  maintaining therapeutic gains -  is marked by a state of 
constant exchange with the motivational stage. A participant, living a 'real' life with its 
multiple stresses, constantly needs to draw on his/her motivation to maintain his/her health. It 
seems likely that this flux between motivation and volition is rooted in the participants’ 
ongoing experience of depression and their belief it cannot be cured but needs to be managed. 
Management is an ongoing process which requires hard work and vigilance. This may signal a 
fundamental difference between social cognition models of health behaviour for physical 
problems and those for mental health.
This is not to abandon social cognition models altogether as the basis for modelling self­
therapy in the current context. The findings did indicate that being a self-therapist is a 
dynamic process, with participants experiencing setbacks and successes, cycling between 
motivational and volitional states and charting their own course as self-therapists. Social 
cognition models are the best existing foundation on which to model this process. For 
example, the current study supports Conner and Norman's contention (1998) that at least three 
cognitive variables underlie health maintaining activity: the intention to act; self-efficacy 
beliefs and outcome-expectancy considerations. As indicated above, however, other variables 
play a significant part and linear two-stage models appear incompatible with the current 
findings. One possible productive avenue which could guide future development of models 
for maintaining health in this context, is with work with self-identity (Conner & Norman, 
1998). The current study indicates the importance of participants holding in mind some notion 
of themselves as self-therapists. The closer the fit between the therapy and the person's self- 
identity, the less hard work being a self-therapist was and the more likely self-therapeutic
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activity would take place and be perceived as being successful. In addition, chronic illness 
literature indicates that the experience of a chronic condition causes psychological distress if 
sufferers cannot accommodate the illness with their self-identity (Kelly, 1992, cited in Osborn 
& Smith, 1998). In the current study, participants allied themselves with their condition 
(linking it to pre-existing personality) and thereby were able to construct a rationale for self- 
therapeutic management. This may not be the case with other clients, for example those with 
acute depressive conditions. Any new health behaviour model for maintaining mental health, 
then, would have to be both complex and context specific.
5.4 Implications for clinical practice
The findings have wide implications for clinical practice. Current practice lays stress on 
practical issues - such as identifying potential obstacles to self-therapy and problem-solving 
solutions to them - when drawing up end-of-therapy plans (J. Beck, 1995). However, the 
current study indicates that therapist and client need also to explore beliefs about depression, 
the client's view of therapy and its relation to depression and about the rationale and precepts 
of cognitive therapy. For example, the current study indicated that each client adapted therapy 
in ways that were shaped by such beliefs. In Bob's case, for example, his understanding that 
cognitive therapy required him to be a 'hard man' with his family could have been uncovered 
and discussed and a possible source of non-adherence overcome. For Teny, his view that 
therapy was about clearing one cluttered file after another could have been tackled to 
encourage generalisation of the skills he acquired. For participants in this study, the way 
cognitive therapy was utilised extended beyond the use of specific techniques and knowledge 
of cognitive therapy alone. The clinical implication is that therapists need to discuss end-of- 
therapy plans in the context of how clients can draw on all their resources to maintain therapy 
gains. The finding that clients use a range of specific and CT-adapted skills also suggests that 
in the delivery of CBT, therapists may find it hard to judge what is most helpful to clients and 
it is, therefore, important to provide a choice of alternative techniques which the client then 
explores as a self-therapist.
The current study did find that being a self-therapist is a dynamic process, which may be 
better understood by stage of models of change, such as the Transtheoretical Model 
(DiClemente & Prochaska, 1998) or the HAPA (Schwarzer, 1992). This carries major 
implications both for the within-session delivery of CBT and for end-of-therapy planning. 
Attitudes towards being a self-therapist and the possibility of cycling between motivational 
and volitional stages in this process would become an important focus of therapy. In this 
context, therapists may also need to acknowledge that being a self-therapist is going to be
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hard work and might be associated with ongoing vulnerability to depression. The finding that 
self-therapists in this context have to work hard and experience vulnerability to depression 
supports the case which has already been made (Kovacs, Rush, Beck & Hollon, 1981) for 
routinely offering booster sessions with clients with a similar clinical presentation to the 
current sample. Booster sessions may also overcome the problem of simply forgetting parts of 
the therapy, identified as a limit to CT self-therapy by some participants. Additionally, the 
importance of memoiy was highlighted by the 'Remembering the therapy1 theme and should 
encourage clinicians to consider giving clients audio-tapes of sessions as an aide memoire, 
along with written handouts.
Clinicians might also pay close attention to what participants see as potential limits to their 
use of CT post-therapy. The current study indicated that clients themselves were veiy clear 
about what the limits were, but none reported s/he had plans in place to overcome them. 
Current good practice on exploring obstacles to self-therapy and solutions should be sufficient 
to ensure limits are explored. Participants often identified wider systemic factors limiting self- 
therapeutic activity and it may be that cognitive therapists might need to draw on systemic 
models to explore these areas. Additionally, the importance of promoting self-efficacy, which 
is already emphasised in current practice (Fennell, 1989) was highlighted. Promoting self- 
efficacy appears to be central because self-therapeutic activity for this group is based on a 
belief that depression cannot be cured but can be managed using CBT. Interestingly, for this 
sample, feelings of self-efficacy were strongest when the participant felt that both s/he and 
her/his therapist were joint agents of change in therapy, indicating the importance of 
establishing a strong therapeutic alliance and collaborative working.
5.5 Limitations o f the current study
Because of the idiopathic nature of the research design, generalising from the findings should 
be treated with caution. At best, the findings from the current study can only be applied to 
adults fitting the inclusion and exclusion criteria set out in the study (Smith, 2002). It is not 
valid to claim, for example, that clients with major depression disorder without prior episodes 
or those of ethnic origins other than White-UK would present as self-therapists in the same 
way. However, the applicability of the findings to other NHS clients rests on the degree to 
which the current sample is homogeneous and representative of NHS clients having cognitive 
therapy for depression (Smith, 2002). The sample might be unrepresentative in two ways. The 
quality and quantity of the cognitive therapy might not reflect prevailing practice as indicated 
earlier. For long term depression, therapy lasting more than one year and promoting cognitive 
change at the core belief level has been recommended, especially when there are indications
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of Axis II disorders (Padesky, 1999). The existence of Axis II disorders (DSM-IV, 1994) was 
not controlled for in the current study. Secondly, the opt-in sample selection process - adopted 
for ethical reasons - could have led to a selection bias in favour of those participants who were 
likely to be most accommodating to the researcher and be active self-therapists on completion 
of therapy.
While it is acknowledged in the IPA approach that the participants' words do not reflect 
"fixed, inner attitudes" (Osborn & Smith, 1998), IPA does privilege the participants' accounts 
as if they reflected some inner reality (Willig, 2001). In the current study, perhaps more than 
other DPA studies, there is reason to challenge whether participants’ accounts were accurate 
reflections of their feelings, thoughts and actions. To meet one rhetorical aim of their account, 
that of explaining what made them a good client, (Potter, 1996) participants may have wanted 
to present themselves to the interviewer as good, hard-working self-therapists. Also, as noted 
above, there might have been a selection bias, which might have produced participants who 
were keen to accommodate the researcher. There was, however, some evidence in support of 
IPA’s realist ontology position in the current study: at least one participant (Harry) said he 
was not a self-therapist; participants gave detailed elaborated examples of how they 
implemented self-therapy (indicating that their claims to be active self-therapists were 
supported by evidence in the form of action); and no one claimed to be the perfect self­
therapist, with all admitting to crises and limitations.
Finally, the first named research author cannot claim to have strictly bracketed his 
foreknowledge of cognitive therapy and health behaviours in ways that maximised the 
phenomenology of the study (Willig, 2001). For example, in the interview schedule he may 
have prompted a response bias with regard to identifying salient beliefs about depression 
(around susceptibility etc.) and missed other important beliefs (Conner & Norman, 1998). 
However, the first author has attempted to attenuate this possible bias by personal reflexivity, 
allowing the reader to interrogate the full context of the research process.
5.6 Directions for further research
Within a qualitative framework, further research could improve on the current design to 
capture more clearly the essence of the experience of being a self-therapist in this context, 
which is the goal of IPA (Willig, 2001). The search for the meaning of the experience might 
be aided by using IPA again but having a different interview schedule, focussed more on the 
participants' wider belief system regarding depression and mental health and examining self­
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therapy in the context of self-identity. One could ask more direct questions about what self- 
referrent and other-referrent meanings around implementing CBT techniques and knowledge.
Taking a quantitative approach, the current research lays the foundation for the development 
of a measure of whether a person with recurrent or chronic depression will become a self­
therapist following CBT. As the current research shows variables to be measured would 
include not only the client's use of specific and/or adapted-CT techniques, but also self- 
efficacy beliefs, beliefs about vulnerability to depression, perceived outcome-expectancies, 
therapeutic alliance and perceived limits to CT use. If such a measure could be developed, 
between-group controlled studies could be done to answer the key question of whether being a 
self-therapist is required to delay relapse onset in depression and what aspects of self-therapy 
(and therefore CT itself) serve to most protect the client.
2 4 6
Major Research Project
References:
Abraham, C. & Sheeran, P. (1993). In search of safer-sex promotion; beyond beliefs and texts. 
Health Education Research Theory and Practice, 8(2), 245-254.
Abramson, L., Seligman, M., & Teasdale, J. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: critique 
and reformulation. Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 87,49-74.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual o f mental 
disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Armitage, C. and Conner, M. (2000). Social cognition models and health behaviour: a 
structured review. Psychology and Health, 15,173-189.
Barling, N. & Lehmann, M. (1999). Young men’s awareness, attitudes and practice of 
testicular self-examination. Psychology, Health and Medicine, 4(2), 115-127.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theoiy of behavioural change. 
Psychological Review, 84, 191-215.
Barber, J. P., & DeRubeis, R. (1989). On second thought: where the action is in cognitive 
therapy for depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 5,441-457.
Barnard, P. and Teasdale, J. (1991). Interacting cognitive subsystems: a systemic approach to 
cognitive affective interaction and change. Cognition and Emotion, 5,1-39.
Beck, A., Rush, A., Shaw, B. & Emeiy, G. (1979). Cognitive Therapy o f depression. New 
York: Guilford Press.
Beck, A. (1989). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. London: Penguin.
Beck, A., Wright, F., Newman, C. & Thiese, B. (1993). Cognitive Therapy o f Substance 
Abuse. New York: Guilford Press.
Beck, J. (1995). Cognitive Therapy: basics and beyond. New York: Guilford Press.
2 4 7
Major Research Project
Birchwood, M., and Tairier, N. (1995) (Eds.) Psychological management o f schizophrenia. 
Chichester: Wiley.
Blackburn, I., Eunson, K., & Bishop, S. (1986). A two-year naturalistic follow-up of 
depressed patients treated with cognitive therapy, pharmacotherapy and a combination of 
both. Journal of Affective Disorders, 10, 65-75.
Bordin, E. S. (1979). The generalisation of the psychoanalytic concept of the working 
alliance. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 16,252-260.
Brewin, C. R. (1989). Cognitive change processes in psychotherapy. Psychological Review, 
96(3), 379-394.
Carr, A. (1999). The Handbook o f Child and Adolescent Clinical Psychology; a contextual 
approach. London: Routledge.
Clark, D. (1999). Anxiety disorders: why they persist and how to treat them. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 37, S5-S27.
Cohen, N., Parikh, S. & Kennedy, S. (2000). Health beliefs and compliance with antipsychotic 
medication. British Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 35,393-397.
Dobson, K.S. (1989). A meta-analysis of the efficacy of cognitive therapy for depression, 
Journal o f Consulting and Clinical psychology, 57(3), 414-419.
Conner, M. & Norman, P. (1998). The role of social cognition in health behaviours. In M. 
Conner and P. Norman (Eds.) Predicting health behaviour.research and practice with social 
cognition models. Buckingham: Open University Press.
DiClemente, C. & Prochaska, J. (1998). Toward a comprehensive, transtheoretical model of 
change: states of change and addictive behaviors. In W. Miller and N. Heather (Eds.) Treating 
addictive behaviours (2nd ed.). New York: Plenum Press.
Dingwall, R., Murphy, E., Watson, P., Greatbatch, D. & Parker, S. (1998). Catching goldfish: 
quality in qualitative research. Journal o f Health Services Research and Policy, 3(3), 167-172.
Elliot, R. & Shapiro, D. (1988). Brief Structured Recall: A more efficient method for studying 
significant therapy events. British Journal o f Medical Psychology, 61,141-153.
2 4 8
Major Research Project
Elliott, R., Fischer, C. & Rennie, D. (1999). Evolving guidelines for publication of qualitative 
research studies in psychology and related fields. British Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 38, 
215-229.
Evans, M., Hollon, S., DeRubeis, R., Piasecki, J., Grove, W., Garvey, M. & Tuason, V. 
(1992). Differential relapse following cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy for depression, 
Archives o f General Psychiatry, 49, 802-808.
Fennell, M. J. (1989). Depression. In K. Hawton, P. Salkovskis, J. Kirk and D. Clark (Eds.) 
Cognitive behaviour therapy for psychiatric problems: a practical guide. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Fenton, W. Blyler, C. & Heinssen, R. (1997). Determinants of medication compliance in 
schizophrenia: empirical and clinical findings. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 23(4), 637-651.
Fiske, S. & Taylor, S. (1991). Social Cognition (Td edn.) New York: McGraw-Hill.
Frank, E. & Thase, M. (1999). Natural history and preventative treatment of recurrent mood 
disorders. Annual Review o f Medicine, 50, 453-468.
Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery o f Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative 
research. New York: Aldine.
Gloaguen, V., Cottraux, J., Cucherat, M., Blackburn, I-M. (1998). A meta-analysis of the 
effects of cognitive therapy in depressed patients. Journal o f Affective Disorders, 49, 59-72.
Henwood, K. & Pidgeon, N. (1992). Qualitative research and psychological theorising. British 
Journal o f Psychology, 83(1), 97-112.
Hollon, S., Evans, M. & DeRubeis, R. (1988). Preventing relapse following treatment for 
depression; the cognitive pharmacotherapy project. In T. Field, P. McCabe, & N.
Schneiderman (Eds.) Stress and coping across development. New York: Erlbaum.
Jacobson, N., Dobson, K., Truax, P., Addis, M., Koemer, K., Gollan, J., Gortner, E. & Prince,
S. (1996). A component analysis of cognitive-behavioural treatment for depression. Journal o f 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64,295-304.
2 4 9
Major Research Project
Jacobson, N. & Gortner, E. T. (2000). Can depression be de-medicalised in the 21st century: 
scientific revolutions, counter-revolutions and the magnetic field of normal science.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 103-117.
Jamison, K., Gemer, R. & Goodwin, F. (1979). Patient and physician attitudes toward lithium. 
Archives o f General Psychiatry, 36, 866-869.
Janz, N. and Becker, M. (1984). The health belief model: a decade later. Health Education 
Quarterly, 11,1-47.
Jarman, M., Smith, J.A., & Walsh, S. (1997). The psychological battle for control: A 
qualitative study of healthcare professionals' understandings of the treatment of anorexia 
nervosa. Journal o f Community & Applied Social Psychology, 7, 137-152.
Judd, L. (1997). The clinical course of unipolar major depressive disorders. Archives o f 
General Psychiatry, 54,989-991.
Keller, M.B. & Hanks, D.L. (1995). Course and natural histoiy of chronic depression. In J. S. 
Kocsis and D. Klein (Eds.) Diagnosis and Treatment o f Chronic Depression. New York: 
Guilford Press.
Kelly, G. Mamon, J. & Scott, J. (1987). Utility of the Health Belief Model in examining 
medication compliance among psychiatric outpatients. Social Science and Medicine, 25(11), 
1205-1211.
Kovacs, M., Rush, A., Beck, A., & Hollon, S. (1981). Depressed outpatients treated with 
cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 38,33-39.
Leventhal, H., Meyer, D. & Nerenz, D. (1980). The common sense representations of illness 
danger. In S. Rachman (Ed.), Medical Psychology 2. New York: Pergamon Press.
Lin, E., von Korff, M., Katon, W., Bush, T., Simon, G., Walker, E. and Robinson, P. (1995). 
The role of the primary care physician in patients’ adherence to antidepressant therapy. 
Medical Care, 33(1), 67-74.
2 5 0
Major Research Project
Madill, A., Jordan, A., & Shirley, C. (2000). Objectivity and reliability in qualitative analysis: 
Realist, contextualist and radical constructionist epistemologies. British Journal of 
Psychology, 91,1-20.
Meltzer, H., Gill, B., Petticrew, M. & Hinds, K. (1994). OPCS Survey o f Psychiatric 
Morbidity in Great Britain, Bulletin No 1. London: HMSO.
Mills, N., & Williams, R. (1997). Cognitions are never enough: the use of "Body Metaphor" 
in therapy with reference to Barnard and Teasdale's Interacting Cognitive Subsystem Model. 
Clinical Psychology Forum, 110, 9-13.
Moser, C., & Kalton, G. (1977). Survey methods in social investigation (2nd edn.). London: 
Heinemann.
National Service Framework for Mental Health, (1999). London: HMSO.
Ogden, J. (2000). Health Psychology: a textbook. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Osborn, M., & Smith, J.A. (1998). The personal experience of chronic benign lower back 
pain: an interpretative phenomenological analysis. British Journal o f Health Psychology, 3, 
65-83.
Padesky, C. (1994). Schema change processes in cognitive therapy. Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 1 (5), 267-278.
Padesky, C. & Greenberger, D. (1995) Clinician's guide to mind over mood. New York: 
Guilford Press.
Potter, J. (1996). Representing reality: discourse analysis, rhetoric and social construction. 
London: Sage.
Robinson, L., Berman, J., Neimeyer, R. (1990). Psychotherapy for the treatment of 
depression: A comprehensive review of controlled outcome research. Psychological Bulletin, 
108, 30-49.
Rosentsock, I. (1966). Why people use health services. Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 
44, 94-127.
2 5 1
Major Research Project
Rush, A., Weissenburger, J. & Eaves, G. (1986). Do thinking patterns predict depressive 
symptoms? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(2), 225-235.
Sanderson, W. & McGinn, L. (1999). Cognitive behavioral treatment of depression: clinical 
application and empirical status. In M. Weissman (Ed.) Treatment o f depression in the 21st 
century. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association Press.
Schwarzer, R. (1992). Self-efficacy in the adoption and maintenance of health behaviours: 
theoretical approaches and a new model. In R. Schwarzer (Ed.) Self-efficacy: thought control 
of action. Washington DC: Hemisphere.
Schwarzer, R. (1999). Self-regulatory processes in the adoption and maintenance of health 
behaviours: the role of optimism, goals and threats. Journal o f Health Psychology, 4(2), 115- 
127.
Schwarzer, R. & Fuchs, R. (1996). Self-efficacy and health behaviours. In M. Conner & P. 
Norman (Eds.), Predicting health behaviour: research and practice with social cogntiion 
models. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Shaw, B.F., & Segal, Z. V. (1999). Efficacy, indications and mechanisms of action of 
cognitive therapy of depression. In D. Janowsky (ed.) Psychotherapy: indications and 
outcome. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press. Science and practice o f Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shea, T.
Smith, J. A. (1996). Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis in health psychology. Psychology and Health, 11,261-271.
Smith, J.A. (1999). Towards a relational self: Social engagement during pregnancy and 
psychological preparation for motherhood. British Journal o f Social Psychology, 38, 409-426.
Smith, J. A. (2002). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Lecture. Guildford: University 
of Surrey.
2 5 2
Major Research Project
Smith, J. A., Jarman, M. and Osborn, M. (1999). Doing interpretative phenomenological 
analysis. In M. Murray and K. Chamberlain (Eds.) Qualitative Health Psychology: theories 
and methods. London: Sage.
Teasdale, J. (1997). The relationship between cognition and emotion: the mind-in-place in 
mood disorders. In D. Clark & C. Fairbum (Eds.),
Teasdale, J. (2000). Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in the prevention of relapse and 
recurrence in major depression. In K. Katu (Ed.) Meditation as health promotion: a lifestyle 
modification approach. Proceedings; The 6th conference organised by the Transnational 
Network for the study ofphysical, psychological and spiritual wellbeing. Delft: Eburon 
Publishers.
Turpin, G., Barley, V., Beail, N., Scaife, J., Slade, P., Smith, J. & Walsh, S. (1997). Standards 
for research projects and theses involving qualitative methods: suggested guidelines for 
trainees and courses. Clinical Psychology Forum, 108, 3-7.
Williams, J.M.G. (1997). Depression. In D. Clark and C. Fairbum (Eds.) The Science and 
Practice o f Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, L., & Falbo, J. (1996). Cognitive and performance-based treatments for panic 
attacks in people with varying degrees of agrophobic disability. Behaviour Therapy and 
Research, 34,253-264.
Willig, C. (2001). Introducing qualitative research in psychology: adventures in theory and 
method. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Wills, F., & Sanders, D. (1997). Cognitive therapy: transforming the image. London: Sage.
Young, J. E. (1990). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: a schema focused approach. 
Sarasota, FL: Professional Resources Exchange.
2 5 3
Appendix 1
Major Research Project
254
Major Research Project
Appendix 1: An example of a guide to self-therapy sessions for CBT (Beck, J., 1995)
Beck recommends that client and therapist draw up a guide to self-therapy before the end of 
treatment and discuss how it will be instigated and any obstacles the client perceives in being 
a self-therapist (for example, the interfering thought, “This is too much work”). The author 
provides a template for a client self-therapy session as follows (in abridged form):
1. Set agenda:
What important issues should I think about?
2. Review Homework:
What did I learn? If I didn’t do homework, what got in the way (practical problems; automatic 
thoughts)? What should I continue to do for homework?
3. Review of oast weekfs):
Other than a specific homework assignment, did I use and cognitive therapy tools? Looking 
back, would it have been advantageous to use the cognitive therapy tools more? How will I 
remember to use the tools next time? Did any problems come up? If so, how well did I handle 
them? If the problem recurred, how could I handle it next time?
4. Think about current problematic issues:
Am I viewing this realistically? Is there another way of viewing this? What should I do?
5. Predict possible problems that may occur between now and the next therapy session? 
What problems may come up in the next few days? What should I do if the problem does 
arise? Would it help to imaging myself coping with the problem?
6. Set new homework:
What homework would be helpful? Should I consider doing a Dysfunctional Thought Record? 
Monitoring my activities? Working a behavioural hierarchy? Scheduling pleasure and mastery 
activities? Reading therapy notes? Doing a positive self-statement log?
7. Schedule the next self-therapy appointment?
Clients are encouraged to try a self-therapy session once a week initially, then tapering it off 
to once a month and then every season and finally annually.
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David Glasman: Doctoral Research Thesis.
Working Title 
Tackling depression: the role of cognitive therapy 
Participants
Age: Adults aged over 18.
Gender: Men or women 
Exclusion criteria:
1. Any client judged to be depressed following a one-off loss or other life event, with good prior 
adjustment
2. Any client displaying psychotic features.
3. Any client with drug or alcohol dependency as well as a diagnosis of depression.
4. Any client who is currently considered at risk of self-harm or harm to others.
5. Any client who is known to be participating in another research study.
6. Any client who does not show improvement by the end of therapy.
Inclusion criteria:
1. Any client who is being treated with group or individual CBT for a primary diagnosis of 
depression, as defined either by DSM-IV criteria or by scores of 20 or more on the Beck 
Depression Inventory at the start of therapy.
2. Age 18 or over.
Researcher: David Glasman, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, DClin. Psych., University of Surrey
Supervised by: David Brock, Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Horley CMHT.
Mick Finlay, Research Tutor and Lecturer in Psychology, University of Surrey
Contact: David Glasman on Tel: or email
E.S.L.R.E.C Ethics Approval granted: May 2001. Ref no. 11DGCB(299)
R & D Approval granted: June 2001
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EAST SURREY LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Santhams, 
West Park Hospital, 
Horton Lane, 
Epsom, Surrey, 
KT19 8PB.
SH/AJR
Date: 30th April 2001.
To: David Glasman,
31 Cedar Way,
Guildford, Surrey,
GU1 1JH.
Dear Mr Glasman,
RE: THE USE CLIENTS MAKE OF COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY FOR 
DEPRESSION AFTER THERAPY HAS FINISHED 
REF: 11DGCB(299) - to be quoted on all future correspondence please
Thank you for sending us the above research submission and I now confirm that 
Chairman's Approval has been given to go ahead with this trial.
In future, the Committee would like to follow up all new trials. Therefore, we would 
be grateful if you could send us an update after a period of a year from the 
commencement of the study with the following details:-
1. Is the research still continuing?
2. If it is, which stage has it reached:-
2.1. Data being collected
2.2. Data being analysed
2.3. Research being written up
2.4. Research published.
N.B. If you are sending any Protocol Amendments to us, please ensure that 
you highlight the areas of change.
Thank you for your trouble.
Yours sincerely,
Selina Harris,
Manager - ESLREC
c.c. JC 
c.c. MO
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SOUTH WEST SURREY LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Education Centre,
The Royal Surrey County Hospital, Egerton Road 
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XX 
Tel: 01483 571122 ext 4382 Fax: 01483 303691
Chairman: Professor D L Russell-Jones MD FRCP Co-ordinator: Mr J Kerslake
Please quote 
Our Ref: EC95/01
20 November 2001
Dr David Glasman 
31 Cedar Way 
Guildford 
GUI 1JH
Dear Mr Glasman
The use clients make of the rationale and techniques of cognitive-behavioural therapy 
after treatment is concluded: an exploratory study using interpretative phenomalogical 
analysis
I am pleased to be able to inform you that at its meeting held on 13 November 2001 the Ethics 
Committee approved the above study.
The Committee’s decision was based on its review of the following documents:
i) The South West Surrey LREC application form dated 29 October 2001
ii). The Participant Information Sheet -  Research (version undated)
iii) Research Consent Form 1 -  Pre-interview (version undated)
iv) Research Consent Form 2 -  Post-interview (version undated)
v) The Interview Schedule
The Committee’s approval is subject to the following conditions:
i) No deviations from or changes of procedures set out in the above documents 
should be initiated without prior written approval of the Committee.
ii) If the start of the project is delayed by more than year from the date of 
approval, the project should be re-submitted to the Committee for further 
review.
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iii)
iv)
v)
The Committee should be provided with a copy of the report on the outcome of 
the study or a copy of any published document.
You omitted to sign the Application Form. Please provide the Committee with 
a signed version of the document.
You will need to complete the text in the Participant Information Sheet under 
the heading ‘Who has reviewed the study?’
Yours sincerely
Co-ordinator
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Participant Information Sheet - Research 
Working Research Title:
Coping with depression: the role of cognitive-behavioural therapy.
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with friends, relatives and 
your GP if you wish. Ask us if  there is anything that is not clear, or if  you would like 
more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) publish a leaflet entitled 'Medical Research 
and You’. This leaflet gives more information about medical research and looks at some 
questions you may want to ask. A copy may be obtained from CERES, PO Box 1365, 
London N16 0BW.
Background and purpose of the study:
I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of Surrey, conducting a research 
study which looks at how people cope after they have been treated with cognitive- 
behavioural therapy for depression. Although it is believed therapy is helpful, there has 
been little research on how it helps people once treatment has finished. I am undertaking 
this research to develop a fuller understanding of what happens when therapy finishes.
Those who volunteer will be required for just one interview lasting approximately one 
hour at some time between September 2001 and March 2002. There are no other 
requirements.
Why have I been approached?
You have been approached to take part because you have been identified by your therapist 
as a potential participant in a study of how people cope after cognitive-behavioural 
therapy for depression. I am seeking people aged between 18 and 65 who have completed 
treatment for depression using a cognitive-behavioural therapy approach. I hope to recruit 
between 10 and 15 people for the study.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide not to take part, it will 
not affect the standard of care you receive. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. This will not 
affect the standard of care you receive.
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What will happen if I take part?
Those who volunteer for the research will be interviewed for approximately one hour 
about their experiences since treatment finished. You will also be asked to supply some 
demographic details, such as ethnicity and your age range. The interviews will be audio­
taped. At the end of the interview, if the interviewee wishes to talk further, I will be 
happy to arrange another meeting. A consultant clinical psychologist will also be 
available to talk further, if  necessary. Interviews will take place at a location that is 
convenient for you. You will not required to do anything else and you will require no 
special preparation before the interview. I am using a research methodology, called 
qualitative research, which places particular value on hearing individuals’ direct 
experiences.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
As you will be interviewed about coping with depression, there is a slim chance you will 
find your participation distressing. However, a number of safeguards have been put in 
place: the interviewer/researcher is a trainee clinical psychologist who is trained to be 
aware of signs of distress; the interview will be about how you are coping having seen 
improvements during your treatment; the interview will be terminated immediately if you 
become distressed: if you become distressed after the interview, you can contact the 
interviewer/researcher if you need to talk further and a consultant clinical psychologist, if 
necessary.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There will be no direct clinical benefit to you in taking part in the research. However,
I hope that the information we get from this study may help us develop more effective 
cognitive-behavioural therapy for future patients with depression. I also hope that those 
who take part will find it helpful to talk about their experiences.
Will anyone need access to mv medical notes?
I will not need access to your medical notes. I will also not need direct access to the notes 
kept by your therapist but I may need to ask your therapist to check details on my behalf. 
The details I may need to check will not involve what you disclosed to your therapist 
during therapy, but will include things like your scores on questionnaires the therapist 
used to measure your progress during therapy. This information will be passed to me by 
your therapist without me seeing your file.
Will mv taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly
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confidential. Your therapist will NOT have any access to what you say at interview and 
the interview will not enter your medical record. Measures will be taken to ensure your 
anonymity. The audio-tapes of the interviews will be erased immediately after they have 
been transcribed. Your name on the transcript will be replaced by a letter, and any other 
names and locations, which could identify you, will be omitted. These precautions will 
apply when I discuss the research with my supervisors and when the research is written 
for publication. On completion of the research, I also propose to present the findings to 
the community NHS trust’s mental health staff as part of their education programme. All 
information at the presentation will be anonymised.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
This research is being conducted as part of my Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. It will 
form my doctoral thesis which will be bound and kept by the British Library and form the 
subject of a viva voce examination. I also hope that the research will be published in a 
scientific journal. The approximate publication date would be late 2002 or early 2003. As 
stated above, all identifying details will be omitted in any report or publication. The 
results may also be used for educational purposes as stated above.
Who has reviewed the study?
The East Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this study. 
What do I do now?
If you wish to take part in the study, please complete the enclosed Participant Reply Slip 
and send it to me in the stamped addressed envelope provided. I will then contact you.
Further Information:
If you would like to find out more about the research, please ring me on 01483 578843.
If you agree to take part in this study you will be given a copy of this information sheet 
and a signed consent form to keep.
David Glasman 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
School of Human Sciences 
University of Surrey 
Guildford GU2 5XH
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David Glasman: Doctoral Research Thesis.
Working Title: 
Tackling depression: the roie of cognitive therapy.
Name of client:
Name of therapist:
Date form completed:
Please rate the degree to which you feel your client has developed the following understanding and 
techniques of cognitive therapy.
Key to scale:
0 = Not at all
1 = Sometimes
2 = Frequently
3 = Most of the time
Cognitive Therapy Skills Checklist
(Adapted from Clinician’s Guide to Mind over Mood by Padeskv with Greenberger (Guilford. 1995) 
Skills developed by client: Rating
1. Understands the interaction between thoughts, moods, behaviour, 
physical reactions and environment.
2. Understands the cognitive model.
3. Recognises the connection between thoughts and moods
4. Identifies moods
5. Identifies automatic thoughts
6. Identifies hot thoughts
7. Identifies evidence in support of a hot thought as well as evidence that 
does not support the hot thought
8. Generates alternative explanations to the hot thought based on the 
evidence collected
9. Designs and implements experiments to test automatic thoughts
10. Develops action plans to solve problems
11. Experiences a mood shift as a result of Thought Records, experiments 
and/or action plans
12. Identifies underlying assumptions and core beliefs
13. Recognises and records evidence that is contrary to underlying 
assumptions and core beliefs
14. Identifies new core beliefs and assumptions
15. Recognises and records evidence that is consistent with new 
assumptions and core beliefs.
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Patient identification number for this study:
Research Consent Form 1 -  Pre-interview
Research Title:
Tackling depression: the role of cognitive therapy
Name of researcher:
David Glasman
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated  ^
For the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or 0
legal rights being affected.
3. I consent to an audio-tape being made of the research interview and to all 
or parts of this recording being transcribed for the purposes of research and 
education. I understand that all information which could identify me will be 
anonymised. I understand that if  I withdraw my consent, the audiotape informStnln 
will be erased immediately.
4. I agree to take part in this study. *
Name of participant....................  Date................... Signature..................
Name of researcher...................... Date..................  Signature....................
On behalf of those involved with this research project, I undertake that, in respect of 
the audio-tape(s) made with the above participant, professional confidentiality will be 
ensured, and that any use of audio-tapes or transcribed material from audio-tapes will 
be for the purposes of research only. The anonymity of the above participant will be 
protected.
Name of researcher..........................  Date.................  Signature................
1 for participant, 1 for researcher
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Participant identification number for this research:
Research Consent Form 2 -  Post-interview
Proiect Title:
Coping with depression: the role of cognitive-behavioural therapy
Please read the following paragraph and, if  you are in agreement, sign where 
indicated.
I agree that the purposes of this research, and what my participation in it would entail, 
have been explained to me in a manner that I understand. I have given consent to be 
interviewed about my experiences of coping following cognitive-behavioural therapy 
for depression. I have been interviewed and know I have been audio-taped. Having 
been interviewed and an audio-tape having been made of the interview, I also consent 
to all or parts of this recording being transcribed for the purposes of research.
Name of participant.........................  Date...............  Signature.................................
On behalf of those involved with this research project, I undertake that, in respect of 
the audio-tape(s) made with the above participant, professional confidentiality will be 
ensured, and that any use of audio-tapes or transcribed material from audio-tapes will 
be for the purposes of research only. The anonymity of the above participant will be 
protected.
Name of researcher.................  Date........................  Signature
1 for participant, 1 for researcher
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Participant identifier no.
Date of interview:
1.What is cognitive therapy?
Each participant in this study has undergone a specific approach to treating depression called Cognitive 
Therapy.
la.Can you tell me what the term cognitive therapy means to you?
[Prompts:
Did it encourage you to handle specific situations in particular ways?
Did it encourage you to think in particular ways?
What specific skills or techniques did you learn?
What did you learn about how depression works?
Why were you encouraged to think in particular ways? ]
lb.Not everyone learns about using these skills and ways of thinking to tackle depression from 
therapy. Where did you learn about using these techniques to tackle depression?
2. Current management of depression
In the current study I am interested in whether and how people make use of the things they learned in 
therapy after they have finished treatment. In therapy you would have been encouraged to use various 
skills and ways of thinking to tackle your depression.
2a.Do you use any of the skills and ways of thinking you learned in therapy now?
[ if  no: go on to section 3]
[Ifyes:]
Which skills and ways of thinking do you use?
Can you give me the most recent example of when you used these skills and ways of thinking?
Is this a typical example of how you use these skills and ways of thinking?
[ If yes, go on to 2b]
[If no:]
Can you give me an example which is typical of your use of the skills and ways of thinking you 
learned in therapy?
2b.How often do you use these skills and ways of thinking to tackle depression?
Research into using psychological skills to tackle depression suggests there are times that people don’t 
always use the skills.
2c. Are there times (situations, moods or when you are with certain people) when it does not feel 
right or convenient to use those skills and ways of thinking?
2d. Are there times when you think you should use the skills and ways of thinking and you don’t?
[ifyes:]
Can you give me the most recent example?
What prevented you from using the skills and ways of thinking that you learned?
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[if  no: go on to 2e]
2e. Why do you continue to use the skills and ways of thinking you learned in therapy to tackle 
depression?
2f. Since therapy ended, have you always used these skills and ways of thinking in the same way 
as you do today?
(ifyes:
Can you tell me why?
[if no:
In what way has it changed?
Can you tell me why it has changed?
2g. Do you ever find yourself not using the skills and ways of thinking and if so what do you do to 
ensure you continue using them after that?
3. Non-use of CBT depression-management skills and wavs of thinking
You said you do not use the skills and ways of thinking you learned in therapy to tackle depression.
3a. Can you tell me why you don’t use them?
3b. Since therapy ended, have you never made use of the skills and ways of thinking you learned 
in therapy?
[if  no: go on to next section]
[ifyes:
In what way has your use of the skills changed?
Can you tell me why there has been a change in your use of the skills and ways of thinking 
learned in therapy?
Did you make attempts to restart the techniques? If so, what did you try and what factors made 
you stop.
** For all participants
4. Use of other methods to tackle depression
4a. Apart from what you learned in cognitive therapy, does anything or anybody else help you 
tackle depression?
(If no; go to section 5)
(ifyes:
4b. If you had to rate which things, including the cognitive therapy techniques, were most 
helpful, how would you rate them? Use a scale of 0=no use whatsoever; 100= most useful all the 
time.
5. Beliefs about and attitudes to depression
I would like, finally, to ask you some general questions about your beliefs and attitudes towards 
depression, as research suggests this affects the way people use the treatment they have received.
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5a. If someone told you they were depressed, what would you imagine they meant by that?
5b. If someone told you they were depressed, do you think they would be in for a long haul or a 
short stretch? Can you specify as closely as possible how long?
5c. How much do you think you can keep depression in check so that it does not dominate your 
life?
5d. Has your view of what depression is changed over time?
Previous attempts to manage depression:
6a. Before you started cognitive therapy, did you make previous attempts to tackle depression?
(If no:
Can you tell me more about that?
(Ifyes:
What attempts did you make?
Did you feel you were successful or not?
What factors helped or hindered those attempts?
Prompts and probes
Could you tell me more about that? 
What makes you say that?
What happened then/ after that? 
Why do you think that happened?
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Transcript 
Patient id. No. 2
Can you tell me what the term cognitive therapy means to you?
It means to me, erm... lookingat ways that you think about things and feel about things and trying to 
deal with them in a positive way and that can me4an ingrained kindof beliefs that you could be trying 
to change in order to make yourself feel better and to maybe put in long-term depression lines, to 
hopefully prevent it recurring again.
Can you give me a specific example that comes to mind?
Having had serious depression at one point I can recognise now when I am feeling a bit down.
So its something about helping you recognise the signs?
Yeah, it's about helping recognise the signs and trying to deal with it positively, erm.. looking at, it is 
an issue of looking at something negatively if you can try to change it to make yourself feel better 
rather than dwelling on it, so, erm, as an example, for example, recognising the signs to start with.
Do you also connect with specific techniques you might use?
Yeah, when it comes to your... the way you are thinking, you kindof analyse it a bit and think well, 
you know, we were given specific names because we were given notes about different thought 
processes, but, you know, is it an error, are you making an error in your thinking, is it true what you 
are thinking, have you got any evidence to show that your thinking is really correct. That kind of thing, 
and then analysing it and turning it around to your advantage.
So it's about kindof thinking in certain ways and using some skills or specific techniques? 
Techniques...?
For you it’s more about thinking?
It affects me more the thinking patterns and so, because its something that’s built up with me over my 
adult lifetime its something that i am learning to address and I have done mainly in the last year or so . 
So its kindof like everything in my life I am adopting the cognitive-behavioural therapy techniques to.
Not everyone learns that way of using these techniques to tackle depression. Did you learn that in your 
six weeks of CBT or have you gathered over the years that way of thinking about things from other 
places?
I was aware of it before because I have done anxiety management courses and it is a similar type of 
think, but I must say that I haven't really applied it as much as I have since I have done the course. The 
course made me much more aware and I have got to as stage now when I want to make a lot of changes 
and that is the line i am now going down. But I was aware of it before, but I had so many changes I 
had to make ands a lot of that was physical, so I have concentrated on doing exercises, which I still do 
anyway, but I have used the thinking processes more. As an example, two and a half months ago I gave 
up smoking. I was a heavy smoker. I decided that the time was right, I was feeling better and I have 
stuck with it but I have had to apply a lot of the techniques to that in itself, so, erm..
You have used it for something other than...
Use it specifically as a goal, we were asked to set a goal and that was mine and I'm on my way to 
achieving it.
Study about use after finish. It does sound as if you are still using what you learned than now?
276
Major Research Project
Well, personally, yes. I think it depends on what stage the person is when they go into the group. They 
could go into it.. .there were a couple of people in my group who were in the midst of depression and I 
had been out of it for a long time. So I think it depends what stage you are at and how determined you 
are to change yourself. But I was at.. I wasn’t even sure I was going to do it because I had done the 
anxiety management courses and I had a community nurse at the time, who has now gone, because I 
don’t need her anymore, so to speak. She said about it but I said " oh no not another course" but i'm so 
glad that I did it because... I never really kindof, I didn’t really know what to exp4ecet in regards to...
I know you can do it to change things if you are anxious and stressed but I never knew you could apply 
it to stop depression occurring again so I'm quite pleased that I did it, I'm really pleased I did it. I am 
using it myself because I am quite determined I want to change my habit of patterns, but I don’t know 
that would apply to eveiyone.
Very specifically now, if you think of ways you specifically use it. You have mentioned smoking and 
also mentioned preventing, heading off depression. Can you say how you might do that on a daily basis 
or think of a recent example?
Several things. Firstly, I try and plan my time because now that I am working again - 1 work part time - 
and the rest, evenings and weekends tended to be my, the times when I would feel down, so I make 
sure now that I’m, for example in the winter especially because it gets dark a bit early so any time 
between three till six, I hate that period now in the winter when it gets dark, so I make sure now that I 
am busy at that time or at least I am still out if I have finished work and I don’t come home or I go to 
my sister's or something, so I am specifically am aware of that, whereas in past winters I am sure that it 
has contributed to me being down even though I have been aware of it because I have not really done 
anything about it.
How did the therapy help with that awareness . Was it something about understanding how depression 
works or did you specifically bring that issue up?
No, I didn’t bring the issue up. But part of the course was at the beginning was to talk about what 
depression was to people and what caused it, so it would have been something which I mentioned then. 
So it is making myself more aware really, of the different things that make me down and that’s one of 
them. So I thought well I can do something about that physically rathe4r than mentally by being out of 
the house and not sitting here in the dark and blah, blah ,blah and erm.. .and planning my time: we were 
given some blank timetable sheets with the days of the week and one of the jobs, part of the homework 
was to fill it in for that week and, although I don’t use it regularly, I know that my bad times are 
evenings and weekends so I try to make sure I am busy I am not in al day, getting out of the house is 
important. That’s another thing. I also keep my notes to hand of all the different thinking errors...
Can you give me an example when you... you keep your notes to hand, so you write things down... ?
I don’t write things down but I refer to the notes, so if I've got a particular worry...
Notes you were given on the course, and those notes refer to the thinking errors that might make you 
depressed, like all or nothing thinking, when you think this is the worst thing that might possibly 
happen?
Exactly, yeah.
So you might physically get them out and look at them?
Oh yes I do, I get them out and look at them...
Would you do that in public or at home? Do you actually carry them around with you?
I tend to keep them indoors because I find that... I have always found it difficult to relax indoors, 
possibly because I have never had my own place. This is the first time I've had my own place, I've 
always lodged everywhere so I have never felt very happy with where I have lived. I have been here 
now four years and it is gradually coming, but I still have a problem with evenings and weekends. And 
so, an example might be that... I tend to feel more anxious of an evening... so say after six when I have 
had my dinner its like "what am I going to do now" , I might start to feel a bit down. That’s when my
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mind starts racing and I start thinking may be of negative things or.. .you know, I've just had dinner so 
" maybe I shouldn’t have eaten that" or "Am I going to get fatter?”. Because I am on my own I get into 
a negative cycle of thinking and that’s when I have to stop myself because I am aware of it now and I 
look at my notes, I pull them out and I think "Is that really true what I am thinking?" or "what can I do 
to make myself feel better?" And I know now that I have to kindof do something physically to switch 
off. For example, I might get involved with a film on tele, whereas normally it would just be on in the 
background, or, I have got a bike, so I could go out on my bike, or, I'd groom the cat, or something like 
that. So, yeah, I would pull them out.
So it's something very helpful for you to have at home?
Oh yeah, definitely.
Have you ever carried it around and used it, say, when you have been a waitress and somebody has said 
something nasty to you and you have got upset...?
No, because I have to think quickly on my feet at work, but I am still aware of it. So if I'm..., for 
example, as a waitress and especially at the moment its extremely busy and I know from the past that I 
have let the stress of work carry me along and I have not dealt with it, whereas now at work, even 
though I am only doing part-time hours it is quite a stressful job sometimes and so if I can take a step 
back and say to myself, "Its not going to make it any easier to be stressed to do this job so I might as 
well destress myself and remove myself from situations. If I wanted to go off and have a break they 
would let me because they are aware of the depression I have had, so they are very good. So... whereas 
in the past I wouldn’t have addressed that I would have just carried on. I wouldn’t take my notes 
necessarily but it is still in the back of my mind. Also I make notes at home, I carry a notebook and I 
tend to write things down.
What sort of things might you write down. When might you use it?
At the moment, my thoughts have been taken over by giving up smoking. So I ma focussed on one 
thing and I am writing a lot f  notes about that. But I suppose in a way you could say that that in itself is 
an example because if I looked at it very negatively that could make me feel more down, in fact in the 
last couple of months I did have one particular week when I was feeling down and I didn’t know 
whether it was the fact that I, the distress of giving up smoking or what it was and I thought it was 
probably a combination of things. But I find that.. .if I write notes about giving up smoking or positive 
things and things that I..., if I start to think negatively, I'll switch off and start to feel something good 
about it, then that helps. And I'll write down how I have been feeling in weeks when I am having a bad 
week, write down how I have been feeling when I am having a good week or a good day so I can refer 
back to it, which is something I actually did when I was in the midst of depression. It was something I 
was told to do...
Who told you to do that?
When I was in hospital... well, not told me. They said it was a good idea to do when I got out to keep a 
record of how I felt and I did and I have still got my diary...
So that was something you actually learned outside your six-week course, that’s something you have 
been doing for a while?
At the time I did it, because when I had my breakdown, that was at the end of 1998, so that was nearly 
three years ago; for a time I did it because I wasn’t actually living here I was living with my Mum and 
when I moved back here it was quite scary and I did carry it on for a while, but, you kindof don’t after 
a while, but I find writing things down helpful, so from time to time I will.
I just want to get this straight. Is this something which you carried into the course, you already had that 
strategy as a way that can be helpful for you, so it wasn’t specifically the cognitive therapy
No
But did the course reinforce that as being useful?
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Definitely, the course definitely reinforces... erm, it reinforces the use of techniques and stuff. It's not 
something you can just read and then take it home and forget about. If you really want to stop yourself 
getting depressed again I think you really have to use what they give you. You have a choice, do you 
know what I mean. Its like, erm, again like giving up smoking, eveiy time I see an advert on tele 
they're pushing it, pushing it, pushing it and that's great because its reinforcement and sometimes you 
can get a bit complacent and think I cant be bothered to try that anymore, I just want to sit here and 
have a cigarette and a drink and forget al about it, but you have to keep.. .it's hard work.
How often do you use what you learned in cognitive therapy?
On a daily basis.
There is research in how they use these things. It suggests people don’t always use these things and tat 
is normal. For you are there particular times, situations, moods, when you are with certain people, 
when you think you should use the skills but cant use?
Erm...
I suppose you talked about this when you are a waitress and you have to think on your feet... ?
Yeah.. .times when you are busy like that at work, I wouldn’t have time to get out my notes and think 
what does this situation apply to, so I try and do the best I can at the time. But it is something I often 
think about when I finish my shift. I might be sitting on the bus on the way home and think, well this 
happened today at work. I try not to make it a constant thing with everything because it is hard work 
and its mentally draining, but if there is something specifically that is on my mind, then that is the time 
I feel I have to think about it, if something is playing on my mind. But I don’t apply it to every single 
thing, because you just couldn’t. You know at work it is difficult. When I am out with friends 
especially if I have had a few drinks then I don’t always need to be using it, but its not something that’s 
on my mind, that I need to address, then I can relax a bit. Sometimes if I am here on my own of an 
evening and I am feeling particularly relaxed I will just switch off from everything and do what ever I 
want, eat what I want, do what I want, erm, and don’t worry about it. But no, I just think its something 
now that I am going to keep using until I get where I want to get.
Are there are times when you think you should use them and don’t. Are there times when you think it 
would have been useful? You don’t have to say yes or no, there’s no right or wrong answer?
I think sometimes I still - obviously it takes some time to change your habits - and I think I still 
sometimes think in a way that is not doing me very well.. .1 am trying to think. I can't think of a 
specific example.
It might be an example; two things perhaps. You might be dwelling on something that if you had 
applied the techniques you would be able to dismiss; or perhaps you have applied the techniques, 
thought about the evidence for and against it and you have decided that this belief you have doesn’t 
really hold water but it doesn’t really shift. Those are the two things that might happen, that I can think 
of but there might be other things for you?
Erm.. .1 can only really use the example for the moment of giving up smoking, because that’s my 
main.. .you know there have been times when I know in my mind I am thinking, I am focussed and 
everything and there might come a time, I don’t know any situation, where for example somebody is 
smoking around me or something and it suddenly makes me think about and I think, "maybe, I'll just 
have one." In the last two months there have been two occasions where I have had a couple of puffs, 
two cigarettes. At those times, its kindof like, "Yes, I know all the reasoning" and "NO, I know I 
shouldn’t have one, its not going to do me any good but sod it I'm going to have one anyway."
And kindof everything just goes out the window? There's that as an example. And afterwards you start 
really thinking about it again and you think, "Oh no, I shouldn’t have done that." But sometimes...
Sometimes, yeah?
It's an impulse, you just do it.
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2: What was the other thing you said about?
That maybe you have used the techniques, but maybe I still hold the belief, but sometimes I still feel 
down about something. There's no right or wrong answer to this.?
Yeah, I know where you are coming from and there probably is, but I just can’t think of an example, 
but that does happen, I'm sure it does happen.
Why do you continue to use what you learned in cognitive therapy?
Because specifically, I don’t want to get depressed again. I don’t want to go back to... I don’t want to 
go back to, I don’t want to hold my habits, physically and mentally that lead me to get depressed in the 
first place. And I want to make myself a better person for me and I don’t feel that I have really done 
that in my adult lifetime, I really don’t. I have been successful in jobs and different things. I've had god 
full-time jobs, I've a good education, I've got a good family, al loving family, I've really got everything 
I want but I have just not been happy. I have struggled in relationships, hence why I am on my own at 
the moment and there are so many things I could apply the use of cognitive therapy to; for example, 
relationships is one big issue, because I find that, you know, if I meet someone and I really like them I 
would sit by the phone waiting for it to ring and that’s when you think yourself into a bit of a "Oh they 
don’t like me, it must be me, blah, blah, blah," But no, I would apply the therapy to that as well. There 
are so many...
You are using it because it is feeling that it has been effective?
Oh definitely, it does work, but it is hard work because... it is, I think, changing the habits of a lifetime. 
The way you think becomes a habit. I just think if I carry on like that, there is a good chance I could get 
depressed again. So I have changed everything. I have changed, the hours I work at the moment. I am 
on a special work scheme, so I only do a certain amount of hours and I still receive some benefits and 
there is a future for me at the hotel I'm at, I'm hoping to go into the conference side of things. I am 
doing the waitressing because I want to build my confidence up. Erm...so I have changed the sort of 
job I am going to do; the people I mix with; basically everything, a lot of things. But still I know its 
going to be an ongoing process, there's not going to be one particular end result, its going to be 
something gradually that I can see is changing already using those techniques.
Since the course has ended have you always used the techniques in the same way?
I don't think it has followed any particular pattern, but definitely the notes we were given on the 
thought processes and the thinking errors and that kind of thing is something that I have used day-to- 
day, not necessarily getting them out but in my mind. Occasionally I might use the week planner or the 
day planner if I think that I'm not going to be particularly busy - but at the moment I am - so there is no 
particular pattern, but there is nothing I think that I have particularly changed.
So you have used them in the same way because it feels right is fairly effective and appropriate?
Yeah, I can see how it applies to me.
Do you ever find yourself not using those skills and are there ways you prompt yourself to use them, or 
does this all take place in your head?
Yeah, for example, I had a week recently, three weeks ago when I had a particularly down week, as I 
said to you. It was kindof, that was the week I ended up having a puff of a couple of cigarettes and by 
the Friday I didn’t know if it was that. I thought if it was that [not smoking] that was really getting me 
down then I ought to do that, not to prove to myself that I don’t need it, but what is all the fuss about. 
And also the weather had changed or the clocks had changed and it had got particularly dark and it was 
miserable - 1 don’t mind it like today but it when it is raining and grey - but I started questioning - 
because I love my job, I really love my job - and I had started questioning that week whether I liked my 
job at all. It was bothering me that I was questioning it because I thought had not felt like that at all. 
Then I thought to myself, by the weekend by Friday night I really had to use the techniques to think to
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myself, well, you know "it could be a combination of things and I'm not going to judge about my job 
until I feel a bit better and I'm not going to.. .1 know that going back to smoking is not going to make 
me feel any better and I know that I cant change the weather but I can do something about what I do." 
So I kindof had to really work hard that weekend to think about all these things.
So it might have been that during that week you had been applying the techniques but it hadn't been 
having the effect and you were getting more and more questioning about your life and then you 
recognised I really have to work on this?
Yes, because by the Friday. I don't recognise when I am feeling down or getting depressed and life 
kindof you know when you are busy it carries you away and sometimes you still don’t recognise 
exactly what it is, it just creeps up on you and by the Friday I felt particularly tearful, I was crying all 
day and I haven't had that for a long time. It was bothering me. But I thought, "No, I've got to get 
myself out of this" and I knew I could do it and erm, so I did start the techniques, so on the job front I 
Thought, well, I wasn't going to worry about it until I went in on my next shift, which wasn’t until the 
following Tuesday and then see if I felt better and see if it was all back to normal, which it was. I felt 
absolutely fine and I'm still loving it. So I thought to myself obviously it was worth thinking positively 
about it because I could have sat there and dwelled on it all weekend and thought I don’t know if I'm 
want to go in next week. I thought, No, I'm going to switch off and worry about it when next week 
comes, I'll do it then and everything's been fine. The same with feeling down. All of a sudden having 
had a couple of puffs of a cigarette, decided that that wasn’t just the issue, it was a combination of 
things, I thought I'm not going back to that and I just picked myself up and by the Monday I felt back 
to normal.
It almost seems as though you were using it, you were very tearful and that acted as a cue for you that 
you have got to work very hard?
Yes, definitely. I could of... um, it is hard when you are in a situation to use the techniques all the time. 
You know, when you are really, I think when you are feeling down it is hard to use them and by Friday 
that week I was. But then, I thought I have really got to get myself out of it, whereas during the week it 
kindof built up and I hadn't really...
It had been harder to use them?
I just think it was the first time I had felt pretty awful in a long time and I thought I don’t want to go 
down that road, so what can I do to change it. Whereas sometimes its harder, its hard work to use them 
when you are feeling down but that is probably the time when I think you need them most. But day-to- 
day when I am feeling OK, its still hard work but you can do it more easily.
Apart from what you learned in that six-week course does anything or anybody else help you tackle 
depression?
As I mentioned my, I do a lot of exercise and I try to eat healthy. I must admit I have gone on to the 
chocolate now - one addiction for another - but I try to eat healthier and I know that does play a part: if 
you can try and do.. .1 haven't got a car but I've got a mountainbike and I bike or walk everywhere so I 
am quite used to it, I do it everyday. I know that helps me and relaxation techniques, which I did learn 
on the course, and I have got personal headphones so I can cut off all the noise and I listen to relaxing 
music, and I do all the bodily relaxation techniques - 1 do yoga. My family are brilliant. My Mum has 
had depression herself, so she understands and they are always there for me if I want to talk. Just 
knowing that Beechcroft is there is wonderful because although, I have only just recently, kindof 
decided I have had a community nurse for three years and I can do it on my own. Now I have got the 
techniques to do it on my own, but the course really brought them out. But Beechcroft is there, if ever I 
want to go in there, or there is any problem I have, but I haven't got that regular one-to-one contact, but 
I'm quite pleased about that because I want to do things on my own now. There are a lot of things. My 
friends help me. Obviously having a pet helps because she is quite de-stressing when she is quite; erm, 
lots of things.
Does having a job help?
Yes
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Was that something you had anyway?
No. I had a full-time job before I ended up having a breakdown and it was a fairly stressful job. I 
worked in a call centre and I did shift-work. I actually had a lot of problems at work, because I had a 
lot of time off sick and not coping, but I never addressed any of my problems then and I got disciplined 
and it just snowballed. But I was out of work from then -m December 98 - until June of this year, when 
I started this job. I actually went on a job search course, which is offered by a local charity called 
ESRA, and they basically, it is for people who have been through depression and, it is a free course and 
they go through your options etc. and it was a really good course. I did that in October last year and I 
didn’t feel ready to start work straightaway. There is no pressure to start. I have done a bit of voluntary 
work because I wanted to do something over the last couple of years. There is an elderly lady I help 
out, things, and I do a bit of babysitting but not a proper job. Since I have started work, it has just been 
wonderful. I am so glad I did it, but getting started was the hardest thing after being depressed it really 
was.
Did you start the job before you did the cognitive therapy course?
Yes.
So it was something you put into train yourself?
Yes. Again I think for people who haven’t, there's people on the course that are at a similar stage I was 
at last year when I started my job search course in October. There were people on the course that were 
at that stage and they were really worried about even thinking about going back to work and I think the 
techniques could help that, because again if you think positively and you think you can do it and you 
do it properly and you don’t just go rushing straight back in and you think about then it can work. It 
worked for me and I’m so glad I'm working now. I know I couldn’t cope with full-time work still 
because I have had weeks and at the moment we are busy and I am doing an extra day and I’m finding 
that quite tough, but I want to do it because I have only got two more weeks of working an extra day 
and then we are back to normal in January. So, I know I would still find it tough to be doing full-time 
work, but at least I am working and I am happy and I have got routine in my life again, which is good.
If you had to rate things on a scale, could you say what techniques you use and how you would rate 
them?
Can I just get my notes out, because there are so many things we did [gets notes and looks at them]. I 
have got a sheet on all the, the notes on all the rational thinking and how it plays an important role in 
depression, so thinking errors and "shoulds" and "musts" and all that kind of thing.
How much do you, what would rate in turn of actually challenging thinking errors, how useful?
Oh, 10 out of 10. Definitely. Definitely one of the biggest things for me. Also writing down, for 
example, this sheet was the situation, how you felt, the automatic thoughts and the thinking error. So 
using an example, we had to write down week to week the situation you were in. I don’t trend to do 
that so much now, because, erm, I kindof can do it in my head, but nevertheless I still read through 
some of the previous examples I had... so, personally, it doesn’t help me so much, so 8 out of 10. But 
it's still usefUl. And then the diary keeping, the activities for the week. When I need it, it is great, seven, 
eight out of ten but I don’t use it on a daily basis because pretty much my weeks are planned out and I 
like my routine, but I think it could be for people who haven't got a job or...
But for you, in your situation?
Yeah, seven. I often do refer to other people. I must start saying how \I feel. I'm always like that. 
Basically, they were the main things we used on the course. So mainly, it was the thinking errors and 
that kind of thing, which were the most useful for me.
Can I ask about beliefs about depression? If someone told you they were depressed what would that 
mean to you?
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Um.. .well, I mean, I don’t know because to different people it means different things. It depends on 
how well I knew the person. If my Mum told me she was depressed, I would know that she probably 
needed some help and would need medication or something, whereas to a friend at work, who I didn’t 
know particularly well, they could just be having a down week or a down day and I don’t know how 
depressed they are because I don’t know how they do it.
This is a long way of asking what does depression mean to you, for you?
Well, depression for me is kindof a pretty serious illness. It affects me as a person, how I relate to other 
people and affects my life day to day, so, for me, it's pretty awful thing to have. But I know what real 
depression is and I don’t think a lot of people, who haven't had it, do, and that’s where the problem lies. 
But I know what depression is, but it means different things to different people.
A very serious problem?
It is very serious.
What did it mean at its most serious?
Well, you can have depression in different forms, but for me, when I was at my worst depressed, I was 
suicidal and I felt like nobody understood and it’s a very lonely feeling, because its so horrible. You 
feel so down that you can't describe it. Its not just like feeling fed up or feeling tearful. When I was at 
my worst, I couldn't do anything for myself. All I could do was curl up in a ball and hope it would go 
away, which it obviously didn’t and I ended up in hospital. But I don’t think I would have survived it, I 
think I probably would have committed suicide if I hadn't been taken into hospital because I felt so 
awful. And I didn’t feel it was something I was in control of, it was something I had to do. So it is 
something which, if it gets to its worst, really is out of control, you are out of control.
One of the questions I was going to ask you was how much you think you can actually control 
depression?
When you are at your utmost worst depressed, I think you need someone else to take over for a while. 
So I think that when people need to be3 hospitalised. So I think if I didn’t have my family, if my Mum 
hadn't taken me in the day she had, I don’t know what would have happened. So if you are lucky 
enough to have that support, support is important, but if you haven't got it, I don’t know. I think when 
you are at your worst you need someone to take over.
And as you move through that, beyond that?
As you start to get better. I mean once I had been in hospital for 10 days I started to feel a bit better. It 
was the fact that I had no responsibilities so I was just being fed at certain times, I was just being given 
medication at certain times, I didn’t have to think about any responsibilities. I think if I didn’t have 
that, those responsibilities taken away from me I don’t think I would have got through it.
The stage you are at, how much do you feel you can control depression?
Well, because for me personally I know that I am still on medication and that plays a part, but that's not 
everything. I am hoping that at some point in the future I can reduce it or come off it, but that's not 
something that, I would take lightly and I know I have to make a lot of changes before I think about 
that. So, to me, now I know what it's like to be seriously depressed...um...
It sounds to me you are trying to exercise control, as if you feel it is controllable.
I am aware that it could come back, I am not kindof thinking I am immune to it now. But I have to be 
in control all the time. I think I am quite vulnerable still and I think unless I am in control of aspects of 
my life, like work and keeping my flat in order and paying my bills and all sorts of things, I have to be 
in control. But it is the only way I can cope with it, but in the past, um, I haven't had that control and 
when its gone out of control then things went wrong. So I think its important to have it under control 
and that means for me keeping on my medication and using cognitive therapy, for me they are the two 
things...
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Although you don’t think you are immune to depression, I get the impression that you do feel if you do 
the right things it is controllable?
Yes. Oh definitely, it is controllable.
What’s your impression, whether depression is a short-term thing or a long-term thing?
Oh, it's both. I think depression is such a wide-scoped thing that someone who’s never had it before 
might have serious depression for a month and then they might never get it again. I think it depends a 
lot of the person, their chemical make-up, circumstances of their lives and er, a lot of things, but I think 
it could be both.
For you does it feel long-term?
Long-term.
Has your view of depression changed over time?
Yes. I first had depression when I was sixteen. I was doing my exams then, my O levels. I was pretty 
bad then, but not as bad as this time, so I was on medication. So I have been on medication on and off 
nearly all of my life. And, to me, my view of tackling it in the past was take my medication, sign 
myself off work, so I'm not working, you know, de-stress myself that way and then go back to work 
and everything will be fine. I've done that over the years and, of course, I would be in work one year, 
two years, and then I would get depressed again. So over the years.. .you know it has really radically 
changed for me in the last two years, since I had my breakdown. Its probably the best thing that could 
have happened to me, because it really led me to think what led me to get like that in the first place so 
my view of depression now has changed. Depression is not something you can control by taking a 
couple of months off work and hoping it will go away or going on holiday and you will come back de­
stressed. It's something you have got to work on. And a lot of it is the way you think and you have got 
to work on it over a period of time and that’s something I've discovered since I had my breakdown, 
whereas before its was "Okay, I'll take some time out."
So for you its not just a matter of trying to avoid the issue and hope it will go away, it’s actually about 
confronting the problem and using some skills...
Yeah, confronting the problem. Yeah, but you can only do it if you really want to. I mean obviously 
you have got to be determined that you don’t want to get like that again and you want to do things 
properly and that’s what I am, personally.
Before you started therapy, did you make other attempts to tackle depression since you were 16?
Only since I've had my breakdown and before the course, so we are talking of a period of a couple of 
years, because the course was only recently. You know, I took up doing more exercise, thinking that 
would help. What prompted me to do that was one of the things I was offered when I came out of 
hospital was a badminton class which was a free evening and it was something that was offered 
through the service. That really helped because the times I went I felt so good and it prompted me to 
carry on, so there was that, and in the process I lost six stone, because I was 18 stone. So in the last two 
years I have lost six stone. So the exercise was one. Getting a bit of routine into my life with a bit of 
voluntary work; spending more time with my family, quality time with my sisters and their children, so 
keeping myself busy that way; but since the course, is really when I have applied the other techniques.
Did you think those things you were talking about were successful?
Yes
But still went on the course, why?
Because I felt as though... one thing is, I am always open to suggestions and my community nurse 
thought it would do me some good and I was only hesitant because I had been on a similar one for the
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anxiety and I thought it would be the same thing. But nevertheless, it proved me wrong, in the way that 
dealing with depression you can apply the techniques and, um, so ...sorry I forgot the question.
I was wondering why you went on the course if you felt other things were helpful?
I just felt I needed to...I don’t know it suddenly built up in me and I just thought I really needed to 
change my way of thinking. It was just something that gradually built up in me and I felt that if this 
was the course that was going to do it, then I would try it. Maybe it might just be the boost that I 
needed because once you have been doing other things for a long time you get a bit complacent about 
it. I got used to cycling everywhere, and I was thinking what can I do next, so I really felt that needed 
changing, so that’s why I went on it.
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